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Abstract 
This thesis investigates everyday encounters between benefit recipients and street-
level welfare agencies in an era of behavioural conditionality, marketised 
‘activation’, and neoliberal paternalism. Central to this thesis is a concern with the 
relational dynamics that policies of ‘behavioural conditionality’ and ‘mandatory 
activation’ produce, explored through reflexive analysis of the researcher’s own 
experiences as a street-level activation worker, and thirty in-depth interviews with 
former colleagues, other street-level staff, and benefit recipients. Informed by 
relational and psychosocial theorisations of both the subject and street-level 
welfare organisations, the thesis looks at the interactions between 
symbolic/ideological representation, individual agency, and street-level 
organisation. Arguing that attention to the dynamic, libidinal investments of 
street-level employees casts familiar street-level practices in a new light, the thesis 
draws attention to a dynamic of illusio-disillusionment (Bourdieu, 2000) among 
street-level staff, re-rendering familiar practices of ‘creaming and parking’ in terms 
of punishment and protection. Similarly, it is argued that specific instances of 
support, indifference, and/or sanction do not exist as discrete experiences in the 
life of claimants, but as ongoing possibilities, producing a situation of ever-present 
surveillance and threat. In this way, conditional activation services come to 
resemble a protection racket, in which both the threat and means of defence are 
produced simultaneously. These dynamic materialisations of behavioural 
conditionality are situated with respect to the ideology of neoliberal paternalism, 
which at street-level takes the form of magical voluntarism, and the enforcement 
of an anti-sociological imaginary which, it is argued, results in the denial and 
effective privatisation of the troubles, difficulties, and needs that bring people to 
welfare services in the first place. 
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‘But I’m not guilty,’ said K., ‘it’s a mistake. How can a person be guilty 
anyway? We’re all human, every single one of us.’ ‘That is correct,’ said 
the priest, ‘but that’s the way guilty people talk.’  
Franz Kafka, The Trial  
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Chapter One – Introduction  
In welfare, for too long, the right had let social division and chronic 
unemployment grow; the left argued for rights but were weak on 
responsibilities. We believe passionately in giving people the chance to 
get off benefit and into work […] But with the chance, comes a 
responsibility on the individual - to take the chance, to make something 
of their lives and use their ability and potential to the full […]An active 
welfare state which brings together benefit offices and job centres so 
that instead of simply dishing out cash, personal advisers provide 
everybody coming through the door with advice and support to help 
them into work or at least get them closer to the labour market. This is a 
welfare state which reflects all our responsibilities: the responsibility we 
have to engage actively with the jobless to provide them with 
opportunities; their responsibility to engage actively with us and take 
those opportunities (Tony Blair, 2002). 
Compassion isn’t measured out in benefit cheques – it’s in the chances 
you give people - the chance to get a job, to get on, to get that sense of 
achievement that only comes from doing a hard day’s work for a proper 
day’s pay. That’s what our reforms are all about. Transforming lives. 
Helping people walk taller. Attacking the complacent, patronising view 
that said all millions of working-age people were good for was 
receiving from the state. And saying: no – self-reliance is in everyone. 
Industry is in everyone. Aspiration is in everyone. No-one is a write-off. 
That’s why getting people into jobs is central to our vision for making 
this country stronger and we need to keep building a system that 
delivers this vision (David Cameron, 2012). 
Trawling for outcomes 
It’s high summer and there’s very little shade on Depot Lane. Though only a 
twenty-minute walk from the office and a short distance from the amble and 
clatter of the high street, it feels as though I have crossed a boundary. There are no 
other pedestrians making this particular route, which twists back over the railway 
line and leads to a patch of messy ground set between trunk road, train tracks, and 
the elevated dual carriageway which hums overhead.  Shop fronts, offices, and the 
busy mingle of bus stops have all gradually petered out, giving way to a quiet 
road of pot-holed tarmac and the grey-green painted steel of warehouse buildings 
and industrial units. As I walk around the swing barrier a security guard in his 
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cabin nods me through. Proceeding past the bus depot toward the thrust of 
buildings, hard and sharp in the sunlight, I don’t really know where I am going, 
nor can I picture the face of the person I am looking for.  
Nine months before, in the winter, I had applied for a job. The advert had said: 
Advisors are the heart of [Activation Works] and make up the majority 
of the workforce. An advisor’s role is simple: to get as many people into 
suitable, lasting work as possible. Exactly how this goal is achieved 
depends largely on the skills and initiative of each individual person; 
there is no such thing as a ‘typical’ advisor. 
That morning I had been instructed to use my initiative. It was nearing the end of 
July and having fallen very far behind my target of job outcomes it was by now 
too late to find any ‘suitable, lasting work’ for my clients in time for the monthly 
target deadline. Instead, it was strongly suggested that I trawl through my 
caseload and search for potential outcomes which may have gone unnoticed. This 
meant identifying people who might recently have gone into work without telling 
me.  
I spent the morning conducting a telephone tour of schools across the sprawling 
breadth of the borough. One of my regular clients, Zenab, had mysteriously 
stopped answering my calls. In her thirties, with two school-age children, Zenab 
was one of my more reliable clients and, I thought, someone who genuinely 
valued coming along to my appointments. Near the top of my ‘job-ready’ list, I 
mentioned her name regularly in supervision, each time assuring my line manager 
that soon, next month, she would be an outcome.  
An ESA claimant, Zenab had some form of osteoporosis –a condition I only dimly 
understood, if at all – but nevertheless had been making applications to work as a 
teaching assistant in local schools. She was under no obligation to do so, and, quiet 
and softly spoken during her appointments, I sometimes felt the need to check 
whether she actually wanted to get a job. A couple of weeks before she had been 
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offered an interview (she didn’t tell me which school; I hadn’t asked). On hearing 
this news, and recognising the name, my line manager became visibly excited: she 
would do a mock interview with Zenab herself –we would work together to give 
her the best possible chance of getting the job.  
The day of the mock interview I had been sick. Returning to work I was told that it 
had gone well and that they’d had a very positive, motivational conversation. 
Zenab, my manager told me, was a little under confident, but otherwise came 
across very well: make sure that you are really supporting her, really encouraging her. 
She should be in work; it would make all the difference.  
The day of the job interview I called Zenab; unable to get through, I waited to hear 
from her. She didn’t return my call. Nor did she answer when, the next day, I 
called again. And so this morning, in search of an outcome, my manager checked 
with the DWP and found that Zenab was no longer claiming benefits: there was a 
possibility that she had got the job. With a phone and an online directory I worked 
my way around the local schools, asking if in September they were to have a new 
teaching assistant starting called Zenab. Having no luck, after some thought my 
line manager handed me her mobile phone: here, call her from this; she won’t 
recognise the number…  
Later that day I am wandering between industrial units looking, not for Zenab, but 
for Jason, who is also ignoring my calls. I have only met Jason on a couple of 
occasions, and at each meeting he has told me that there is very little point paying 
him much attention – he is going to come off benefits very soon, and a friend of his 
with a workshop on Depot Lane is going to give him some work. On these 
occasions I have asked him to let me know when this happens; perhaps I will be 
able to help him with Working Tax Credits, buy him some work tools, new 
clothes, or give him supermarket vouchers. As I make my way around the 
industrial site I am rehearsing what I might say if I do find him here, the different 
Introduction   5 
offers I might make, whatever will persuade him to do the necessary paperwork 
so that I can add my outcome to the job board.  
There are very few people here; most of the units appear to have shut up shop for 
the day. Finding one unit with the roller doors raised, I walk in. No, sorry, no Jason 
here. Turning back toward the office I feel despondent, bemused, slightly 
ridiculous. After making my way past the security cabin and around the barrier I 
sit down on a wall overlooking the railway line, and try to conjure up a notion of 
what I have been doing with my day.  My thoughts, clearer than doubts, haven’t 
quite formed into questions. I wonder what has happened to Zenab, and why she 
doesn’t want to answer my calls. I might have an idea. Earlier that day when I 
called her from an unknown number she had answered, putting the phone down 
as soon as she heard my voice. I try not to have the thought, but it’s there in the 
back of my mind: has she stopped claiming because she has a job, or just to avoid 
us, to avoid me? There’s no way of knowing unless I speak to her, but the last 
thing I want to do is call her again – although tomorrow I will no doubt have to do 
exactly that. 
Beginnings 
This thesis has a number of different beginnings, and one of them is here, on 
Depot Lane, feeling despondent and disillusioned with my job as a street-level 
employment advisor.  This was a role I performed for nine months, between 
December 2008 and September 2009.  At that time I was almost entirely ignorant of 
the wider political and policy context in which the role was situated; I was 
unaware of the recent developments in welfare and social security policy, of the 
trend toward increasing conditionality in the benefits system, and of the 
‘activation’ of benefit recipients. However, in doing this job I began to wonder 
about its guiding rationale, the framework behind it, and to question what relation 
these bore, if any, to my day-to-day experiences. When in 2013 I saw an 
advertisement for an ESRC studentship addressing ‘activation’ and ‘behavioural 
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conditionality’ as they were practiced, looking for an ethnographic account of the 
experiences of advisors and claimants,  in the sorts of organisation for which I had 
worked, I applied.  
This thesis also has another beginning, which lies with these policy developments 
themselves. Over approximately three decades, under successive governments, 
there has been an increasing emphasis on making receipt of various benefits 
conditional upon some form of activity aimed at work and the labour market. In 
speeches and political rhetoric these changes have been described in terms of 
offering people ‘opportunities’ or, as David Cameron put it, ‘the chance to get on’. 
These changes have also been described in terms of balancing rights with 
responsibilities, accompanied by an insistence on the ‘duty’ of benefit recipients to 
‘engage’ with the ‘help’ they are offered. These are euphemistic formulations for 
the extension of sanctions  – penalties of benefit withdrawal for those deemed 
incompliant, or seen in some way to be refusing the ‘opportunities’ and ‘help’ they 
have been offered.  
If, at first, it seems difficult to connect this rhetoric with my description of 
searching for outcomes, then this incongruity might also be a useful way of 
situating the main aim of this thesis. What, it asks, do policies of activation and 
conditionality mean in practice? What do they look like to the low-level – ‘street-
level’ – employees tasked with carrying them out, and to the people – the 
‘claimants’ – who are their targets? In studying the street-level spaces where 
policies of conditionality and activation are made and materialised in practice, this 
thesis aims to provide a fine-grained and nuanced account of everyday 
experiences which might otherwise remain hidden under the rhetorical cover of 
‘help’, ‘opportunity’, ‘rights’ or ‘responsibilities’.  
Although divorced from the more elevated (some would say obfuscatory) political 
rhetoric accompanying these policies, my tale of searching for outcomes 
nonetheless introduces several important themes which wind their way through 
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this thesis, the first of which is the very sense of such a disconnect itself. As this 
thesis will explore, there is often a large gap between people’s initial expectations 
and their subsequent experiences of street-level activation work. This tale also 
introduces the theme of street-level relations, and their complex and sometimes 
obscure and unseen dynamics. Whatever I liked to think, I nonetheless had a very 
incomplete picture, as a street-level advisor, of what my clients thought or felt 
about me, or about the conditional and mandatory requirements of their 
‘activation’. In addition to interviewing former colleagues and other street-level 
advisors, this thesis also looks at the different experiences that claimants have of 
street-level activation services. A third important theme is the overwhelming 
importance of ‘outcomes’ and performance targets in the life of street-level 
activation. Alongside the ‘formal’ policies of conditionality and activation, there 
has also been a second track of ‘operational’ reforms which are no less important. 
These are the reforms which mean that such services are now often contracted out, 
operating within a quasi-marketised environment in which certain metrics of 
performance exercise important forms of power.  
This research brings both a street-level (Lipsky, 2010) and an ethnographic 
approach to its investigation of the policies of conditionality and activation. The 
former is a tradition of policy analysis which attends to the everyday sites and 
spaces where citizens meet face-to-face with street-level officials and low-level 
policy actors, seeing the interactions between them as important occasions where 
policy is made in practice. An ethnographic approach is particularly suited to such 
a form of analysis; attentive to the texture and detail of everyday life, it seeks to 
understand the meaning of local practices as they are situated within a broader 
contextual fabric of social relations and interactions.  In this research I have made 
(auto) ethnographic use of my own experiences alongside data drawn from semi-
structured interviews with benefit claimants, former colleagues, and other street-
level activation workers. In so doing, the thesis assembles a variety of perspectives 
and experiences into a multi-layered and nuanced account of conditional work-
first activation-in-practice. In this way, the research approaches its object of street-
8  Chapter One 
level activation through the perspectives of both advisors and claimants, and its 
research questions reflect this approach. It asks: 
• How are street-level advisors invested in the field of activation? (What is 
the activation illusio?) 
• What conflicts do street-level advisors face? 
• How do advisors cope with street-level conflicts? 
• Are there limits to coping? How might these be understood? 
• How are activation and conditionality experienced by claimants? 
• How do claimants experience their interactions with street-level advisors? 
How do they deal with advisors? 
• What do activation and conditionality mean to advisors? 
• How do advisors process claimants? 
• What forms do the myth of altruism and the ideology of benign 
intervention take in street-level activation services? 
• How does the quasi-marketised form of street-level activation affect the 
relations and interactions between advisors and claimants? 
Outline of the thesis 
Chapter Two develops the context for this research by introducing the policies of 
conditionality and activation, outlining their recent history in British social policy 
over the last two decades. In so doing, the chapter draws attention to the 
ideological preoccupations driving and shaping these policies, looking in 
particular at the way they are organised around a construction of the ‘welfare 
recipient’ as a particular kind of problem person – as dependent, demoralised, and 
inactive. The specific policy content of ‘behavioural conditionality’ and ‘activation’ 
is thus introduced alongside a critical discussion of their guiding ideological 
framework, which is characterised in terms of  ‘neoliberal paternalism’, wherein 
the state is seen to have an important role enforcing the work ethic, and in the 
formation of moral subjects with an orientation toward work and the labour 
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market. The chapter then reviews literature addressing the question of agency as it 
relates to ‘welfare subjects’, and concludes by suggesting that there is more scope 
for investigating the dynamic lived experience of conditional activation 
programmes, focusing on the interaction between street-level practice, 
symbolic/ideological representation, and everyday agency.  
Chapter Three situates the research with respect to studies of ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’, and policy implementation. It highlights the contribution of street-
level literature in terms of asserting the importance of street-level organisations as 
places where policy is made, rather than simply implemented. This chapter argues 
that the renewed interest in street-level perspectives in research on ‘active’ welfare 
states has been driven by developments in both formal and operational policy; this 
twin track of reform redoubles the importance of street-level sites as places where 
both policy and politics are mediated. The final section of this chapter returns to 
consider some important themes from across the street-level literature; these are 
the themes of coping, client processing, and street-level identity. It is argued that 
within the broadly defined ‘street-level’ approach to policy research there are a 
variety of ways in which the street-level actor and street-level decision making 
have been conceptualised; these are sometimes implicit, under-theorised, or 
contradictory. It is argued that in this respect street-level research might benefit 
from more sociologically informed theorisations of street-level practice. 
Chapter Four introduces the conceptual framework of the thesis, which might best 
be described as psychosocial. Constructing street-level sites in terms of an 
activation field, this chapter introduces concepts which enable the research to 
explore the ways in which street-level advisors are invested in their work. This 
approach, it is argued, is particularly useful for the exploration of the dynamic 
relationship between street-level organisations, street-level advisors, and welfare 
users, especially where the interventions of the former target the behaviour, 
conduct, and affective dispositions of the latter. This conceptual framework is 
fashioned from the synthesis of Bourdieu’s theoretical oeuvre with certain 
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psychoanalytic concepts; the chapter makes use of recent theoretical work 
exploring the points of affinity between these two approaches, and argues that the 
psychoanalytic concepts of splitting, projection, and introjection provide a useful 
means of understanding the ways that an individual habitus might accommodate 
and negotiate street-level social conflict. This framework is linked back to the 
street-level literature, and is argued to provide greater analytical purchase on such 
street-level concerns as coping and investment in the advisor role. 
Chapter Five outlines the methods and methodological approach adopted by the 
research. This is ethnographic, drawing on my own experiences as a ‘complete 
member’ of the activation field alongside semi-structured interviews with street-
level advisors and benefit claimants. This chapter provides a brief account of a 
changing research design, outlining the ways in which it developed in response to 
some of the contingencies of the field. There is also a reflexive account of my 
experiences of conducting interviews, in which it argued that attention to the 
unconscious dynamics of interviewing, in terms of the expected forms that 
participants bring with them to interview, can be a useful means of analysing the 
social relations operative in a particular social space. The chapter addresses the 
ethical principles guiding the research, and concludes with an exposition of its 
analytical approach, which is described as abductive, with analysis developed 
throughout the research process in the movement back and forth between 
concepts, experience, and data.  
Chapter Six is the first of three findings chapters, and focuses on the experiences of 
street-level advisors. This chapter aims to answer the following questions: How 
are advisors invested in their role? What conflicts do they face? How do advisors 
cope with street-level conflict? Are there limits to coping and, if so, what are these? 
In particular, this chapter focuses on some of the very different experiences that 
advisors have of street-level activation, and attempts to develop a theoretical 
account which can both accommodate and explain these divergent experiences. In 
particular, this chapter makes use of the concepts of illusio and disillusionment in 
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order to explore the specific forms of expectation and investment that advisors 
brought to the role, and sees street-level conflict as being produced at the 
intersection of organisational imperatives, client situations, and advisors’ 
orientations and investments. This chapter looks at the ways in which some 
advisors attempt to make their role fit more closely with their idealised 
conceptions of it.  
Chapter Seven turns to the claimant, and looks at the different ways they interpret 
and experience the requirements of conditional work-first activation. This chapter 
aims to answer the following questions: How are activation and conditionality 
experienced by claimants? What are the subjective and relational dynamics of 
activation? What do activation and conditionality mean in practice for claimants? 
What is the role of street-level advisor, from claimants’ points of view? How do 
claimants experience their interactions with street-level advisors? This chapter 
argues that conditional work-first activation can take the form of a protection 
racket, the constituent elements of which are explored. In particular, this chapter is 
concerned with the way in which activation works at the level of feeling and 
ideological representation, and involves the activation of stigma. 
Chapter Eight is the final findings chapter. It returns to street-level advisors in 
order to understand more about the ideological practices of the activation field. In 
particular, this chapter returns to the question of how, and what it means, for 
advisors to be invested in their role (and thus, what constitutes the activation 
illusio). This chapter aims to answer the questions: How do advisors process 
clients? What does activation mean to advisors? What forms do the myth of 
altruism and the ideology of benign intervention take in the context of street-level 
activation? In contrast with Chapter Six, which set out some of the ways that 
advisors attempt to make their role fit more closely with their conceptions of it, 
this chapter addresses the way in which conceptions of the role come to frame and 
influence street-level practice. This chapter concludes by looking at some of the 
street-level conditions of punitive practice and social sadism in activation services.  
12  Chapter One 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis by drawing together its various argumentative 
strands, considered under the headings ‘street-level symptoms’, ‘obscure 
dynamics’, and ‘street-level fantasy’. In so doing, it argues that understanding the 
policies of conditionality and activation in dynamic, relational terms – rather than 
as a collection of discrete practices – draws attention to their implicit and 
sometimes obfuscated politics. 
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Chapter Two – Conditionality, activation, and the 
construction of claimants 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with street-level encounters in welfare to work services. 
This chapter begins to develop the context for such encounters by examining the 
policies of activation, conditionality, and their recent history in British social 
policy. This chapter also argues that it is important to attend to the ideological 
context of such welfare encounters, the way that they are discursively constructed, 
and how this might shape the ways they are experienced. After exploring some of 
the ideological justifications for intensified conditionality and the mandatory 
activation of benefit recipients, this chapter reviews literature on anti-welfare 
sentiment, and the stigmatisation and ‘othering’ of classed subject positions. 
Following this discussion, the chapter then turns to literature addressing the 
question of agency as it relates to ‘welfare subjects’. The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that there is more scope for investigating the dynamic lived experience 
of conditional activation programmes, specifically focusing on the interaction 
between street-level practice, symbolic/ideological representations, and the agency 
of benefit recipients.  
Conditionality and activation 
This thesis is concerned with behavioural conditionality. In the context of social 
security systems, ‘conditionality’ simply refers to the fact that entitlement to social 
benefits or assistance is not automatic, but dependent on a variety of factors such 
as personal circumstance and need. Over the past decade ‘conditionality’ has risen 
in prominence as a point of focus for social policy researchers; however, as Clasen 
and Clegg (2007) point out, ‘individual rights to social benefits have always and 
everywhere been conditional in some ways,’ making conditionality a ‘cornerstone’ 
of all welfare states (p171-172). The growing interest in this topic, especially in a 
British context, might then be attributed to the fact that recent decades have 
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witnessed the cumulative tightening of traditional conditions of eligibility (Clasen 
& Clegg, 2007; Novak, 1997), the ‘creep’ of conditionality into new welfare 
domains (Dwyer, 2004), as well as the creation and proliferation of new forms of 
‘behavioural’ conditionality, extended to cover ever wider groups of welfare users 
(including the already employed), such that Dwyer and Wright (2014) now speak 
of ‘ubiquitous conditionality’.  
Although the empirical context of this thesis is largely derived from these new, 
specifically ‘behavioural’ forms of conditionality, it is worth situating these with 
respect to traditional eligibility and entitlement criteria. Clasen and Clegg (2007) 
distinguish between three types of condition that regulate access to social benefits: 
conditions of category, conditions of circumstance, and conditions of conduct. 
Categorical conditionality describes a situation where entitlements are restricted to 
members of a defined category of support – for example, the condition that one is 
past retirement age in order to claim a state pension, or unemployed in order to 
claim unemployment benefit1. Circumstantial conditionality refers to what are 
commonly regarded as eligibility and entitlement criteria. The circumstances in 
question might be a history of contributions, as in insurance-based systems, or 
particular circumstances of need, as in means-tested systems.  Conditions of 
conduct – referred to in this thesis and elsewhere in terms of ‘behavioural 
conditionality’ – apply once the other two forms of conditionality criteria have 
been satisfied and, it is argued, serve the function of ‘regulating ongoing benefit 
receipt’ (2007, p. 174). This ongoing regulation of the welfare service user has been 
understood in a variety of ways; in terms of labour discipline and social control 
(Piven & Cloward, 1993; Wacquant, 2009), wage suppression, labour stratification 
and the (re)commodification of labour (Greer, 2016; Grover, 2012, 2003; Holden, 
2003; Peck, 2001; Wiggan, 2015); and in terms of governmentality and the 
production of subjectivity (Dean, 2002; Hartman, 2005; McDonald & Marston, 
                                               
1As Clasen and Clegg also point out (2007, p. 172), even putatively universal benefits are not 
wholly ‘unconditional’ in this categorical sense. For example, proposals for a universal basic 
income or citizen’s income usually include the categorical condition of residency or citizenship.  
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2005). This thesis explores the ongoing regulation of benefit recipients in terms of 
their agency and everyday lived experience. Later this chapter will review some of 
the key literature informing this approach. Before doing so, however, it is worth 
considering another important policy term which has become very closely 
associated with the turn toward behavioural conditionality, and which describes 
one of the most significant ways in which this form of conditionality will be 
experienced by welfare users in the UK – namely, ‘activation’. 
Activation and behavioural conditionality are, in the British context, tightly 
intertwined. In Jobcentres and welfare-to-work offices, in the day-to-day lives of 
frontline service workers and benefits recipients, it can sometimes be difficult to 
distinguish between the practices properly attributable to one policy category or 
the other. This might be understood as a result of the particular form taken by 
activation policy in the UK. The term ‘activation’ is often used as shorthand for 
active labour market policies and their associated programmes. Whilst ‘activation’ 
is sometimes used as a synonym for neoliberalism in the field of welfare, active 
labour market policies actually have their origins in 1950s Scandinavian social 
democracy. Active labour market policy is a ‘particularly ambiguous policy 
category’ (Bonoli, 2010, p. 439) encompassing a range of different policy measures. 
Bonoli (2010) offers a classification of these in terms of incentive reinforcement, 
employment assistance, occupation, and human capital investment. Broadly 
understood, active labour market policy is about the state taking an ‘active’ 
approach toward the supply of labour, rather than ‘passively’ supporting or 
insuring against social risk. The activity of the state can take a variety of forms, 
such as the provision of training and education. However, the form taken by 
active labour market policy in the UK (and the Anglophone world more generally) 
has been much more focused on reinforcing incentives – through conditionality 
and sanctions – than it has on providing education or training.  
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Policy context 
The introduction of Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) in 1996 is widely identified as a 
significant juncture in the development of behavioural conditionality and more 
‘active’ approaches to social security policy in the UK (Finn, 1996; Fletcher, 2015). 
Symbolically, in terms of nomenclature, the re-naming of Unemployment Benefit 
(UB) as Jobseekers’ Allowance, and of the unemployed as ‘job-seekers’, can be 
understood as an exercise in ‘the power of nomination’ (Bourdieu, 1985), 
signalling a shift away from an understanding of unemployment as a social risk 
that is endured (and that might require collective provisions and support), and 
onto the individual agency and personal responsibility of the unemployed to 
change their circumstances and find work (Wiggan, 2012, p. 384).  
Jobseekers’ Allowance replaced two benefits available to the unemployed: 
contributions-based Unemployment Benefit, and the non-contributory, means-
tested, Income Support (IS). The replacement of Unemployment Benefit by 
contributions-based JSA also included a reduction in the length of entitlement to 
contributions-based support from twelve to six months; after six months claimants 
would move onto means-tested, income-based JSA. Following the abolition of 
earnings-related supplements (1982), and of partial UB rates for those with 
incomplete contributions, this was a further erosion of insurance-based features of 
the British welfare state (Clasen, 2001), and a tightening of eligibility and 
entitlement criteria (Clasen & Clegg, 2007).  
The introduction of JSA also included new ‘behavioural’ conditions, along with 
increased monitoring and more expansive powers of compulsion. Building on an 
existing requirement that the unemployed attend ‘restart interviews’ (1986), and 
the (re)imposition of the ‘Actively Seeking Work Test’ (1989), the Jobseekers’ Act 
(Jobseekers Act 1995, The Jobseeker’s Allowance Regulations 1996) introduced the 
requirement to sign a Jobseeker’s Agreement, and an obligation to follow any 
‘jobseeker’s directions’ given by employment officers. In so doing, the act 
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increased the scope for employment officers to withhold or withdraw benefits 
from those deemed insufficiently active in their attempts to find work. Failure to 
follow jobseeker directions, to sign on, or turn up for an appointment meant the 
loss of entitlement to benefits; claimants would have to restart the process and 
make a new application for JSA. 
These developments were viewed at the time as a portent of greater compulsion in 
the benefits system, and as evidence of a trend toward more coercive regulation of 
the unemployed and other welfare service users (Finn, 1995; Novak, 1997). 
However, it is with the successive changes introduced under three New Labour 
governments (1997-2010) that the welfare landscape more closely begins to 
resemble the one in which the thesis fieldwork took place, with its particular 
street-level features. These changes can be summarised in terms of (i) the 
intensification of behavioural conditionality, and its extension to new groups of 
welfare users, and (ii) the much greater role given to the third and private sectors 
in the delivery of employment and welfare services. The remainder of this section 
will address the first set of developments; the turn toward contracting out and 
quasi-marketisation will be addressed in the following chapter (Chapter Three) 
which is concerned with the street-level organisation of welfare-to-work services. 
New Labour was able to introduce its various New Deal programmes relatively 
soon during its first term in office. This was largely because, in many respects, 
they were following a path already laid down by the previous Conservative 
government with the introduction  of JSA, but also through schemes such as 
Project Work and the Lone Parent Caseworker Project (Walker & Wiseman, 2003, 
p. 10). Project Work, launched alongside JSA, was a pilot involving thirteen weeks 
of compulsory supervised job search, followed by thirteen weeks of mandatory 
work experience, for those unemployed for two years or more. The Lone Parent 
Casework Project was a voluntary programme providing lone parents on Income 
Support with a named caseworker, there to provide advice and guidance on 
finding work. In the various New Deals, elements of these programmes were 
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developed and extended to ever wider groups of welfare users. Some New Deal 
programmes were, like the Lone Parent Caseworker project, initially voluntary, 
but by the end of New Labour’s time in government the principle of mandatory 
participation had been widely extended, not only to lone parents, but also to 
disabled people and those claiming incapacity benefits. 
The first New Deal programmes, introduced in 1998, were those for young people 
(18-24) and the long-term unemployed (two years or more). For both groups, the 
rules and conditions attached to JSA still applied, and participation in the New 
Deal was made mandatory. In addition, the New Deal for Lone Parents (for people 
claiming Income Support with a child over the age of five) had been running in 
pilot areas since 1997, and was rolled out nationally in 1998. Initially voluntary, 
attendance at ‘work focused interviews’ was made a mandatory requirement by 
2001. Other New Deals included those for partners, for disabled people, for the 
over-fifties, and for musicians.  
The move to greater compulsion – that is, to greater behavioural conditionality – 
gathered pace following 2000, when attendance at ‘work-focused interviews’ was 
made mandatory for lone parents and, in some pilot areas, for all new claimants. A 
mandatory programme of work focused interviews (Pathways to Work) for those 
claiming Incapacity Benefit and Income Support on the grounds of incapacity was 
piloted in 2003 -2004, and rolled out nationally in 2007-2008, with the aim and 
intention of reducing the number of people claiming incapacity benefits (Barnes & 
Sissons, 2013). In a symbolic reprise of the renaming of Unemployment Benefit, in 
2008 Incapacity Benefit and Income Support on the grounds of incapacity were 
replaced by a new benefit, Employment Support Allowance (ESA). At the same 
time a new test – the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) – was introduced to 
assess whether or not someone was entitled to ESA. On the premise that many of 
the people claiming incapacity benefits could – and ought – to be job-seeking, this 
assessment was explicitly designed to reduce the numbers of people claiming 
benefits on the basis of incapacity, and facilitate a transfer to JSA (and thus to a 
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tighter conditionality and activation regime). This assessment has generated 
considerable controversy since its introduction; what should be noted here is that 
ESA and the WCA were designed to tighten eligibility criteria, but they also 
symbolically and institutionally shifted the emphasis away from social risk and 
the claimant’s personal circumstances of entitlement, toward the normative telos of 
employment, even for those currently deemed incapable of work. In this way, the 
introduction of ESA, and the rollout of Pathways to Work, with mandatory 
attendance at six staggered work-focused interviews, signifies the extension of 
behavioural conditionality to new groups of claimants. It made activity related to 
work and employment central to the ongoing regulation of benefit claims, even in 
those cases where someone was deemed incapable of work.  
The extension of behavioural conditionality and the raft of activation programmes 
introduced under New Labour were initially designed during a period of buoyant 
labour markets and a growing economy, and it was assumed that these conditions 
would continue. However, the launch of ESA coincided with the onset of the 
credit crunch and the following recession. Rather than auguring a retreat from 
either conditionality or activation, the politics of austerity that followed in the 
wake of the crisis brought about a renewed emphasis on both, in a concerted effort 
at ideological misdirection and displacement – users of welfare services were 
presented, nor as victims of the neoliberal economic crisis, but as its culprits 
(Mirowski, 2014; Seymour, 2014; Wiggan, 2012). In 2010 the newly elected 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government outlined its proposals for 
sweeping ‘reform’ of the benefits system (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2010a, 2010b). These included the replacement of New Labour’s various New 
Deals with a single Work Programme; the introduction of a new, tougher 
sanctions regime; and the replacement of six different types of payment available 
to working age people with the single benefit, Universal Credit2. These changes 
                                               
2 The rollout of Universal Credit was originally intended to occur between 2013-2017; it has been 
subject to numerous delays, and at the time of writing, its future looks uncertain.  
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mark both a continuation and intensification of the turn to a more punitive welfare 
system under New Labour (Wiggan, 2012). This involved a tightening of eligibility 
criteria and greater focus on the regulation of benefit claims through behavioural 
conditionality and monitoring; an emphasis on work incentives and discipline 
pursued through punitive sanctions; and the extension of conditionality to new 
groups – in the proposed case of Universal Credit, to claimants who are already in 
work, for whom there will be a requirement to demonstrate steps taken to 
securing more or better paid work.  
Neoliberal paternalism and the construction(s) of the 
claimant 
Occurring across several decades and under different governments, the trend 
toward greater conditionality and the mandatory ‘activation’ of welfare recipients 
has been accompanied by different ideological and discursive justifications. These 
include: moral panics about a purported ‘underclass’ (Bagguley & Mann, 1992) 
lone parents (Atkinson et al., 1998; Mann & Roseneil, 1994), and ‘the broken 
society’(Cameron, 2011; Driver, 2009); concerns about economic efficiency and 
fiscal rectitude; and problems of demoralisation and ‘dependency’ (Duncan Smith, 
2010, 2014a; Freud, 2007).  One curious feature of this situation is that continuity 
and consistency with respect to the overall welfare-to-work project is accompanied 
by some discordant notes among its various justifications. Among the influential 
proponents of welfare reform during this period one can find laissez faire 
libertarians who emphasise the reassertion of market discipline and work 
incentives (Murray, 2008; Murray et al, 1999); ‘new’ paternalists for whom, 
conversely, the state has a duty to actively foster and inculcate moral norms of 
work and the work ethic (Mead, 1997); and communitarians and ‘third way’ 
thinkers for whom the ‘reform’ agenda embodies a rebalancing of ‘rights’ with 
‘responsibilities’ (Etzioni, 1994; Giddens, 1999; Lund, 2008). Here I argue that a 
focus on these discursive and logical contradictions belies an underlying political 
and ideological consistency, and this section explores the ideological context 
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surrounding the policy developments outlined above in terms of ‘neoliberal 
paternalism’(Schram et al,  2010; Soss et al, 2011; Whitworth, 2016). First, it 
addresses the influence of Murray (2008; Murray et al., 1999) and his argument 
that welfare provision fosters an ‘underclass’ insulated from market imperatives, 
and the recommendation that welfare be withdrawn such that these are 
reintroduced. It then outlines the work of Mead (1997, 2008), who argues for a 
strengthening of the welfare state’s paternalist functions. The market-based and 
paternalist influences on activation and conditionality can be viewed as 
antithetical and paradoxical (Whitworth, 2016); however, in the third section I 
argue that, when viewed through the wider literature on neoliberalism, it is 
possible to discern an underlying political consistency amid these seemingly 
antithetical elements. 
Murray, the underclass, and economic incentives  
Although widely discredited (Alcock, 1994; Lister, 1990), the work of Murray 
(2008; Murray et al., 1999) has exerted a powerful influence, if not necessarily in 
terms of specific policy formation, then at least in terms of how developments in 
welfare policy since the 1980s have been received, understood, and circulated in 
wider academic and popular discourse: it has had a powerful ideological influence 
(Bagguley & Mann, 1992) contributing to what Jensen (2014) calls ‘anti-welfare 
commonsense’. Best known for his argument concerning ‘the underclass,’ Murray 
writes from an economically libertarian and socially conservative perspective, and 
with respect to the United States argues that the ‘Great Society’ reforms and 
expansion of welfare programmes during the 1960s were, perversely, largely 
responsible for the social ills of poverty and unemployment that obtained by the 
1980s.3 Following the success of his book on U.S. social policy, Losing Ground, and 
the notoriety it gained him, in 1989 The Sunday Times invited Murray to the UK to 
assess the extent to which his argument held in the British context, publishing the 
                                               
3 Murray’s argument is in this sense typically reactionary, in the sense defined by Hirschman 
(1991); indeed, Murray’s argument is one of Hirschman’s examples and targets.  
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resulting essay in its pages and stimulating extensive debate (Murray et al., 1999). 
For Murray welfare programmes have perverse effects because they undermine 
both the discipline of economic incentives exercised by the market, and patriarchal 
social relations of familial dependence.  They do so by establishing a space in 
which it is possible to survive without recourse to either the labour market or 
someone, usually a husband, who is attached to it. As a result, Murray argues that 
welfare states foster a behaviourally and culturally distinct underclass who make 
the rational economic decision not to work, and who are therefore immune to the 
disciplinary norms that obtain for those who do. To this he attributes a plethora of 
social ills.  
There is, in Murray’s work, a sometimes discordant mix of utilitarian economic 
jargon about ‘incentives’, ‘utility maximisation’ and ‘rational choice’ alongside 
Victorian moralising about ‘illegitimacy’ and the values of marriage. This latter 
aspect is described by Alcock (1994, p. 49) as ‘more like the preaching of a 
revivalist church minister than the analysis and policy prescription of an academic 
social scientist’. The critic of Murray’s work is faced with a rich and sometimes 
bewildering array of potential targets, from its premises, (lack of) methodology, 
manipulation of empirical data, inflammatory use of language, to the inferences 
drawn. These latter are often circular (Alcock, 1994, p. 50), returning to the 
assertion of empirically unsupported premises, and as such ‘fundamentally 
flawed’(David, 1994). The central thesis (or assertion) of a culturally distinct 
‘underclass’, whilst lacking empirical support in Murray’s own work (Lister, 1990, 
p. 26), has nonetheless proven a potent ideological image – a ‘zombie concept’ – 
which academics have continually felt the need to revisit and challenge on an 
empirical basis (Macdonald et al, 2014). Nonetheless, Murray’s lurid moral 
conservatism alloyed with market-based prescriptions finds a clear echo in the 
rhetoric surrounding welfare reform both prior to, during, and after New Labour’s 
time in office. There are particular resonances in the pronouncements of the 
Coalition and then Conservative governments’ Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, Iain Duncan Smith (Duncan Smith, 2010, 2014a, 2014b), architect of the 
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Work Programme, for whom the utilitarian logic of ‘incentives’ is explicitly tied to 
a moral project addressing a putative ‘culture of dependency’. 
Mead, paternalism, and moral supervision 
Mead, like Murray, has made the trip from the U.S. to the U.K. in the capacity as 
an ‘expert’ on poverty and welfare systems, in his case at the invitation of David 
Cameron’s chief strategist Steve Hilton (Asthana et al., 2010), for whom he 
provided advice on the Coalition welfare reforms. While they differ in their 
specific policy recommendations (cutting welfare spending versus strengthening 
the supervisory powers of welfare agencies) and in some aspects of their analysis, 
both Mead and Murray frame their arguments in similar ways, with reference to 
the Great Society reforms that took place in the 1960s, in which they both identify 
the same problem: the (mis)attribution of responsibility and perverse effects of 
sociological reasoning when applied to social policy. For both Murray and Mead, 
structural, sociological reasoning is something that attributes agency to 
impersonal structures, stripping the individual of personal responsibility for their 
problems. Mead writes that ‘[p]olitically, the significant fact about the new social 
science was its determinism. Any science must assume that the phenomena under 
study are “caused” in some sense by identifiable outside forces’(2008, p. 55). He 
continues: ‘Great Society social analysis…treated even personal problems like 
nonwork or family breakup as if they were forces acting on the poor, just like 
economic need or discrimination’(Mead, 2008, p. 57). Both Murray and Mead, 
despite their differences, exhibit what might be called, adapting Mills (2000), an 
‘anti-sociological imagination’; they both share a profound antipathy to forms of 
sociological reasoning that turn private troubles into public issues, that connect the 
vicissitudes of personal biography to wider social, historical, and contextual 
forces4. Looking ahead, this thesis will argue that the anti-sociological imagination 
                                               
4 On this point, Gane (2014) has argued that the birth of neoliberal thought , located in Mises and 
Hayek, originates in the critique of sociology and its notions of ‘the social’, against which is 
posited an alternative economic epistemology in which the only ‘truth’ it is possible to 
apprehend emerges through individual rational economic activity and the pricing mechanism.  
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is one characteristic of neoliberal paternalist ideology as it exists at street-level, in 
the practices of conditional activation, which are, amongst other things, about the 
privatization of people’s troubles and difficulties.  
Unlike Murray, Mead does not argue that what he calls ‘non-work’ (emphasising 
that it is a personal choice, rather than a social, structurally determined ill) is 
explicable solely in terms of a logic of rational economic maximization, arguing 
that some aspects of ‘nonwork’ cannot be explained by economic logic: rather, 
Mead emphasises the determining role of culture, values, and morality (Mead, 
2008, pp. 78–80). Mead’s proposed solution to this problem is the reassertion of 
authority, in the form of obligation. He argues that the problem with welfare 
programmes is not that they are too generous (contra less-eligibility, economic 
arguments) but that they are too permissive, and fail to set norms and obligations 
for recipients. Whereas for Murray only the adjustment of economic incentive 
structures has efficacy, for Mead the welfare state has an important paternalist role 
to play, which he envisages in interpersonal terms. Welfare-to-work programmes 
combine both these elements: conditional activation alters incentive structures 
through the introduction of sanctions for non-compliance; it also entails one-to-
one ‘moral support’ in the form of activation and supervisory monitoring. Whilst 
these programmes might, in this sense, appear to draw from contrasting and 
contradictory understandings of the ‘problem’ and its causes (rational-economic 
versus moral), as I argue below, these contradictory elements can be understood in 
terms of ‘neoliberal paternalism’.  
Neoliberal paternalism 
A central feature of neoliberalism, whether it is understood as the restoration of 
class power (Harvey, 2007), a regulatory regime of accumulation (Peck, 2001), or a 
mode of governmentality (Foucault, 2010) is the emphasis on market mechanisms 
and competition as the preeminent means of organising social life. More than this, 
neoliberalism is characterised by the recognition that the state must first construct 
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and then maintain (Brown, 2003) the conditions in which competition and market 
forces can operate – often taken to be what distinguishes it from nineteenth 
century liberalism, where market forces are taken to arise spontaneously in the 
absence of intervening constraint.  
It has been argued that policies of conditionality and work-first activation can be 
characterised in terms of neoliberal paternalism (Soss et al., 2011). For Whitworth 
(2016) neoliberal paternalism, in both its discursive and policy manifestations, is 
riven by internal fracture and contradiction. It is ‘neoliberal’ to the extent that 
policies are developed according to the logic of markets, competition, and the 
autonomous choosing agent; it is ‘paternalist’ to the extent that agency is 
purposefully constrained, and ‘choices’ are forced on policy subjects who are 
constructed as in some way deficient and unable to make the ‘right’ choices. Here, 
I would suggest that while the ‘neoliberal paternalist’ coinage is relatively recent 
(Soss et al., 2011), these identified tensions also recall the debates surrounding 
Thatcherism, the New Right, and its similarly contradictory mix of free-market 
liberalism with authoritarian tendencies (Gamble, 1988; Hall, 1979). As such, the 
discursive and logical inconsistencies manifest in neoliberal paternalist policy-
discourse and policy-making arguably have a longer history, one mutually 
constitutive of the neoliberal project as such. From this perspective, the tension 
between autonomous competitive agents and the coerced subject of paternalism is 
only a contradiction when neoliberal paternalist policies are viewed in discursive 
terms alone, or read with the intent of extracting an internally consistent political 
philosophy. When viewed as part of a practical political project, on the other hand, 
and in particular a class project (Harvey, 2007), the combined promotion of 
competition and market mechanisms alongside more coercive forms of state 
intervention becomes less surprising, and exhibits a practical and political 
consistency, if not a logical or discursive one.  As has been widely argued (Brown, 
2003; Harvey, 2007; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2013), the neoliberal 
opposition to collectivism, and the construction of competitive market-relations in 
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its place, necessarily entails the coercive and sometimes violent removal or 
refashioning of certain barriers – of public ownership, workplace and trade union 
rights, and other social entitlements – but also the refashioning of the moral 
subjectivities and ways of life associated with these (Dardot & Laval, 2014; 
Lazzarato, 2009, 2012; Read, 2009).  
Paternalist coercion can, in this sense, become a precondition for treatment as a 
‘freely-choosing’ competitive agent5. Amable (2011) draws attention to the way 
that neoliberalism is also a moral project with its own specific ethical content –
where competition, individual responsibility, and self-reliance are promoted as 
moral virtues and normative ends.  By understanding policies of conditionality 
and activation in this way, as part of an ideological and moralising project, it 
becomes possible to understand the consistency uniting what might in other 
respects appear to be their contradictory discursive elements and influences. For 
neoliberal paternalists the cause of moral concern, and thus the target of neoliberal 
paternalist intervention, are those subjects who are not (yet) sufficiently market-
oriented (or market-dependent). This is seen as both a problem of incentives, 
market mechanisms, and non-market dependencies (where support comes from 
the state), and as a problem of demoralisation. Neoliberal paternalism is about the 
active fashioning of moral subjects for markets (Schram et al., 2010; Soss et al., 
2011) and, in the case of conditionality and activation, for labour markets.    
This ideological formation is at once discursive and material – it is a formation 
embodied in institutions and their practices (Hall & O’shea, 2013; Seymour, 2014), 
                                               
5 This argument has been made with respect to nineteenth century ‘liberal government and 
authoritarianism’. Dean (2002) argues that nineteenth century liberalism’s paradoxical 
relationship to certain forms of social authoritarianism is in part a function of its conception of 
the subject. Liberalism’s concept of the subject and its freedoms is modelled on an idealised 
notion of free market-relations; however, where subjects are unable to assume such relations, 
the state has a right to intervene and force these relations upon them. Dean suggests that the 
contemporary ‘neoliberal’ paradox of coercive ‘workfare’ schemes rests on a similar principle – 
engaging with the labour market is a precondition for being viewed as a ‘free’ and ‘choosing’ 
agent. The labour market, and its associated social relations, are not ones from which one is 
‘free’ to withdraw. 
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particularly those studied by this thesis. These institutions and their practices are 
not, however, isolated or independent of other forms of discourse and practice, 
and it is worth considering the ways in which the paternalist policy construction 
of the dependent welfare claimant sits alongside other representations of class, 
inequality, and poverty within neoliberal society. Jensen (2014) has explored the 
way that, through the alchemy of austerity (Clarke & Newman, 2012), deep social 
problems of inequality have been magically transformed into problems of 'welfare 
dependence', 'cultures of entitlement' and 'irresponsibility'’ (Jensen, 2014). Jensen’s 
analysis is concerned with how televisual representations of benefit claimants 
contribute to the cultural and political crafting of doxa, understood following 
Bourdieu (1977) in terms of received categories of understanding whose power lies 
in their assumed and unquestioned status. Such representations are important 
precisely because of the way they intervene in the emotional life of welfare 
(Hoggett & Campling, 2000), and in doing so help to shape conceptual and 
affective responses to social policy, directed towards particular political ends. For 
Jensen, the proliferation of stigmatising representations of poverty need to be seen 
and analysed in terms of the crafting of folk devils and the generation of moral 
panic; she draws parallels with Hall et al’s (1978) analysis of the racialised moral 
panic surrounding ‘mugging’ and the figure of ‘the mugger’, pointing to the way 
that the figure of ‘the skiver’ similarly condenses various social anxieties and 
resentments (Hoggett et al, 2013), and does so in a way useful for anti-welfare 
politics. As she puts it, ‘[t]hrough imagining/inventing anxieties about the 
scheming deceits of those entitled to social protection, such entitlements become 
easier to undermine and dismantle’ (Jensen, 2014, p. 2). This is a process aided by 
the circulation of such representations through a range of contexts – from the 
Houses of Parliament through various media forms – such that they come to 
represent a form of unquestioned ‘commonsense’. 
This analysis can be situated alongside a broader literature from both sociology 
and cultural studies addressing the affective experience of class, and that has 
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drawn attention to the way that class both mobilises and is made through various 
affective and emotional responses. In the work of Skeggs and Loveday (2012) 
attention is drawn to the way that classed subjects struggle to realise their value in 
situations where they are judged and positioned by powerful (dominant) others as 
without value. The emotional dynamics of class are often found to be marked by 
feelings of disapproval and disgust. This comes across particular strongly in the 
work of Tyler (2008, 2013) who carefully anatomises the figure of the ‘Chav’ in 
terms of the middle-class social anxieties it represents and condenses; anxieties 
about female sexuality, reproduction, racial mixing. The figure is also found to 
express an anxiety about social mobility, and the need to enforce distinctions and 
exclusions. There is a focus on the relational dynamics of class and classed 
feelings; those who are judged as without value are judged from specific social 
positions. Such judgements relate as much to the position of the one making the 
judgement, as they do to the one who is judged (Bourdieu, 2010; Skeggs & 
Loveday, 2012).  
This particular body of work is also concerned with the way that those who are 
dominated also struggle to realise their own value, and how ‘class’ can come to act 
as a name for, and means of understanding, the structures through which one is 
positioned; and that in recognising such structures people are able to assert 
alternative spheres of value and ways of valuing themselves. However, as Skeggs 
and Loveday (Skeggs & Loveday, 2012) write, this raises the important question of 
‘what happens when ugly feelings have no conceptual frames such as class that 
enable people to connect and collectivize their understandings? What happens 
when the affects of anger and anxiety produced through injustice are not attached 
to their proper object?’ Recent research addressing the lived experience of 
claimants  (Garthwaite, 2011; Shildrick & MacDonald, 2013; Shildrick, MacDonald, 
Webster, & Garthwaite, 2012) points to the way that the ideological doxa of anti-
welfare commonsense is something that many people live within, as much as they 
do against (Lister, 2004). Understanding how welfare recipients live with, within, 
and against certain ideological constructions of their situation can benefit from an 
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understanding of how claimants have and exercise agency. The next section 
addresses the literature on agency in relation to welfare subjects, conditionality, 
and activation. 
Moral agency and agency against moralism 
The turn toward activation and behavioural conditionality has been accompanied 
by extensive debate within academic social policy on the question of agency 
(Deacon, 2002, 2004; Deacon & Mann, 1999; Greener, 2002; Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 
2004; Wright, 2012, 2016b). In some respects this debate can be seen as one 
response to the policy turn, particularly in the case of activation and 
conditionality, toward addressing social problems constructed in terms of 
individuals, their moral conduct and behaviours. For Deacon (2002; Deacon & 
Mann, 1999), the renewed policy focus on matters of individual moral conduct 
might be attributed to the social policy establishment’s ‘neglect’ or ‘denial’ of 
individual agency, and its continued commitment to an outdated  paradigm 
overly focused on the structural determinants of individual welfare need. In this 
view, the broadly social democratic left, in neglecting to address questions of 
behaviour, motivation, and moral accountability, had ceded this terrain to 
conservative moralists such as Murray (Murray et al., 1999), Mead (1997, 2008) and 
Etzioni (1994) granting them an important position from which to influence social 
policy discourse. Deacon and Mann (1999) argue that it is therefore imperative 
that questions of responsibility and  moral accountability receive greater 
engagement (rather than simply critique) from social policy researchers, 
particularly via the analytical concept of ‘agency’, although as Deacon (2004) 
points out, this concept has been interpreted in very different ways within the 
discipline.  
There is perhaps a risk in entering this terrain of tacitly accepting some of its 
landmarks, boundaries, and broad categories of understanding (for example, the 
importance of ‘taking responsibility’ or the significance of ‘moral codes’  - see 
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Deacon & Mann, 1999, p. 433), such that debate becomes constrained by the terms 
set by the (re)moralised political agenda of those conservative figures whose 
influence it might seek to counter. As Lister (2004) writes, there is ‘a fine line 
between acknowledgement of the agency of people in poverty, including their 
capacity to make mistakes and “wrong” decisions like the rest of us, and blaming 
them for that poverty’ (Lister, 2004, p. 125). Similarly, highlighting a key limitation 
of this debate, Wright (2012) points out that much of the subsequent discussion 
‘has been skewed towards considering the intentions of benefit recipients…but has 
largely overlooked the motivation and behaviour of more powerful social actors, 
such as policy-makers and employers’ (Wright, 2012, p. 310).  Much of the 
significant work on the agency of welfare subjects, mindful of such risks and 
limitations, has sought to move beyond simplistic and ‘thin’ accounts of agency 
(e.g. beyond abstract and normative discussion of the ‘responsibilities’ attendant 
to rights), drawing theoretical resources from sociology and psychosocial studies 
in order to produce more nuanced and contextually sensitive conceptualisations. 
Looking ahead, Chapter Four will explore some of these sociological and 
psychosocial concepts in greater depth.  
Policies of conditionality and activation are based on particular discursive 
constructions of the welfare subject (Wright, 2016b). These discursive 
constructions can be described as ideological, and as such need not be 
conceptually or internally consistent, instead composed of ideational fragments, 
institutional and social practices, representations and resonant images (Eagleton, 
1991; Therborn, 1999); as outlined in the previous section, the ideology of 
neoliberal paternalism is assembled out of a mixed-up assortment of discursive 
bric-a-brac (Whitworth, 2016). Nevertheless, from this ideological image-collage 
there stand out particular themes (the broken society, the underclass, the work 
ethic) and accentuated figures (the shirker, the skiver, the scrounger) toward 
which policies are directed (and, in this account of ideology, help to reproduce6). 
                                               
6 This argument is also made by Howe (1990) who, following a critical discussion of the categories 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, writes: ‘social policies based on the presumed empirical existence of social 
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Two notable aspects of the way the welfare subject is presented in neoliberal 
paternalist discourse, and in conditional activation policy, are that it is either 
mostly passive and requires ‘activating’, or that it is a ‘bad’ or ‘malevolent’ agent 
who needs to be encouraged/coerced, by incentive or by sanction, into making the 
‘right’ personal choices.  
In a discussion of agency in the context of poverty, Lister (2004) argues against the 
kind of reductive ‘Othering’ that turns people living in poverty into ‘passive 
objects – in either the benign form of the helpless victim or the malign spectre of 
the lazy, work-shy, welfare dependent’ (Lister, 2004, p. 124). Drawing attention to 
the varied ways that people might exercise agency in the context of material (and 
symbolic) constraint, she discusses agency in terms of its personal, political, 
everyday, and strategic dimensions, offering a fourfold taxonomy of getting by, 
getting (back) at, getting out, and getting organized. ‘Getting by’ describes the 
personal, everyday forms of creative agency that are required in order to cope and 
simply keep life going in situations of poverty. This is a form of agency that is 
often invisible (not least to policy makers and street-level actors), most often 
noticed only when it breaks down and turns an ongoing situation into an official 
‘problem’(Lister, 2004, p. 130). This is a creative form of agency that involves 
‘juggling, piecing together and going without’ (Lister, 2004, p. 133); frequently it 
involves the active enrolment of whatever material, social, and relational resources 
are to hand, as well as ‘resource augmentation’ through the informal economy. In 
the specific context of activation, conditionality, and claiming benefits, this 
account draws attention to the ways that what certain policy-actors construe as the 
merely ‘passive’ receipt of benefit is but a single moment in a complicated, active, 
and  often exhausting project of getting by.  
                                                                                                                                              
groups bearing a simple correspondence to these two cultural categories are therefore seriously flawed. Any 
such policy will not only fail to achieve its stated aims, but it will continue to reproduce the conditions which 
appear to render them sensible.’(Howe, 1990, p. 4) An argument might be made for the supersession of 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, in policy discourse perhaps more than popular, by the terms ‘active’ and 
‘passive’. Howe’s point about the role of social/institutional practice in the production of ideological 
distinctions would, however, still hold. There is a question about the extent to which ‘active/passive’ and 
‘deserving/undeserving’ do the same, or similar ideological work.  
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 ‘Getting (back) at’ describes an everyday, political form of agency that includes 
the kinds of ‘everyday resistances’ described by Scott (1992), such as the 
deployment of ‘hidden transcripts’ which reject and subtly subvert the norms and 
values of dominant others. The work of Kingfisher (1996) has drawn attention to 
this kind of resistant agency in the context of interactions with welfare services; 
she describes how her participants employed a range of strategies in order to 
negotiate with inadequate welfare systems, through practices of concealment, 
exaggeration, ‘hyper-truth’ (the exaggerated performance of playing by the rules) 
and other techniques of impression management. With respect to the different 
ways that claimants might tactically engage with welfare agencies and 
professionals, Greener (2002) argues that this will often depend on the particular 
social and cultural resources they bring to such situations, but also how these 
relate to the wider welfare field and its structure of rules (on the notion of welfare 
as a field see also: Peillon, 1998). Drawing on Bourdieu’s (1977, 1992) concepts of 
capital, field, and habitus, he argues that some claimants ‘may achieve quicker and 
more deferent service from welfare professionals where [they possess a more] 
upper-class disposition likely to mean that the claimant is recognized as being 
“one of us”’(Greener, 2002, p. 702). In this vein, Wright (2003) discusses the shift in 
power relations that can occur when employment officers are confronted with 
clients of perceived higher status (in terms of qualification, class-background, or 
previous occupation) – clients they labelled as the ‘hoity-toity’ or ‘snooty’ ones. 
Although attracting their own form of derision, these clients were able to ‘evade 
close scrutiny’ on account of their intimidating social position – a form of power of 
which they weren’t necessarily consciously aware (Wright, 2003, pp. 248–249).This 
approach draws attention to the relational nature of agency in welfare encounters, 
pointing to the way that it is exercised within a field of rules with which 
individuals can be differently accommodated (Ahmed & Jones, 2008); it also 
suggests the need to consider how the agency of welfare subjects interacts with, 
and can be constrained by, the perceptions and agency of others – street-level 
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welfare workers, but also more distant but influential policy actors with the power 
to shape the rules of the game.   
Also discussed in terms of ‘getting (back) at’ are other more symbolically inflected 
forms of resistance (the explicit rejection of dominant norms and values) and, as 
well, more violent and destructive forms of agency aimed at the self, close others, 
and the wider community (Lister, 2004, p. 140). On this point Hoggett ( 2001) 
argues that there is a need to understand the psychosocial and non-rational 
dimensions of agency in situations of constraint, hurt, and suffering (Frost & 
Hoggett, 2008). This account points to the fragmented, non-unitary nature of the 
self, of the existence of non-reflexive aspects of agency, and the possibility of non-
rational and non-purposive action. Elswhere Hoggett (Hoggett, 2005, 2006, 2010) 
also develops a psychosocial and psychodynamic account of front-line, street-level 
welfare organisations, and this thesis will explore the implications of this 
approach for the research in greater depth in Chapter Four.  
There is present, in both ‘getting by’ and ‘getting (back) at’, a tension between 
resistance and acquiescence, between rejection of both material and symbolic 
forms of domination, and accommodation with them. Resistance to particular 
bureaucratic rules can be combined with assent and attachment to their overall 
normative framework – for example, those who exercise their agency in order to 
‘fiddle the system’ may nevertheless demonstrate a strong attachment to the work 
ethic which the system is designed to police (Dean, 1998; Dean & Melrose, 1997). 
In a different way, negative labelling and stereotyping can be both resisted and 
accepted at the same time – that is, resisted in the particular, personal instance 
precisely through acceptance of the general legitimacy of scrounging discourse. In 
an account of the ways that unemployed men ‘get by,’ Howe (1998) points to the 
relative absence of resistance in terms of ‘hidden transcripts,’ instead describing 
the way that the dominant discourse of ‘scrounging’ is fully assumed and even 
energetically adopted by the unemployed men themselves. This is part of a 
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paradoxical strategy to avoid negative labelling, and follows from the difficult 
double bind the unemployed find themselves in:  
The only incontestable proof of willingness to work is actually to get a 
job. Barring that, the unemployed strive to conform, or at least claim to 
conform, to the expectations which kin, friends and neighbours have of 
them so as to get themselves classed as 'deserving'. The problem, 
however, again, is that the extent of conformity is always open to 
dispute and is not a matter of objective measurement: what constitutes 
'diligence' in looking for work, and how is 'restraint' in claiming 
benefits measured? (Howe, 1998, p. 539) 
In negotiation with this double bind the unemployed men in Howe’s study strove 
to adopt the norms and forms of discourse of those around them; they made their 
efforts to find work as visible as possible, no matter how unrealistic, in the process 
subjecting themselves to repeated forms of painful rejection. At the same time, the 
unemployed men constantly monitored their own conduct, and were careful to 
avoid engaging in too many social activities lest these be seen as inappropriate 
(e.g. going to the pub, using leisure services) and as evidence of their ‘scrounging’ 
behaviour. Such activity and self-surveillance allowed them to adopt the 
discursive and ideological distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, 
placing themselves on one side of this divide and  negatively labelling others. This 
particular psychosocial, psychodynamic response to situations of shame and 
stigma  is widely identified throughout the literature on peoples’ experiences of 
unemployment, poverty, inequality, and making benefit claims (Garthwaite, 2011; 
Patrick, 2016; Peacock et al., 2014; Shildrick & MacDonald, 2013; Shildrick et al., 
2012). Looking ahead, in Chapter Seven the thesis will explore some of these 
dynamics as they operate in the context of welfare-to-work encounters.  
In addition to these everyday forms of agency, ‘getting out’ and ‘getting 
organised’ represent more long-term, strategic projects. As Lister emphasises, 
living in poverty often means strategic horizons are constrained by everyday 
necessity, and there are significant barriers to enacting longer-term projects. 
‘Getting out’ of poverty might mean getting a job, but even with a job ‘getting out’ 
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of poverty is not guaranteed. Some types of low paid, insecure work are more 
likely to keep people in poverty (Shildrick et al., 2012). Lister  points to 
quantitative studies that demonstrate dynamics of cycling in between work and 
welfare (Heady, 1997; Jenkins et al., 2001; Lister, 2004, p. 145). More recent 
qualitative research on social insecurity and the ‘low pay, no pay cycle’ (Shildrick 
et al., 2012) describes the difficulties people face on entering low paid, insecure 
work, where finding a job is likely to be temporary, and unlikely to mean an 
escape from poverty and the material constraints it places on strategic agency. This 
work also directly confronts the myths and assertions of moralists such as Mead 
(1997, 2008) and, differently, Murray (Murray et al., 1999) that those regularly 
reliant on social benefits – either through demoralisation or disincentive – become 
disengaged from the labour market, and disaffiliated from the work ethic: ‘one of 
the strongest, single findings of the study was that interviewees, who had been 
caught up in the low-pay, no-pay cycle over years, expressed great personal 
commitment to employment’ (Shildrick et al., 2012, p. 84). The place of welfare-to-
work programmes in this dynamic – ostensibly there to support the ‘strategic 
agency’ of claimants – is found to be less than supportive: targeted at the long-
term unemployed, it ignores the low-pay, no-pay dynamic; based on the myths of 
inactivity and demoralisation, the focus on conditionality and sanctions 
exacerbates the difficulties people face (Shildrick et al., 2012, pp. 218–220). 
‘Getting organised’ is a strategic-political form of agency; as such it confronts the 
same constraints faced by ‘getting on’. However, where ‘getting on’ can readily co-
exist with and alongside negative symbolic representations (and may be 
motivated by the need to escape these as well as material conditions), ‘getting 
organised’ faces a particular symbolic challenge in the sense that it often requires 
the recuperation of stigmatised and spoilt identities. It also entails forging 
collective identities against dominant individualised, individualising, blaming and 
self-blaming constructions of poverty and unemployment (Lister, 2004, pp. 150–
151).  Policies of conditionality and activation have, however, produced organised 
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forms of political activity; it would seem that this has often been allied to the anti-
austerity movement, and emerged particularly strongly following 2010 and the 
Coalition government’s subsequent ‘reform’ agenda. Prominent groups include 
Boycott Workfare and Disabled People Against Cuts (DPAC) (although there are 
numerous local groups); forms of activity have included the protest and picketing 
of Jobcentre Plus and welfare-to-work offices, work capability assessment centres, 
and employers taking advantage of free labour through various work experience 
and workfare schemes. These groups also keep an online presence, and maintain 
websites and social media feeds providing advice to other claimants on their 
rights, and on techniques for dealing with welfare agencies in order to avoid 
certain aspects of conditional compulsion. This is a topic that has received very 
little academic attention  (although on DPAC see Williams-Findlay, 2011), and 
very little is known about the origins, extent, or reach of these forms of collective 
political agency.  
There are also more everyday forms of political agency that would seem to sit 
somewhere between ‘getting (back) at’ and ‘getting organised’ – Lister refers to 
‘collective self-help’(Lister, 2004, p. 154) – which in the context of street-level 
welfare interactions might include the sharing of knowledge (of the benefits 
system), or support (accompanying others to interviews and appointments). The 
significance of collective political support, albeit of a more diffuse kind, is 
identified by Howe (1990), who found that those claimants who came from 
families or communities that rejected the ‘scrounging’ narrative and the 
‘undeserving/deserving’ distinction were more likely to assert their rights and 
entitlements in encounters and interactions with welfare agencies. These were 
families and communities that had a strong history of political involvement and 
trade union participation, demonstrating the important influence that even 
historical or tangential forms of ‘getting organised’ can have for the exercise of 
individual agency in this context. 
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Informed by such contextualised accounts of agency as offered by Lister (2004) 
and Hoggett (2001), recent research into the lived experiences of people in regular 
contact with conditional, activating welfare regimes has staged a confrontation 
between welfare ‘reform’ as it is presented in policy discourse, and as it is 
experienced in real life. Wright (2016) makes this confrontation central and 
explicit, presenting the model of the welfare subject as constructed in policy 
discourse (inactive, dependent) alongside the alternative theorisations of creative 
and reflexive agency (Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 2004; Wright, 2012) and data drawn 
from in-depth qualitative interviews. Importantly for this research, Wright 
identifies the ways that ‘activation’ interacts with the agency of welfare recipients 
in practice. Arising from welfare recipients’ engagement with activation 
programmes, Wright identifies a dynamic she calls ‘activity without results’ which 
describes a situation where continued and repeated (mandatory) activity toward 
finding work nevertheless fails to result in a job or change of situation – the 
stipulated activities being inappropriate, unnecessary, or unable to counteract the 
influence of other external factors. This echoes the account provided by 
Southwood (2011) of his own experience of attending welfare-to-work schemes, 
which he describes as a dispiriting and demoralising experience of ‘non-stop 
inertia’.  
Conclusion  
This chapter began by exploring policies of activation, conditionality, and their 
recent history in British social policy. Since the 1980s eligibility for various benefits 
has been tightened, and their value progressively eroded; meanwhile, behavioural 
conditionality has intensified, and been extended to ever wider groups of people. 
This chapter argued that it is also important to attend to the ideological context of 
such welfare encounters, the way that such encounters are discursively 
constructed, and how this might shape the way that such encounters are 
experienced. The intensification of behavioural conditionality has been 
accompanied by reinvigorated reactionary attacks on the welfare state, in the form 
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of moralising discourse about the work ethic (‘shirkers’), and stigmatising 
narratives about poverty (‘scroungers’). This chapter reviewed the valuable 
literature on agency and welfare interactions. It argued that building on this 
literature, there is scope for investigating the dynamic lived experience of 
conditional activation programmes, specifically focusing on the interaction 
between street-level practice, symbolic/ideological representations, and the agency 
of benefit recipients.  Alongside the intensification of conditionality, and 
ideological development and ‘anti welfare commonsense’, the delivery of 
employment support has been increasingly wedded to the policing of the benefits 
system; furthermore, this has occurred in a context of creeping privatisation and 
quasi-marketisation, with a much bigger role given to contracted organisations, 
many of them operating for profit. The following chapter turns to address this 
street-level, organisational context of conditional welfare encounters, as well as the 
role of the street-level employee. 
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Chapter Three – Street-level bureaucracy  
Introduction 
This thesis explores aspects of activation and behavioural conditionality as they 
are materialised at street-level. This chapter situates the research with respect to 
street-level studies of policy implementation generally, and of activation and 
conditionality specifically. The first section of the chapter locates the street-level 
perspective within studies of the policy process and policy implementation. It 
highlights the contribution of street-level literature in terms of asserting the 
importance of street-level organisations as places where policy is made, rather 
than simply implemented. The chapter then outlines some core features of the 
street-level approach to policy research, before considering the emerging street-
level literature on activation. The renewed interest in street-level perspectives in 
the case of activation has been driven by developments in both formal and 
operational policy (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2009); this twin track of reforms (van 
Berkel & Borghi, 2008) redoubles the importance of street-level sites as places 
where both policy and politics are mediated (Brodkin, 2013a). One consequence of 
the operational reforms accompanying activation is the prominence of operational 
and management issues in the street-level literature on activation. The remainder 
of the chapter turns to consider some important themes across the street-level 
literature. These are the themes of conflict and coping; client processing; and 
identities. The final section of the chapter draws attention to some differences and 
points of disagreement within the street-level literature; these differences relate to 
the ways in which the street-level bureaucrat and street-level situation are 
conceptualised, which has consequences for how the practice of street-level 
advisors is understood.  
Implementation studies and the policy process 
This thesis can be thought of as an implementation study. Implementation studies 
have a specific place within the field of policy analysis and, more specifically, 
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studies of the policy process (Hill, 1997; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). The latter are 
those forms of policy analysis ‘in which attention is focused upon how policy 
decisions are made and how policies are shaped in action’(Hill, 2012, p. 5), and 
how ‘policy is shaped by social, institutional, political, economic and other 
contexts’ (Birkland, 2014, p. 4). The notion of ‘the policy process’ developed soon 
after the establishment of public administration and ‘the policy sciences’ (Lasswell, 
1951, 1970) as a distinct disciplinary space in the mid-twentieth century United 
States (Hill & Hupe, 2014, p. 6). As an object of analysis it has been extensively 
adopted and developed in different national contexts, including the United 
Kingdom (Ham & Hill, 1984).There is a broad literature addressing the different 
ways in which the policy process might be conceptualised, in terms of stages or 
cycles (Easton, 1967; Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 1995; May & Wildavsky, 1979), and 
drawing attention to different forms of feedback and complexity within and 
between its different stages (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Jenkins, 1978). Within the 
different conceptualisations of the policy process, implementation is but one stage 
among others. 
From the beginning of the 1970s implementation specifically began to receive 
greater attention as a worthy and interesting topic of study in its own right, again 
first and foremost in the United States, but also in Europe (Hill, 1997, p. 127). The 
context of this growing interest was a perceived ‘mismatch between policies-as-
conceived and policies-as-executed (or not executed)’ (Brodkin, 2015, p. 27). In 
particular, there was a sense that the reforms and policies instituted from the 1960s 
onwards under the banner of the ‘War on Poverty’ and ‘Great Society’ 
programmes were not having their intended effects and outcomes (Hill, 1997, p. 
129). The influential work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) sought to direct 
attention toward the ‘black box’ (Palumbo & Calista, 1990) of implementation in 
order to study what went wrong on the frontlines of policy implementation, or as 
the subtitle of their book put it, to understand ‘[h]ow great expectations in 
Washington are dashed in Oakland’ (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). There was a 
concern to understand the ‘gap’ between policy-as-formulated and policy-as-
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practiced – the so-called ‘implementation gap.’ In the United Kingdom, Hood 
(1976) formulated a similar problematic, focusing on the ‘limits of administration’ 
and its ability to control policy implementation and achieve compliance.  
These early problemetisations of policy implementation carried with them certain 
normative assumptions which became the focus of critique and extensive debate 
(Sabatier, 1986). Briefly put, the conceptualisation of an ‘implementation gap’ as 
the product of small, cumulative deficits in compliance was reliant on a definition 
of policy as distinct from its implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2014, p. 4). Within this, 
it was assumed that policies-as-formulated were clearly defined and identifiable, 
such that deviance from their aims and goals might be easily discerned (Hill, 1997, 
p. 133). This approach tended to assume that whatever deficiencies and deficits 
were associated with a policy accrued on its journey away from elite centres of 
power and downward toward the front-lines of implementation and delivery. 
These assumptions represented a ‘top-down’ or ‘managerial’ understanding of 
policy, in so far as they express something of the perspectives and assumptions of 
elite policy-actors and mangers (Barrett & Fudge, 1981), viewing the ‘problem’ of 
implementation almost exclusively as one of control and compliance. The field of 
implementation research thus became the site of debate between such ‘top-down’ 
approaches, and opposing ‘bottom-up’ frameworks (Sabatier, 1986). Proponents of 
a ‘bottom up’ approach (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Elmore, 1979; Hanf, 1982) 
emphasised the need to understand more about the organisational context of 
implementation, and put forward a view of policy as the negotiation of a complex 
arrangement of conflicts and relationships. In this view there was a need to ‘get 
away from a single perspective of the process that reflects a normative 
administrative or managerial view of how the process should be’, focusing more 
on the empirical complexity of implementation as it actually occurred, and ‘on the 
actors and agencies themselves and their interactions’ (Hill, 1997, p. 139). Lispky’s 
(1980) theory of ‘street-level bureaucracy’ offered one such approach, conceptually 
grounded in a wealth of empirical material from front-line policy delivery.  
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Street-level bureaucracy 
 ‘Street-level bureaucracy’ refers to those sites and spaces where the public meets 
face-to-face with low-level employees of government (or government-funded) 
services – that is, where they encounter ‘street-level bureaucrats’, those service 
workers who ‘interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs’ (Lipsky, 
2010, p. 3). It is also a way of referring to the routine activities and practices that 
occur in these spaces. Street-level bureaucrats typically have a degree, sometimes a 
substantial degree, of discretion in the way they go about their work. This makes 
street-level encounters interesting for a variety of reasons; they are places where 
policy is made or materialised in everyday routine activity (Lipsky, 2010, p. 13); 
they are also sites where power is exercised (Dubois, 2012), social identities are 
made (Watkins-Hayes, 2009), and citizenship defined (Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003). Encounters in street-level bureaucracies teach the public ‘political 
lessons contributing to future political expectations’ (Lipsky, 1984, p. 9) and 
‘socialize citizens to expectations of government services and a place in the 
political community’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 4). In making policy in and through 
practice, street-level bureaucrats directly shape citizens’ experiences of public 
services and the state. 
When it was first published in 1980, Street-Level Bureaucracy drew attention to such 
spaces and asserted their fundamental importance as sites of policy-making 
(Brodkin, 2012, 2015; Hudson, 1993; Rowe, 2012). At that time, among researchers 
of the policy process, and within the wider context of policy-implementation 
research, street-level organisations and the people that worked in them tended to 
be constructed as a particular kind of problem. In drawing a clear distinction 
between policy and implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973), 
implementation research tended to view street-level sites as deviant locations 
where already-defined policies somehow went awry, were deformed, their true 
aims lost or subverted. In contrast with this normative, top-down understanding 
of the policy process (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hill, 1997, p. 129), Lipsky presented a 
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very different view, of policy ‘not as a fixed construct, but as an indeterminate 
one’ (Brodkin, 2012, p. 942), arguing that,  
the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and 
the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, 
effectively become the public policies they carry out (Lipsky, 2010, p. 
xiii). 
In contrast with a view of policy ‘from the perspective of centrally elected 
governments and their administrative elites’ Lispky offered the view from the 
street, of policy as it looks to low-level officials and users of services (Rowe, 2012, 
p. 11). From this perspective what had previously been understood in terms of the 
‘gap’ between policy and its implementation, or as a problem of control and 
compliance, instead became the analytical and empirical problem of ‘how to 
understand complex organisational behavior’ (Brodkin, 2012, p. 941). The task for 
street-level policy researchers was to understand ‘street-level work from the inside 
out’, focusing on ‘what organizations actually did in the name of policy’ (Brodkin, 
2012, p. 943), and paying attention to the factors, forces and dynamics shaping 
street-level practice.  
The indeterminacy of policy, and the corresponding significance of street-level 
organisations, is not, from Lispky’s point of view, a problem that can be remedied 
or altogether resolved, but rather a more fundamental feature of what policy is. 
Policies, as they are officially formulated, are often ambiguous and contradictory. 
This might be because they are the result of conflict and compromise, where the 
form of legislative resolution ‘is to pass on intractable conflicts for resolution (or 
continued irresolution) at the administrative level’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 41). In a 
different way, official policy is often the result of accretions and adjustments 
which may never have been rationalised, or small ‘adjustments to the way existing  
activities are to be carried out’(Hill, 1997, p. 135). The official rules and regulations 
guiding a particular area of street-level work ‘may be so voluminous and 
contradictory that they can only be enforced or invoked selectively’ (Lipsky, 2010, 
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p. 14). Policy is also indeterminate because of the irreducibly ‘human dimensions 
of situations’. It is not always so easy for street-level bureaucrats to decide what 
the rules, even when selectively invoked, might mean in the context of singular, 
specific human situations that are often ‘too complicated to reduce to 
programmatic formats’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 15). What discretion that street-level 
bureaucrats have is located here, amid the conflict, contradiction, ambiguity and, 
therefore, inevitable and necessarily indeterminate nature of official policy.  
During the 1980s, predominantly in the United States, a street-level perspective 
was adopted by research addressing a wide range of policy areas, from education 
(Crowson & Porter-Gehrie, 1980) and the legal profession (Brintnall, 1981), to 
municipal service provision (Thomas, 1986) and welfare services (Hasenfeld, 
1985), among others. By the early 1990s, however, it had become a neglected 
perspective (Hudson, 1993), but one that has over the past decade or so seen a 
revival of interest, not only in the United States but also in the United Kingdom, 
other Anglophone countries, and across Europe. In particular ‘street-level 
bureaucracy’ is emerging as an important perspective in the analysis of activation 
and active welfare states (Brodkin & Marston, 2013). In part this reflects a desire to 
understand more about the street-level dynamics of this relatively recent policy 
turn and its related policy content; however, it is also a result of other operational 
developments and changes in governance which, it is argued, make street-level 
organisations doubly important sites where both the policy and politics of welfare 
reform are mediated (van Berkel et al, 2011; Brodkin, 2013a).  
Street-level bureaucracy and the governance of activation 
In discussing the governance of social security in Britain, Carmel and 
Papadopoulos (2009) draw a distinction between formal policy and operational 
policy. The formal policies of activation and conditionality would be those which 
describe their substantive content – the welfare-to-work programmes and changes 
to conditional requirements outlined in the last chapter. Operational policy refers 
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to the way that these policies are to be delivered or carried out. This is often 
addressed in terms of the governance of such services (van Berkel et al,  2011), 
understood as ‘the organisational arrangements and procedures for policy 
delivery’(Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2009, p. 94). The turn toward activation and 
conditionality has been achieved through a variety of developments in both 
formal and operational policy. In operational terms, there has been a marked shift, 
in the U.K., first toward managerialism in the running of public services, then to 
contracting out, and finally toward marketisation and the construction of large-
scale quasi-markets in welfare-to-work services (Wright, 2011). The specifically 
operational and governance reforms accompanying the development of active 
welfare states are important and significant on their own terms, and have 
generated extensive debate and a wide body of literature, much of it also 
comparative (van Berkel & Borghi, 2008; van Berkel, Graaf, & Tomás Sirovátka, 
2011; Lødemel & Moreira, 2014; Newman, 2007; Sol & Westerveld, 2005; Wiggan, 
2009). Within this, however, the literature also highlights the need to understand 
the relationship between governance and implementation, and the potential 
consequences of operational reform for the ‘content’ of activation as it is delivered 
on the ground (van Berkel, Graaf, & Tomáš Sirovátka, 2011; Brodkin & Marston, 
2013).  
To understand the role of street-level activation workers in contracted-out welfare-
to-work programmes it is necessary to situate them with respect to the managerial 
and quasi-market environment in which they work. In the broadest terms 
managerialism – elsewhere the ‘new managerialim’, or ‘new public 
management’(for a discussion of the different terms see: Clarke et al, 2000, pp. 6–
10) – refers to the attempt to reconfigure public organisations such that their 
institutional form and practice more closely resemble those of the private sector. 
These terms refer to a normative and ideological agenda (Clarke et al., 2000, p. 9; 
Pollitt, 1990) concerned with prioritising matters of efficiency and cost 
effectiveness (or, cost cutting) in the delivery of services, but are also used 
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descriptively as shorthand for the different developments in public sector 
organisation and practice, dating from the 1980s onwards, through which this is to 
be achieved (Clarke et al., 2000). The creation of the Employment Service as an 
executive agency is one example. Functioning semi-autonomously from central 
government, its operational freedoms were matched with financial accountability 
measured and managed through performance indicators and targets (Carmel & 
Papadopoulos, 2009; Price, 2000; Wright, 2011, p. 87). 
Following the development of new public management, there emerged a trend 
toward contracting out and the marketisation of service provision. Wright (2011) 
identifies three stages in the development of welfare marketisation in the UK. The 
first step involved the incorporation of market values into the provision of public 
services, such as the introduction of performance indicators and targets in the 
management of the Employment Service and Jobcentres. This took place between 
1990 and 1997. The second stage involved the increasing use of contracting-out for 
specific, particularly area-based, services. This is the era of Employment Zones 
and the early New Deals during which there was a mix of provision, with some 
welfare-to-work initiatives delivered directly by Jobcentre Plus, and others 
contracted out to private and voluntary sector providers. The third stage involved 
the construction of large-scale quasi-markets in welfare services, roughly from 
2006 onwards –sometimes this stage is dated to the recommendations contained 
within the Freud (2007) report, which alongside its extensive reliance on the trope 
of ‘dependency’, recommended stricter conditionality, more extensive use of 
private and voluntary sector providers, and the creation of a single working-age 
benefit for all claimants, and the rationalisation of existing welfare-to-work 
contracts into a single service of ‘support’(Larsen & Wright, 2014).7 
                                               
7 After advising the New Labour government on its welfare reform agenda, in 2009 Freud switched 
his support to the Conservatives, later becoming Parliamentary Under-secretary of State for the 
Coalition government. His proposals for a single support service influenced the development of 
the Work Programme.  
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As van Berkel et al (2011, p. 261) note, these reforms, important in their own terms, 
are also of interest to researchers concerned with ‘the actual “production” of 
[activation] in the organisations involved in implementation processes’. Brodkin 
(2013b) suggests three ways in which implementation and street-level 
organisations have been conceptualised. Firstly, there is a one-dimensional view of 
street-level organisations, as those spaces in which ‘official’ policy is implemented 
and, through street-level discretion, distorted. This is the view adopted by early 
normative iterations of implementation studies which viewed street-level 
organisations as ‘deviant’ spaces (Brodkin, 2013a, p. 20; Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1973). Secondly, the two-dimensional view of street-level organisations abandons 
these normative assumptions, ‘flips the script and treats policy as an 
indeterminate construct…in order to see how policy is constructed on the ground’ 
(Brodkin, 2013a, p. 21). This is the perspective introduced by Lipsky (1980) and 
‘street-level bureaucracy’. Finally, a three-dimensional view of street-level 
organisations sees them as mediators of both policy and politics, ‘wherein 
politically contested policy projects may be advanced indirectly through 
administrative means, including through managerial reforms that alter the 
arrangements and conditions of street-level policy work’ (Brodkin, 2013a, p. 23). 
As has been argued elsewhere, ‘[n]ot only are governance reforms not neutral’ 
with respect to their influence on the content of social policies, but ‘these reforms 
also often explicitly intend to have an impact on programmes and services’ (van 
Berkel, Graaf, & Tomáš Sirovátka, 2011, p. 237). Slightly differently, Brodkin 
argues that what she calls ‘managerial reforms’ might be understood ‘as a form of 
politics by indirection’ (Brodkin, 2013a, p. 25) and, drawing on Pierson (1994), 
suggests that reforms to operational policy might be understood as purposeful 
attempts to obfuscate political conflicts and controversial policy intentions: 
managerial strategies ‘may be used to smuggle in small changes that, in the 
aggregate, advance broader political projects’ (Brodkin, 2013a, p. 27). In either 
case, whether open and explicit, or indirect and obfuscatory, it is argued that with 
respect to activation, the simultaneous development of both formal and 
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operational policy redoubles the importance of studying its implementation in 
street-level spaces.  
The politics of management emerges as a particularly important point of focus in 
recent street-level studies of activation programmes. One important feature of 
contemporary welfare-to-work programmes, and a consequence of contracting out 
and marketisation, is the prevalence of individualised performance targets and 
managerial surveillance for street-level advisors (Brodkin, 2011a; Soss, R. Fording, 
& Schram, 2011; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2013; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). Changes to 
the operational delivery of welfare services mean that it is less the case now that 
‘[s]treet-level bureaucrats tend to perform in jobs that are freer from supervisor 
scrutiny than most organizational jobs’, or that ‘work norms prevailing in these 
jobs minimize such scrutiny’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 50). On the contrary, recent studies, 
particularly those from the United states, have found that street-level workers are 
subject to wide-ranging and often intense managerial surveillance (Brodkin, 2013; 
Soss et al., 2013; Watkins-Hayes, 2009), and this relates directly to the operational 
context in which the work is carried out, where street-level organisations are 
under pressure to meet specific performance measures in order to receive 
payment. Street-level studies of activation, in their most recent iterations, are 
equally concerned with the way that street-level organisations mediate both policy 
and politics, and within this the role of management is crucial.  
This chapter has so far considered the origins of street-level perspectives in policy 
research, drawing attention to the emphasis on street-level organisations as places 
where policy is made, rather than simply implemented. It has also drawn attention 
to way that activation is shaped by developments in both formal and operational 
policy; for these reasons there is a growing interest in street-level organisations as 
places where different waves of policy reform meet and interact, and in street-
level sites as places where both politics and policy are mediated. Within the 
emerging street-level literature on activation the importance of performance 
management and monitoring emerges as a strong theme. In the following section 
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this chapter offers a more thematic review of some of the street-level literature; in 
doing so it draws attention to how some of the core themes of Street Level 
Bureacuracy have been addressed by specific studies, with a focus on social 
assistance and employment  services (although not exclusively). These are the 
themes of conflict and coping; client processing; and street-level identity. 
Following this thematic review, the chapter concludes by drawing attention to 
some differences and disagreements within the street-level literature. These are 
disagreements concerning the nature of the street-level bureaucrat as a subject, 
and the different ways that the street-level encounter is conceptualised.   
Conflict and coping 
In drawing attention to street-level sites as places where policies are made, and 
their indeterminacies resolved through practice, studies of street-level bureaucracy 
also point to how the street-level outcome of policy indeterminacy is decided 
through conflict and struggle. The discretion that street-level bureaucrats exercise 
is not conceptualised in abstract terms, as the free decision-making of 
unencumbered agents, but as something situated, embodied, and subject to a 
variety of pressures. The picture of street-level policy-making  that emerges from  
Street-Level Bureaucracy is of something  that is, potentially, overdetermined, in the 
sense of being the symptomatic outcome of multiple, often conflicting, forces and 
pressures. Variously, street-level policy conflict is ‘located in the struggles between 
individual workers and citizens who challenge or submit to client-processing’ 
(Lipsky, 2010, p. xiii); clients of street-level bureaucracies pursue a variety of 
strategies for dealing with the bureaucrats who work in them (Kingfisher, 2011; 
Lipsky, 2010, p. 9), who likewise devise different ways of controlling and 
processing clients (Lipsky, 2010, pp. 117–120). Street-level organisations also often 
have conflicting goals; goals which are client-centred and goals which are 
organisation-centred, as well as goals which relate to different wider reference 
groups within the community (Lipsky, 2010, p. 41). The conflict arising from 
ambiguous or contradictory agency goals can also find expression in conflict 
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among street-level bureaucrats themselves (Watkins-Hayes, 2009), or between 
street-level bureaucrats and their supervisors/managers over the ‘legitimate’ 
service aims (Lipsky, 2010, p. 16). For street-level bureaucrats this situation can 
also mean ‘a protracted struggle with themselves’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 203), which 
might be a struggle to cope, to ‘work in a way consistent with their own 
preferences’(Lipsky, 2010, p. 19; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Watkins-
Hayes, 2009), or even to ‘retain a concept of their own adequacy in the job’ 
(Lipsky, 2010, p. 82). Intensifying these integral conflicts of street-level work is the 
fact that it is mostly carried out under conditions of resource constraint (Lipsky, 
2010, p. 33). Street-level bureaucracy is, in this way, a ‘dilemmatic space’ (Hoggett, 
Mayo, & Miller, 2008) replete with struggle and conflict.  
Client processing 
Client processing is an important dimension of street-level work, and another area 
where street-level bureaucrats develop routines and simplifications as coping 
mechanisms. However, although client processing often involves simplification, it is 
by no means simple. As Lipsky writes,  
[p]eople come to street-level bureaucracies as unique individuals with 
different life experiences, personalities, and current circumstances. In 
their encounters with bureaucracies they are transformed into clients, 
identifiably located in a very small number of categories, treated as if, 
and treating themselves as if, they fit standardised definitions of units 
consigned to specific bureaucratic slots. The processing of people into 
clients, assigning them to categories for treatment by bureaucrats, and 
treating them in terms of those categories, is a social process…An 
important part of this process is the way people learn to treat 
themselves as if they were categorical entities (Lipsky, 2010, p. 59). 
The transformation of people into clients involves forms of classification (see also: 
Chapter Four) which are also simplifications of their experiences, personalities, 
and circumstances. This is not a one way process; the forms of classification and 
categorisation are propagated by street-level organisations are also adopted and 
often internalised by clients – one of the ways in which street-level bureaucracy 
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teaches ‘political lessons’ by assigning identities and reinforcing social norms 
(Dubois, 2012, p. 5). As Lipsky suggests, in many respects this is a relational, 
intersubjective, and negotiated process. However, it is also necessarily shaped by 
the different positions of street-level advisors and clients, and the relations of 
power between them. As Lipsky emphasises, street-level clients are 
‘nonvoluntary’, a ‘point which is obvious in coercive public agencies such as 
police departments, but [that] also applies when the coercive dimension of the 
relationship between agency and the client are less clear’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 54). In 
many cases street-level services are ones which cannot be accessed elsewhere, and 
where participation results from need rather than choice, a situation which creates 
particular relations of power and dependence between street-level workers and 
their clients (Hasenfeld et al.,1987). In the case of conditional activation, 
participation in welfare-to-work programmes is mandatory, but it is also the case 
that the aims of clients might in some cases partially align with those of the 
activation service. Research on mandatory activation programmes thus finds that 
the power dynamics of worker-client relations are sometimes ambiguous, and the 
experience of coercion depends to some extent on whether or not the client 
identifies with the programme and its aims. For example, Blaxland (2013) explores 
the way that both formal activation policy and street-level welfare-to-work 
programmes construct claimants in particular ways, addressing mothers primarily 
as workers (albeit ones without a job) and welfare recipients, privileging these 
identities over and above their status as parents (or, indeed, other types of 
identity). In this context, claimants who did not recognise themselves as workers 
or welfare claimants first and foremost tended to resist this construction of their 
identity, and with it the programme and its demands; however, other claimants 
did recognise themselves in the terms presented by the programme, aligning 
themselves with it. Blaxland understands this in terms of ‘interpellation’ 
(Althusser, 2006) and the creation of policy subjects through such moments of 
recognition (and refusal). Importantly it is the ‘interaction between the mother, the 
adviser and the policy [that] create[s] the ‘fit’ that makes an interpellated subject’ 
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(Blaxland, 2013, p. 794). Client processing at street-level is complex, and despite 
the overtly coercive nature of mandatory programmes, relations but also 
experiences of power can be ambiguous and dependent on the particular 
configuration of relations and interactions.  
Service users are often highly aware of the social norms and roles expected of 
them by street-level organisations, especially to the extent that these coincide with 
broader moral and moralising categories present in the wider culture, such as the 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ (Howe, 1994), ‘the good immigrant’ (Dubois, 2012, 
p. 66), and the ‘good mother’ (Hasenfeld, 2000; Korteweg, 2003, 2006). On the one 
hand, the literature emphasises the way that whilst such categorical identities are 
often imposed on the clients of street-level bureaucracies (Dubois, 2012; 
Kingfisher, 1996), their availability as widely-recognised cultural scripts means 
that they can also function as resources that (some) clients can use in their 
negotiations with street-level advisors.  Kingfisher (1996, 1998) discusses this in 
terms of the ‘hidden transcripts’ touched on in the last chapter; whilst in their 
interactions with welfare agencies, her participants ‘performed’ their 
deservingness, this was often a calculated strategy on their part, an everyday form 
of resistance underpinned by a more questioning ‘hidden transcript’ they shared 
with peers. However, it is important to emphasise that this kind of resistance 
depends on other resources and forms of support, and is not a strategy that all 
clients are able to adopt. It might depend on the support of peers (Kingfisher, 
1996) or friends and family members (Howe, 1990). Sometimes the performance of 
‘deservingness’ can fall flat, or be to no avail, and on other occasions, rather than 
being a tactic of everyday resistance, instead indicates a submission to powerful 
norms that is experienced as a form of suffering (Howe, 1994). 
Street-level identities 
In addition to being spaces where client identities are made, imposed, and 
resisted, street-level organisations are also important to the construction of the 
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social and working identities of street-level bureaucrats themselves. This is a point 
made by Lispky in his discussion of ‘advocacy and alienation’ (2010, p. 71), in 
which he addresses some of the motivations of street-level workers: ‘[t]hose who 
recruit themselves for public service work are attracted to some degree by the 
prospect that their lives will gain meaning through helping others’ (Lipsky, 2010, 
p. 72). Street-level bureaucrats are considered to share a broad orientation to 
public service (variously conceived) and for Lipsky this also entails a certain set of 
beliefs about the value and purpose of their work, which he refers to as ‘the myth 
of altruism’ and the ‘ideology of benign intervention’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 71). Street-
level bureaucrats work hard to maintain this myth, but the conflicts and dilemmas 
encountered during the course of their work can make it difficult to maintain. To 
the extent that the conflicts inherent to their role limit the scope for advocacy, 
street-level bureaucrats can become alienated from their work. This aspect of 
street-level bureaucracy has been developed by Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
(2000, 2003) who argue that understanding the values and motivations of street-
level workers is essential to understanding their discretionary practice. Against a 
view of the street-level worker as a state agent, making discretionary decisions 
about the application of rules, they argue that many street-level bureaucrats are 
first and foremost citizen-agents; in approaching any single, discrete situation or 
dilemma, street-level bureaucrats are guided first and foremost by their identities 
and values, making use of whatever discretionary power they have to apply rules 
in ways congruent with their broader conceptualisation of their role and its 
purpose.  
Although street-level work might be a site for the construction of working 
identities, there are different views on the importance of this for street-level 
discretion and policy-making. Whilst for Maynard-Moody and Musheno identity 
has analytical significance, for Brodkin (2011) the struggle of some bureaucrats to 
work in a way congruent with their beliefs is ‘the exception that proves the rule’– 
the rule being the fact that identity is secondary to the broader managerial system 
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of incentive and disincentive to which street-level bureaucrats are subject, what 
elsewhere she calls the ‘street-level calculus of choice’ (Brodkin, 2013c). Watkins-
Hayes (2009) complicates this picture, raising important questions about the 
interactions between identity, motivation and management in the delivery of 
street-level services. In her ethnography of a welfare-to-work programme she 
identified three distinct orientations – social worker, survivalist, and efficiency 
engineer – among street-level workers, and these corresponded to very different 
ways of approaching the same street-level role. She coins the term ‘situated 
bureaucrats’ to explore the ways that organisational rubrics intersect with complex 
local, gendered, and ethnic identities to produce specific subjective orientations to 
the task of street-level work. Importantly she also reveals the way that these 
orientations can change over time, and in response to organisational and 
operational reform.  
The street-level bureaucrat as subject and agent 
In some ways the concepts of discretion and coping might be understood as two 
sides of the same coin: in discretion the street-level bureaucrat is presented as the 
decisive agent; in coping, they are the subject of pressures and forces greater than 
themselves which constrain, influence and shape their discretionary practice.8 
Lipsky characterises a wide range of street-level routines and practices as coping 
mechanisms, as ways of negotiating and reaching compromise between different 
conflicting pressures.  The importance of discretion, but also of coping, raises an 
important question about the relationship between the two; the answer to this 
question depends, more fundamentally, on the conceptualisation of the street-level 
bureaucrat as a subject. On this point, Street-Level Bureaucracy is theoretically open 
                                               
8 Although as Lipsky notes in the preface to the 30th anniversary edition of Street-Level Bureaucracy, 
the importance of coping is relative to the structural constraints that street-level bureaucrats 
face: ‘Frontline workers whose jobs are relatively free of restrictive structural constraints will 
still develop routines in response to their work requirements. But the routines will not be 
developed primarily to cope with a difficult work environment’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. xvii). He goes 
on to note that Street-Level Bureaucracy largely addresses situations where constraint is 
significant; as this thesis will make clear, this is very much the case in street-level activation 
services.  
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or ecumenical in its approach, exhibiting what Hudson  (1993, p. 394) calls a 
‘Goffmanian eclecticism’. Street-level bureaucrats have been variously presented 
as acting on prejudice or their perceptions of justice (Fletcher, 2011; Lipsky, 2010, 
p. 69), in both cases guided by socially situated subjective perceptions about their 
role, their clients and the situations they are in (Watkins-Hayes, 2009). But nor are 
they indifferent to the pressures of management, performance measures, targets 
and other more calculative concerns (Brodkin, 2011a; Fletcher, 2011; Soss, R. 
Fording, et al., 2011; Soss et al., 2013). If there is an overriding theme in Lipsky’s 
characterisation of the street-level bureaucrat, it is that they largely motivated to 
make their lives easier by simplifying their work and reducing their workload to 
manageable proportions. However, this general characterisation sometimes sits at 
odds with glimpses of workers who strive to pursue a particular agenda through 
their work, and who seek to reconcile it, against countervailing pressure, with an 
idealised notion of public service. If in places the street-level bureaucrat appears a 
contradictory and under-theorised figure, this might be read as a consequence of 
such questions regarding the street-level bureaucrat as a subject being ones which 
are largely tangential to the main aim of the book, which is to establish the 
importance of street-level spaces as a site of policy making, and to offer a broad 
theoretical framework for understanding policy as it is made in such spaces. As 
such questions regarding the relations between subjective aims and identities, the 
pressures street-level workers face, their coping mechanisms and discretionary 
practices receive less attention.  
In applying a street-level perspective, and in trying to understand the ways that 
particular context-specific conflicts are negotiated, the complex overdetermination of 
street-level practice presented by Lipsky is often simplified and certain factors 
emphasised above others. This often depends on the analytical focus; it also 
depends on an (explicit or implicit) theorisation of the street-level bureaucrat as a 
subject. So, for example, in drawing attention to the disciplinary power of 
performance management and performance targets there is a version of the street-
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level bureaucrat as a rational actor, responding in calculative fashion to a system 
of incentives and disincentives (Brodkin, 2011a; Soss et al., 2013). In this view 
street-level bureaucrats are also subjective or socially constructed agents, but this 
agency is subordinate to the ‘calculus of choice’ in which it is situated (Brodkin, 
2013c, p. 152). Elsewhere, in work that draws attention to the subjective 
experiences street-level bureaucrats, there is instead an emphasis on identity and 
the importance of values and cultural norms in guiding discretionary behaviour 
(Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, 2003). Here, abidance to either a system of 
rules or incentives is contrasted with abidance to cultural norms and values; in this 
view the decisions and actions of street-level workers ‘are guided as much by 
meaning as by function’ (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, p. 20). Perhaps the 
most sophisticated conceptualisation of the street-level bureaucrat is the one 
developed in the attempt to explore the ‘formulation of professional identities, 
their connection to bureaucratic discretion, and their relationship to the wider 
social context in which they are embedded’(Watkins-Hayes, 2009, p. 10); in this 
view the street-level bureaucrat is a sociological subject, viewed in terms of 
situated agency and structural constraint. Discretion is viewed as the expression of 
identity, and subject to the influence of a variety of factors and constraints. This 
thesis is interested in the experiences of street-level bureaucrats, as much as with 
the outcomes of their practice. In this respect it is interesting to consider how the 
street-level calculus of choice is socially constructed by actors at street-level; 
furthermore, the thesis is interested in how systems of incentive and disincentive 
are experienced and interpreted by street-level agents.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the street-level approach to policy analysis, and 
situated it with respect to studies of the policy process and implementation 
studies. In reviewing the street-level literature on activation, attention has been 
drawn to the importance of operational as well as formal policy at street-level. 
This is expressed in the street-level activation literature in the focus on 
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management control and supervision. This chapter has also identified key themes 
across the wider street-level literature, such as client processing, conflict, and 
coping, and has also drawn attention to differences and disagreements with 
respect to how the street-level bureaucrat is conceptualised. On this point, I have 
argued that the street-level literature has tended to emphasise the importance of 
street-level workers’ subjective values and identities, or the external constraints, 
pressures, and calculative situations they face. Whilst it is possible to discern 
different and sometimes conflicting conceptualisations of the street-level 
bureaucrat, these are often implicit and as such relatively underdeveloped. 
Responding to this, the following chapter seeks to develop a conceptual 
framework which foregrounds the relationship street-level workers have to their 
role; such a framework will be used to explore the lived experiences of street-level 
activation workers in a way which accommodates both the subjective values and 
identities they might have, but also the organisational pressures and demands that 
they face. In developing this framework I draw on the sociological work of 
Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 2000) alongside a series of psychoanalytic and psychosocial 
concepts. This framework is also useful for understanding the experiences of client 
processing highlighted in this chapter. In particular, it helps to understand the 
specifically intersubjective and relational dimensions of client processing within 
the wider political and ideological context outlined in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter Four – Conceptual framework: the 
psychosocial field 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the conceptual framework of the thesis, delineating its 
broad theoretical approach, and defining its key concepts.  This theoretical 
approach might best be described as ‘psychosocial’, in the sense of being 
‘concerned with the mutual constitution of the individual and the social relations 
within which they are enmeshed’ (Reay, 2015, p. 10). Psychosocial studies is an 
emerging interdisciplinary field of scholarship, and its boundaries, genealogies 
and theoretical debts are the subject of ongoing debate (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; 
Hoggett, 2008; Walkerdine, 2008). However, in examining the ‘suture’ of 
individual and social worlds (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Miller, 1977) or, indeed, the 
intermediate ‘transitional space’ of their separation (Hoggett, 2008; Hollway, 2011; 
Winnicott, 1971), there is a common concern with the role of affect, emotion, and 
unconscious processes in mediating social and organisational life. In addition to 
resources drawn from sociology and critical theory, psychosocial approaches to 
social research have found in psychoanalysis particularly fecund theoretical 
ground from which to explore such processes (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). In this 
vein, this chapter explores the affinities between certain psychoanalytic concepts 
and Bourdieu’s (1977, 1998, 2000) body of sociological theory, arguing that this 
conceptual synthesis is particularly helpful when it comes to understanding the 
relation that street-level advisors have to their role, but also the embodied 
experiences that welfare users have of conditionality and activation.   
Social policy and ‘welfare’ have proven particularly fertile ground for 
psychosocial research, and this is a growing area of scholarship (Cooper & 
Lousada, 2005; Froggett, 2002; Hoggett & Campling, 2000; Stenner & Taylor, 2008). 
Arguably a psychosocial analysis of conditionality and activation is especially 
apposite given the increasingly individualised and individualising thrust of these 
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policies (van Berkel & Valkenburg, 2007), which target both the conduct and 
affective dispositions/presentations of welfare recipients (Friedli & Stearn, 2015). 
Psychosocial theorisations of the welfare subject have proven valuable in drawing 
attention away from the formal, discursive, and rhetorical agendas of welfare 
‘reform’, and toward the real dynamics and lived experience of its materialisation 
(Hoggett, 2001; Wright, 2016). In considering the street-level encounter between 
welfare service user and street-level bureaucrat, there is also a growing 
psychosocial literature addressing the emotional life of organisations, particularly 
those which deliver welfare services (Armstrong, 2014a; Cooper & Lousada, 2005; 
Hoggett, 2005, 2006; Jones, 2013).  
This chapter begins by outlining its core conceptual framework, which is derived 
from the work of Bourdieu. The concepts of field, habitus, and capital are 
introduced, as well as those of illusio, disillusionment, symbolic power and 
symbolic violence. The chapter then addresses some recent criticisms of this 
conceptual body of work, which point to its relative neglect of feeling, affect, and 
emotion. Some sociological work on emotion relevant to the thesis is introduced, 
as well as recent theoretical work highlighting the structural homologies between 
Bourdieu’s theoretical project and that of psychoanalysis. The chapter then argues 
that certain psychoanalytic concepts can contribute to an understanding of the role 
of feelings and emotion in the street-level encounters between advisers and 
welfare recipients, in a way which remains congruent with the overall framework. 
The synthesis offered here builds on recent theoretical developments to offer an 
original perspective on street-level encounters and dynamics. Finally, some key 
psychoanalytic concepts are defined, and their use in literature on social and 
organisational research is reviewed.   
The activation field 
This thesis conceptualises the street-level space of activation in terms of a family of 
concepts drawn from the work of Bourdieu. Specifically, it understands street-
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level interactions as occurring in a field – the field of activation – between 
embodied individuals, conceptualised in terms of habitus. This conceptualisation 
of street-level space enables the research to address in more detail the specific 
relation that advisors have to their role, understood in terms of their enrolment 
and recruitment into the field of activation. Such an approach also offers the 
possibility of thinking about the different ways in which advisors are adapted and 
oriented to their role, offering original insights and new perspectives on ‘street-
level coping’.  
This is a highly integrated and interrelated set of concepts; what analytic purchase 
each concept might have is gained through this integration into a broader 
theoretical body of relationships. However, rather than attempt to map or provide 
an extended account of the activation field, this thesis is more narrowly concerned 
with some of its specific street-level features, particularly as these are experienced 
by participants. Concomitantly, greater use is made of some Bourdieusian 
concepts than others9. This chapter also argues for the compatibility of certain key 
psychoanalytic ideas – projection/introjection, identification, disavowal – with 
these concepts. Nevertheless, here it is necessary to provide a condensed overview 
of Bourdieu’s theoretical body of work, outlining certain key conceptual 
relationships such that the meaning of the specific concepts utilised in later 
chapters – illusio, misrecognition, symbolic violence – is clear.  
                                               
9 As the sociologist Michele Lamont notes, ‘[a]mong Bourdieuphiles, a number of researchers have 
spent their scholarly lives defending the necessary integrity of the whole package’(Lamont, 
2012, p. 229); that is, they reject an approach which would make use of some concepts and not 
others, or that would seek to extend Bourdieu’s theory through the pragmatic 
incorporation/generation of new concepts (for a recent argument against such a ‘pragmatic 
empiricism’ see: Atkinson, 2011). Against this, however, Lamont argues for the value and 
legitimacy of just such a pragmatic approach. Indeed, this might be supported by Bourdieu’s 
own theoretical practice, and his explicit rejection of ‘the reading of the lector [as] an end in 
itself’, seen as the expression of the scholastic fallacy,  an interest only in texts and the relations 
between them, as opposed to a reading that sees concepts as tools simultaneously wrought 
through their practical application (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 53–54). This is the pragmatic approach 
to Bourdieu’s theory taken by Dubois (2012, p. xv), also adopted by this thesis.  
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Field, habitus, capital 
Central to the Bourdieusian theoretical corpus are the concepts of field, habitus, 
and capital; these are interrelated concepts, able to be defined ‘only within the 
theoretical system they constitute, not in isolation’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 
96). In order to illustrate the relationship between these concepts Bourdieu often 
deploys the metaphor of ‘the game’. In this metaphor the field can be understood 
as the game itself, but also the regulations and regularities that govern the activity 
of particular players. We can recognise a field when there is tacit acceptance 
among a group of actors that a certain set of stakes are worthy of interest. A field 
can be recognised through the common orientation of a group of people toward 
certain activities, ends, objects, or concerns. Bourdieu refers to this tacit acceptance 
or common orientation in terms of illusio, a concept of particular importance to this 
thesis, and which will be explored further below. Social life in its entirety might be 
conceptualised as a field; however this broader social field is also composed of 
numerous distinct fields, existing in relation to one another, and with differing 
degrees of relative autonomy10. Examples of fields from Bourdieu’s work are the 
field of cultural production, the academic field, the scientific field, the juridical 
field, and the bureaucratic field, among others. Of particular relevance here, 
Peillon (1998) explores possibilities in conceptualising a distinct ‘welfare field’, 
which includes welfare service users and street-level bureaucrats, but also elite 
political actors who shape the broader terrain. 
The concept of habitus refers to an individual’s ‘feel for the game’. Central to the 
concept of habitus is that it is largely unconscious and embodied. Habitus refers to 
an embodied history; it is the embodiment of history in an individual. For 
Bourdieu this means that habitus is also a particular embodiment of social 
                                               
10 This autonomy is always relative because all fields exist in relation to a broader field of power – 
the field of power being that which regulates the relations between fields (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, pp. 17–18). The activation field is composed of those actors with a stake in the 
policies of activation and conditionality. However, not all participants in this field are equal, 
and this is partially the result of their different proximities to the field of power. 
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structures. As a set of embodied dispositions, accumulated over time, the habitus 
of an individual is the result of their own personal history, and the effect of their 
trajectory through different locations in social space. In this sense it is a ‘structured 
structure’. However, it is also a ‘structuring structure’, in the sense that the habitus 
defines the scope of what a person is able to do in a given position, in a given field. 
The dispositions that have been accumulated define how one might understand, 
interpret, but also act within a particular field, and from a particular location in 
social space: habitus relates to a field in terms of a ‘kind of practical sense for what 
it to be done in a given situation – what is called in sport a “feel” for the game’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p. 25). 
The final concept in this triad is capital. There is an extensive social science 
literature on ‘social capital’ which has become quite influential in some domains of 
social policy (for a critical discussion of this literature see: Fine, 2002, 2010), but the 
meaning of this term in Bourdieu’s work is quite specific. Indeed, one of the main 
points about capital when considered in relation to field and habitus is that it is 
not possible to speak of capital in the abstract, as something which someone might 
possess independent of their habitus or its relationship to a particular field. 
Capital can be understood as a form of power; however, this power is always 
relative to a given field – in this sense Bourdieu speaks of cultural capital, 
academic capital, intellectual capital etc. Capital refers to the resources one might 
be able to deploy in a given situation. As an example, academic accreditations are 
one very important form of capital. Within the academic field itself, particular 
forms of academic accreditation will be recognised differently (accompanied by 
different forms of prestige, signalling different histories and orientations), and will 
allow different moves and transitions to be made. Bourdieu’s concept of capital is 
relational – the power of a particular form of capital is defined by the relationships 
within which it is to be deployed (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). Importantly, 
the power of capital depends on recognition – its potency is gained when others 
recognise it as legitimate. When this is the case, Bourdieu refers to it as ‘symbolic 
capital’, capital that is operative in a particular situation or field (Bourdieu & 
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Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). Academic accreditations are an important form of capital 
in several spheres, not only the academic field, a power derived from this 
symbolic recognition.  Degrees and qualifications from the academic field regulate 
entry to professional and occupational domains. Within this, they will also 
determine the particular point of entry to these other field (e.g. degrees from 
particular institutions might determine the likelihood of entering at a precise 
destination in a professional field, either more or less prestigious etc).  In terms of 
‘the game’, capital might refer to the tokens, chips, or cards held by a player 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). The value of these tokens is relational, and 
dependent on recognition; nevertheless, these can be converted and exchanged 
between fields.  
The concepts of field and habitus are central to the conceptual framework of this 
thesis. In particular, these concepts are central to the exploration of how street-
level advisors are invested in and oriented toward their work. In understanding 
these orientations, the thesis relies on the concept of habitus outlined above, but 
also on that of illusio and disillusionment, which will be explored further in the 
following subsection. The concept of capital takes on a less prominent role in this 
thesis; in part this has to do with a focus on the nature of the activation field itself, 
and of advisers’ different investments in it, rather than following the course of 
particular trajectories through the field vis-à-vis their struggle with competitors. 
However, the discussion of capital draws attention to a very important feature of 
Bourdieu’s theoretical work, which is the symbolic nature of power, and the 
crucial importance of (mis)recognition (by others) in defining what a person is able 
to do.  
Illusio, disillusionment, and hysteresis 
The illusio can be defined as that which binds field and habitus together (Bourdieu, 
2000, p. 151). Elsewhere, it is referred to as the ‘fundamental belief in the interest 
of the game and the value of its stakes’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 11). If a field is 
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constituted by different actors, with different positions in social space, the illusio is 
that which orients their practice and unites them as actors in a particular field. In 
discussing this form of orientation Bourdieu adopts the psychoanalytic idiom of 
investment – illusio, as a form of enchantment, is ‘to be invested, taken in and by 
the game’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 116) –  and draws a direct comparison 
with psychoanalysis in emphasising the libidinal nature of this investment 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 166).  In looking at how individuals become invested in 
particular fields it is important to pay attention to the particular form taken by 
their social and socialised desires (Aarseth, 2016; Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 165–166), 
desires which reside in the habitus and its dispositions, and which will have been 
shaped by the experiences of previous fields, positions in social space, and 
ultimately by the original domestic space itself (the space with which 
psychoanalysis has traditionally been preoccupied).  
In entering a field, a habitus becomes invested in its illusio. One criticism levelled 
at Bourdieu’s work is that in focusing on this fit between habitus and field (on 
their mutual constitution) it has tended to accentuate the integration of both (Silva, 
2016a). Whilst Bourdieu discusses the various determinations of investment at 
length (in terms of the prior dispositions of the habitus, and the available space of 
positions open to it), the problem of disinvestment – or withdrawal from the game 
– is largely unaddressed. The consequences of this for thinking about the role of 
the emotions are discussed at greater length in the next section. Here it should be 
noted that this process of disinvestment or withdrawal is a central concern of this 
thesis. This is of particular concern because the thesis addresses data both from 
those currently situated within the field of activation, but also those who, for 
various reasons, have left it to pursue other forms of work in different contexts. 
For Lispky, the ability of street-level workers to ‘retain a concept of their own 
adequacy in their job’ provides a crucial limit to their ability to continue in the 
work (Lipsky, 1980, p. 82), however, the street-level literature itself has relatively 
little to say about this limit. In this research there is a focus on understanding more 
about the limits to street-level bureaucrats’ coping mechanisms, as well as what it 
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means to ‘fit in with’ and find either enjoyment, or at least some level of 
satisfaction in the role of advisor. Counterposed to illusio, the concept of 
disillusionment  can bedefined as ‘to lose  one’s “belief in the game”, to cease to 
experience it as worthwhile or meaningful’ (Crossley, 1999, p. 815). In paying 
attention to what makes the difference for those advisors who felt comfortable or 
remain in the role (the feeling of ‘fit’ or ‘fitting in’), and those who do not, 
important features of the street-level activation field and its illusio might be 
revealed.  
Such a framework has proven useful in some sociological studies of public and 
voluntary sector workers in organisations undergoing change and transformation. 
In particular, it has been used to understand the difficulties and discomfort 
experienced by public sector workers as they are subjected to the arrival of new 
public management in their organisations, an introduction which entails a radical 
reordering of priorities, effectively the construction of a new game and new illusio 
(McDonough & Polzer, 2012). Colley (2012) uses the concept of illusio to 
understand the emotional and ethical turmoil experienced by workers in the 
Connexions youth support and advisory service during a period in which the aims 
and purposes of the organisation were subject to change and transformation. She 
describes how the introduction of economically driven targets replaced a more 
client-centred organisational ethos, effectively altering the stakes of the game and 
its illusio, especially for front-line, street-level advisors, many of whom held a 
‘deep-seated and long-term commitment and investment’(Colley, 2012, p. 325)  in 
the notion of caring public service work. This resulted in distress and emotional 
suffering, as ‘the shattering of illusio and the incongruence of habitus with the new 
stakes in the field resulted in a disengagement which made it very difficult, even 
impossible, to learn how to practice in a manner that was both ethical and 
compatible with government and institutional targets’ (Colley, 2012, pp. 332–333). 
In these accounts, workers who were already employed by an organisation 
experience a series of difficulties and dilemmas as their organisations are subject 
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to massive change. These two studies are useful, because they deploy the 
framework of habitus, field, and capital in situations in which the rules of the 
game are subject to change and transformation, at the behest of powerful policy 
actors, and where there is a mismatch between habitus and field. Similarly Artaraz 
(2006) uses these concepts to discuss the ways that the different occupational 
groups originally brought together under the Connexions agency – Careers 
Advisors, Teachers, Social Workers – reacted to a shift in focus of the organisation. 
The studies suggest the usefulness of this approach for the conceptualisation of 
conflict at ‘street-level’ – conflicts, borne largely by street-level workers, over the 
meaning, purpose, and definition of their role, and also of the ways that 
individuals in these organisation can and do ‘subvert the service’s ethos through 
their daily practice’ (Artaraz, 2006: 925). Whilst in these studies the habitus finds 
itself in a field that is undergoing change, in this thesis these concepts are 
deployed to explore the different ways that advisors feel more or less ‘in’ or ‘out of 
place’ within street-level services.  
Classification, symbolic power, and symbolic violence 
This thesis is interested in street-level activation encounters as sites of 
classification, classificatory struggle, and the exercise of power. Given the 
importance attached to welfare subjects being/becoming (defined as) ‘active’ and 
fulfilling their behavioural ‘conditions of conduct’, the thesis is interested in how 
‘activation’ and the correct sorts of ‘behaviour’ become recognised and classified 
as such by advisors. Bourdieu defines what he calls symbolic power in these 
terms: 
Symbolic power, whose form par excellence is the power to make 
groups and to consecrate or institute them …consists in the power to 
make something exist in the objectified, public, formal state which only 
previously existed in an implicit state (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 14). 
Amongst other things, welfare conditionality and activation require that claimants 
meet certain conditions. Street-level decisions about how, or whether, such 
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conditions and requirements are being met are also decisions which consecrate or 
institute the existence of certain groups, in this case ‘active’ or ‘inactive’, 
‘compliant’ or ‘noncompliant’ claimants (and, perhaps, lurking in or behind these 
‘principles of vision and division’ there might lie others: strivers and skivers, 
shirker and scroungers etc.). In this sense, the thesis understands the power 
wielded by advisors to also be a form of symbolic power, and the thesis is 
interested in the extent to which this form of power is accepted as legitimate by 
those involved, or contested and made the subject of ‘classificatory struggle’ 
(Tyler, 2015). 
In this way, for Bourdieu, processes of classification and categorisation are 
intimately bound up with the exercise of power; indeed, classification is one of the 
main ways that power is exercised, particularly power in its least visible, least 
contested forms. This is the power that resides in ‘doxa’ and ‘commonsense’, as 
that which ‘goes without saying’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 167), is tacitly accepted, and 
forms the very basis for conscious understanding and interpretation: symbolic 
power is ‘the power to impose and inculcate [the] principles of construction of 
reality’ (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 13). Closely associated with this notion of symbolic 
power is that of symbolic violence; this is a form of domination that has no need of 
explicit threats of overt violence. Rather it is a form of ‘gentle violence’ that 
achieves its effects through consent and (mis)recognition: ‘the gentle, invisible 
form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so much 
undergone as chosen’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192). Elsewhere it is defined thus: 
Symbolic violence is that form of domination which, transcending the 
opposition usually drawn between sense relations and power relations, 
communication and domination, is only exerted through the 
communication in which it is disguised. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 237 n.47) 
Symbolic violence operates through forms of consent and assent; it is a violence 
that is efficacious only to the extent that it is submitted to; however, this 
submission is obtained through an embodied sense of its legitimacy, and a belief 
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(or, perhaps, investment) in the categories and schemes of classification through 
which it operates. These notions of symbolic power and symbolic violence are 
important to the thesis; they provide the means through which accounts of client 
processing in street-level activation services can be situated with respect to forms 
of classification, and to the experience of class and classed subject positions power 
outlined in Chapter Two. 
There is something ‘magical’ about the operations of symbolic power and 
symbolic violence. For Bourdieu, this ‘magic’ resides in the reliance of such power 
on forms of belief. Elsewhere (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 117–126), he describes the 
‘social magic’ achieved by rites of institution (such as the awarding of titles) in 
which a series of social relations (and a particular trajectory through social space) 
become ‘consecrated’ in an individual, who is henceforth able to call upon this 
history as a form of embodied symbolic capital. In the act of consecration, the 
contingent history through which it is made possible is erased and made invisible; 
certain effects of social structure come to be seen as the essential properties of 
individual, properties which justify the act of consecration itself (Bourdieu, 1992, 
p. 170). For Bourdieu this ‘magic’ is an effect of belief, and relies on a simultaneous 
recognition (of the consecration as legitimate) and misrecognition (of the broader 
structure which makes it possible) (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 170). These relations 
between belief and the (mis)recognition of social relations offer one means of 
interrogating the ‘meaning’ of conditionality and activation as particular forms of 
social relation imbued with power.  
This discussion of symbolic power has thus far emphasised the importance of 
‘principles of vision and division’, which is to say, practices of classification and 
modes of understanding. Concomitantly, in this thesis attention is paid to the 
interpretations and, indeed, analysis that participants have of their own situations, 
and the principles which underpin these. However, very little space has so far 
been given to questions of affect, feeling, or emotion. Although ‘principles of 
vision and division’, beliefs, doxa, and ‘commonsense’ are for Bourdieu always 
The psychosocial field  69 
 
embodied in the habitus, as several scholars have pointed out (Probyn, 2004; Reay, 
2015; Robbins, 1991), there remains an emphasis on their cognitive dimensions, 
with rather less consideration given to either the affective or emotional aspects of 
habitus. As Probyn (2004) puts it, ‘Bourdieu himself is rather vague on the place of 
emotion within the habitus. His attention to the physicality of the embodied 
habitus does, however, promise a way of thinking about emotion and affect as 
simultaneously social and physical’ (Probyn, 2004, p. 225). In the following section 
this chapter addresses recent work which has drawn attention to affinities 
between some aspects of Bourdieu’s sociological theory, and certain 
psychoanalytic concepts.  
Bourdieu, emotion, and psychoanalysis 
One criticism levelled at Bourdieu’s theoretical work is that it does not give 
adequate consideration to the role of affect and emotion (Reay, 2004, 2015; Sayer, 
2009; Sweetman, 2003). Another related criticism is that the emphasis on habitus as 
both a structured and structuring structure has, in places, especially in earlier 
work, tended to accentuate the integration of habitus, as well as the integration of 
habitus and field, at the expense of being able to address fragmentation, 
dissonance, ambivalence, or dis-integration (Silva, 2016a). Both issues have 
recently drawn the attention of sociologists and psychosocial theorists, and there is 
an emerging literature investigating the tensions and affinities between Bourdieu’s 
theoretical project and psychoanalysis (Darmon, 2016; Fourny & Emery, 2000), 
which, it is argued, can help to address these limitations (Reay, 2015; Steinmetz, 
2006). In this section I review some of this literature, and explore important points 
of affinity between these theoretical approaches. In particular I draw attention to 
some psychoanalytic concepts that have guided this thesis, and situate them with 
respect to the broad framework outlined above. These are psychoanalytic concepts 
which have to do with conflict within the subject, and which it is argued, are 
useful in understanding the psychosocial domain of welfare interactions and 
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experiences. These are the concepts of identification, projection, introjection, and 
disavowal.  
Emotion and power 
There is a significant body of sociological work on affect and emotion; indeed, it 
can be argued that the social sciences have recently undergone an ‘affective turn’ 
(Clough and Halley, 2007; Thompson & Hoggett, 2012). Within this large body of 
work there are a variety of different approaches and orientations. The term ‘affect’ 
– as opposed to emotion or feeling – can be traced back through two distinct 
lineages; one to the work of Tomkins (1984), for whom affect names an ‘innate 
biological drive’ rather than the more culturally coded ‘emotion’; another, via 
Deleuze (1992) to the philosophical work of Spinoza and his account of emotion as 
‘the modifications of the body by which the power of action on the body is 
increased or diminished’. In this latter orientation, there is a focus on ‘affect 
without a subject’(Wetherell, 2012, p. 123) and on the ways that affect is ‘onto-
formative, meaning that it constitutes subjects and objects [and] sets up relations 
between subjects and objects’ (Wetherell, 2012, p. 159). This understanding of 
affect plays a particularly prominent role in the work of Skeggs (2004, 2005; Skeggs 
& Loveday, 2012), in which it is used to trace the way that affective relations work 
to produce particular kinds of classed subject positions; but also to highlight how 
tracing affective relations can reveal struggles in and against these positions.  
With a rather different orientation  is literature addressing emotion and emotional 
labour, inspired by the work of Hochschild (1979, 2012). In contrast with affect 
studies, this work is concerned with the commodification, management, and 
manipulation of emotion in the context of waged-labour, particularly in service 
work (Dowling, 2007, 2012). Here the subject and their relations are already 
defined (e.g. service employee, manager, and customer etc), and feeling and 
emotion mediates these relations. Rather differently than affect studies, this work 
is concerned with emotion and emotional presentation as a kind of resource that 
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employees can – and are encouraged to – control and manipulate in order to 
achieve particular commercial ends. Similarly, working with Bourdieu’s concept of 
capital, Reay (2004) has argued for the existence of a specifically gendered form of 
‘emotional capital’.  This work introduces the notion of ‘feeling-rules’, more often 
than not implicit rather than explicit, defined as ‘what we imagine we should and 
shouldn’t feel and would like to feel over a range of circumstances’ (Hochschild, 
2003, p. 83). Here, the concept of feeling, or emotion, is of something that is 
socially governed, with clearly discernible rules and codes. Tonkens (2012; 
Tonkens et al., 2013) adopts this framework and applies it to the situation of 
activation, arguing that the move to greater activation also entails changes to the 
‘feeling-rules’ of citizenship; changes which can produce a clash or conflict when 
there are different expectations about the appropriate rules (Tonkens, 2012). This 
work also highlights the potentially positive emotional experiences that activating 
welfare-to-work programmes can provide, specifically in context of volunteer 
work which provides welfare recipients a means to regain their self respect 
(injured by the position of ‘dependency’) but also the fragility of these feelings and 
the potential for further injury (Kampen et al.,2013).  
In some respects the notion that affect and emotion, rather than things which 
impress themselves on already-formed subjects are also productive – of subjects, 
objects, and the relations between them – and the notion of emotion as something 
that moves and moves through and makes subjects (Ahmed, 2004) is useful for 
this research. In places, the thesis does adopt the language of ‘affect’, recognising 
that in some instances participants are moved by forces for which they do not (yet) 
necessarily have names. However, Wetherell (2012, p. 159) draws attention to the 
way that the conceptualisation of ‘affect without a subject’ can risk neglecting the 
embodied subject as a special site where affective force is patterned by individual 
subjectivity. This thesis adopts the view that the individual embodied subject is 
such a special site and that sometimes feeling and emotion are indeed objects over 
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which people can or can try to exert some control, often in line with perceived 
feeling rules.  
However, whilst informed by both the literature on ‘affect’ and ‘emotional labour’, 
for the most part where this thesis is concerned with emotion it is with the more 
colloquial, every day sense of ‘having feelings’. In particular, the thesis is 
concerned with the feelings that participants – both advisors and claimants – find 
hardest to place. These are often ambiguous feelings, which don’t always have a 
clear object, or ambivalent feelings, and situations where the participants felt 
contradictory things. The thesis, then, is interested in conflicting feelings, and 
feelings about conflict, which it understands in terms of the conflicts within and 
between habitus and street-level field. In the discussion of symbolic power above 
there was a noted emphasis on cognitive processes, although as Jones (2013) 
argues, there is also a close connection between power and emotion, particularly 
within and between organisations and their clients: 
Emotion and relationships are central because they are central to how 
organisations, and specifically governing organisations, work. 
Organisations depend on people persuading one another to follow 
particular courses of action, by drawing on resources that sometimes 
include coercive power, or self-regulation based on acceptance of 
differences in power and status, or using elements of desire as tools of 
persuasion. All of these resources operate at the level of people doing the 
persuading, choosing and self-regulation – within structural 
constraints. The workings of organisations are thus mediated through 
embodied relationships, and experienced in emotional terms. But 
recognising this does not mean that governing and organisations are 
being reduced to the irrational, inexplicable or ineffable. Emotions are 
powerful, and power operates through emotions. (Jones, 2013, pp. 6–7) 
Emotion and power are closely connected because at the level of embodied 
relationships people are connected to each other, but also to organisations, 
through feeling. In following this definition of these relationships, this thesis 
attends to feelings as a way of exploring both relations (to other agents, and to the 
organisation, or field) and power. In drawing attention to difficult feelings, 
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feelings about difficult situations, or the feelings that participants find hard to 
place, it also draws attention to the uneven or ambiguous hold of power – 
something which the focus on cognitive processes might otherwise conceal. In 
exploring the feelings that are difficult to place, rather than on a more abstract 
sense of ‘affect’, or on those emotions that are for the most part successfully 
contained and controlled, this thesis finds certain psychoanalytic concepts useful. 
The following subsections introduce these concepts, and connects them to the 
broadly Bourdieusian framework already outlined.  
Coping mechanisms as compromise formations 
This thesis is concerned with the lived experiences of activation and 
conditionality. As indicated in Chapter Two, recent research has drawn attention 
to the way that, for claimants, these are often intensely affective and emotional 
experiences, marked in particular by feelings of anxiety, fear, insecurity and worry 
(Garthwaite, 2014; Patrick, 2017). Albeit in a different way, the position of street-
level advisor is no less marked by difficult feelings and emotional conflict 
(Hoggett, 2005). One of the major themes of this thesis is how the regime of 
conditional activation operates and is materialised in emotional terms, for street-
level agents as much as for claimants. In focusing on the emotional dynamics of 
street-level activation, and the affective interface between individual and 
institution, the thesis makes particular use of the concept of the ‘compromise 
formation’. This concept is useful in exploring a central theme of the street-level 
literature, namely the coping mechanisms adopted by street-level bureaucrats.  
Understanding coping mechanisms specifically in terms of compromise 
formations (compromises within the habitus, and also between habitus and field) 
draws attention to the felt, as opposed to calculative, dimensions of coping. Coping 
can be understood something unconscious, that follows from a particular ‘feel for 
the game’, and that is processed in emotional terms. Rather than emphasise a 
wholly rational or calculative ‘street-level calculus of choice’(Brodkin, 2011a, 
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2013c), it foregrounds the role of emotion and (socialised) desire (Aarseth, 2016) in 
shaping advisers’ responses to street-level demands and dilemmas. 
In psychoanalysis the compromise formation names a symptom which is the result 
of an emotional conflict – the conflict between two (or more) opposing wishes, or 
between a wishful impulse and a repressive force. The compromise formation is 
sometimes distinguished from the reaction formation (where the symptom is a 
reaction against the wish, e.g. expressions of hatred for the secretly loved object), 
and the substitute formation (where the libido is displaced onto a different, 
substitute object), because it is a formation which manages to retain both the 
wishful impulse and its opposition, rejection, or repression, in one symptom. 
Bourdieu adopts this term in order to specify the ways that an individual habitus 
becomes invested in and attached to a particular field – a field for which it might, 
at least at first, be only partially suited (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 100). This is a process 
which Darmon (2016, p. 117) describes in terms of the ‘dialectics between 
individuals and institutions’; there is, in Bourdieu’s use of the concept, a mutually 
conditioning movement between individual habitus and institutional field; 
between the desires and dispositions brought to the field by the habitus, and the 
demands and modifications imposed on habitus by the field. Importantly this 
movement occurs through what Aaseth (2016) calls ‘socialised desire’ (desire 
shaped by and directed toward particular social relations) and the cathexis of 
libidinal investment. The habitus becomes attached to a field, in part, because it 
wants something from it, and because the field might be able to satisfy its desire in 
some way. However, at the same time, the field is able to ‘take advantage’ of 
habitus and its desire, fashioning them in line with its own ends: 
One can equally well say that agents take advantage of the possibilities 
offered by a field to express and satisfy their drives and their desires, in 
some cases their neurosis, or that fields use the agents’ drives by forcing 
them to subject or sublimate themselves in order to adapt to their 
structures and to the ends that are immanent within them. In fact, the 
two effects are observed in each case, no doubt in unequal proportions, 
depending on the field and the agent, and, from this point of view, one 
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could describe each singular form of a specific habitus…as a kind of 
compromise formation (in Freud’s sense). (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 165) 
In conceptualising the attachment of advisors to their role in terms of desire, and 
in understanding their particular occupational habitus in terms of a compromise 
between this desire and institutional (field) requirements, this concept sheds light 
on the affective, rather than the calculative (see: Brodkin, 2011) dimensions of 
street-level coping. As I will argue in Chapter Six, specifically with respect to 
‘creaming and parking’, this has important consequences for how we might 
understand the meaning of such coping practices.  
The concept of ‘compromise formation’ is also particularly useful in highlighting 
the ambivalent dimensions of street-level work. Hoggett (2005, 2006) has drawn 
attention to the way that street-level organisations are necessarily ambivalent 
organisations; in this account, the ambivalence arises from the contradictory and 
conflicting public aims of such organisations, their ‘ambiguity and multiplicity of 
objectives’ (Lipsky, 1980, p. 164), but also the different kinds of public sentiment 
that become invested in them. As outlined in Chapter Two, welfare and 
‘dependency’ are the subject of highly charged and emotive forms of discourse 
(Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Hoggett et al., 2013) with which street-level organisations 
often become associated and expected to contain (Hoggett, 2005). The psychosocial 
concept of the compromise formation draws attention to the ways that this 
containment operates in and through the habitus of advisors. In addition to 
exploring the desires and investments that advisors bring to their role, Chapter Six 
is equally concerned with the impositions of the street-level field on advisors, and 
how these are subjectively registered and experienced.   
Defence mechanisms and the non-unitary self 
The concept of the compromise formation highlights the negotiation of conflicts 
between habitus and field, but in focusing attention on coping, and on the 
accommodations made by habitus, it continues to foreground processes of 
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adaptation and integration (Silva, 2016b). However, this thesis is equally 
concerned with the problems and, in some cases, failures of integration; with 
fragmentation and the dis-integration of experience, and with contradictory 
feelings that are sometimes difficult to name or place. As already indicated, in the 
case of advisors this is addressed in terms of disillusionment, or withdrawal; in 
some cases a break with the field becomes necessary in order to preserve the 
integrity of habitus and its experience. However, with respect to the experience of 
claimants these concepts arguably have less purchase, and this is because of the 
very different way that claimants become enrolled and positioned within the 
street-level field.  
Whereas advisors enter the activation field by applying for a job, claimants 
become subject to its demands and requirements when they apply for benefits. 
Clearly these are very different sorts of ‘application’, and entail altogether 
dissimilar sorts of investment, desire and relationships to necessity. Chapter Seven 
is centrally concerned with the experiences of claimants, which are no less marked 
by forms of desire, investment, and coping needs, but of a very different sort to 
advisors. In particular, claimants must not only cope with the problems that 
necessitate their claim for benefits – in terms of ‘getting by’ (Lister, 2004) – but 
also, as Chapter Seven will explore, with the additional demands and 
requirements of conditional activation. While it is possible to understand some 
aspects of claimants’ coping in terms of habitus and its negotiations with the 
street-level field, it is also the case that claimants’ different position means their 
scope for practical accommodation with the field is differently constrained. 
Importantly, they have significantly less scope to simply ‘exit’ or withdraw from 
the field and any conflicts they might have with it, although their experience of 
activation is no less – arguably more – characterised by ambivalence, dissonance, 
discomfort and conflict than that of advisors.  
In understanding what claimants do (how they cope) with the contradictory 
pressures they face, the difficult feelings they are forced to contain, and the 
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uncomfortable positions they are expected to occupy, the thesis makes use of the 
psychoanalytic idiom of defence mechanisms as a means of coping with conflict. 
Conflict and its negotiation is the central organising motif of both psychoanalytic 
theory and Bourdieusian sociological theory. As Fourny and Emery ( 2000) argue, 
this is more than a superficial resemblance, but expressive of a more fundamental 
‘structural homology’ between the two (2000, p. 111), an argument also developed 
by Darmon (2016). However, if this homology can be defined as ‘a resemblance in 
difference’ (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 140), then this difference lies in the kinds of 
conflict that are addressed, and where they are located. From the sociological 
perspective of field, habitus, and capital, the relevant conflicts are those which 
take place between agents in a field, between fields, or between habitus and field. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, however, the relevant conflicts would be those 
which take place on the terrain of the subject, or habitus, itself. With respect to 
these it might be argued that ‘[p]sychoanalysis offers a much richer array of 
concepts for analyzing the idiosyncratic sense that different individuals make of 
shared social conditions’ (Steinmetz, 2006, p. 453). One consequence of the 
‘psychosocial’ approach adopted by this thesis is that these domains of conflict are 
understood to be related, and that conflicts in one can be expressed, transposed, or 
contained within the other. The argument is that psychoanalytic concepts, 
particularly those related to defence mechanisms, can be useful in understanding 
how forms of social conflict are contained and managed by an individual habitus.  
Conflict is central to the psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the subject because 
the psychoanalytic subject is always conceptualised as split, divided, or ‘non-
unitary’. Indeed, this is foundational to the psychoanalytic project, which begins 
with the ‘discovery of the unconscious’ and the tripartite division of the subject 
into id, ego, and superego.  Particularly relevant to this thesis are those processes 
whereby conflicts and difficult feelings are diverted and managed by divided, 
non-unitary subjects. Particularly useful for this thesis are the Kleinian (1946) 
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concepts related to ‘splitting’, as well as the psychic processes related to denial, 
disavowal, and perversion (Layton, 2010, 2014; Žižek, 2008).  
Projection, introjection, and projective identification 
Klein’s work has been particularly influential among British psychosocial studies 
(Woodward, 2015, p. 75) precisely because of the way it emphasises relations 
between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds (Clarke, 1999). In distinction with Freudian 
theory, it also sees the primary drives –  ‘feelings, passions, emotions which are 
directed at others’ (Clarke, 1999, p. 26) – not as innate biological mechanisms, but 
as formed in the social environment and ‘shaped by interaction with others’ 
(Clarke, 1999, p. 33). There is an emphasis on the mediations between psychic and 
social worlds through fantasy/phantasy, and Klein ‘develops a picture of the 
human condition in which we escape from internal anxieties by projecting them 
into external figures’ (Hoggett, 2006, p. 181).  Important terms in the Kleinian 
lexicon are projection, introjection, and projective identification. Projection can be 
defined as the ‘externalisation of an internal process’ (Freud, 1991b, p. 231) 
particularly as a means of defence (ibid, p. 241). Introjection describes the process 
whereby objects in the external world are taken into the self; indeed, important 
aspects of the ‘self’ and its identifications are formed in this way (Freud, 1991b, pp. 
133, 422).  For Klein, projection and introjection are understood primarily as 
defences against anxiety, and are important processes whereby the ego is able to 
achieve stability and integration. The ego, through processes of ‘splitting’, is able 
to manage anxiety by getting rid of the threats posed by unpleasant feelings – in 
projection some aspect of the inner world is split off and put outside the self, onto 
another person or object.  ‘Projective identification’ refers to a similar process, but 
one in which the process of projection is such that it induces particular feelings or 
emotions in the person who is its object: 
Whereas projection is a relatively straight forward process in which we 
attribute our own affective state to other, for example, we may feel 
depressed and view our colleagues in the workplace as being 
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‘miserable’ or blame others for our mistakes, projective identification 
involves a deep split, a ridding of an unpalatable part of the ‘self’ into, 
rather than onto, someone else (Clarke, 1999, p. 27) 
These concepts – of splitting, projection, and projective identification – are 
particularly useful in understanding the way that habitus is able to manage the 
threats and anxieties provoked by ‘bad’ objects in its world. In projective 
identification, there is also an emphasis on the way that projection can, in certain 
circumstances, put feelings into other people, or make them feel in certain ways, or 
as if they are certain types of thing or person. In Chapter Seven these concepts are 
used to explore the ways that some claimants manage situations of threat and 
anxiety when they have already ‘played their cards’ or exercised their agency in 
the ways they know how. The concepts of projective identification and introjection 
are used to understand the way that welfare recipients are sometimes made to feel 
things, or made to feel as if they are a specific type of ‘bad’ object in their 
interactions with advisors. These concepts are useful in exploring some of the 
ambivalence surrounding activation identities, and the uncertainties of 
identification (as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ welfare subject). 
The perverse social defence and magical voluntarism 
For Klein, ‘splitting’, and the process of ridding oneself of ‘bad’ internal objects is a 
form of denial (Klein, 1935, 1946). Denial, disavowal, and the related defence of 
perversion, play an important role in Chapter Eight of this thesis. In some ways, 
denial might be related to the concept of ‘misrecognition’. The concept of 
disavowal is slightly different, and refers to a situation in which a subject both 
knows and does not know; it describes a defence in which the apprehension of a 
difficult and unpleasant aspect of reality is simultaneously acknowledged and 
denied11; Freud observes of one his patients that ‘the attitude which fitted in with 
                                               
11 It was in the attempt to understand this phenomenon which led to Freud’s theoretical 
postulation of the ‘splitting of the ego in the process of defence’(Freud, 1991a) to which Klein’s 
work is heavily indebted.  
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the wish and the attitude which fitted in with reality existed side by side’ (Freud, 
1928, p. 156). As opposed to denial, or misrecognition, this concept helps to 
understand some of the ambivalent attitudes encountered in activation services. 
This disavowed attitude to reality can be characterised as perverse, which the 
psychoanalyst Lynne Layton (Layton, 2010, 2014) suggests has become an 
increasingly prominent feature of neoliberal subjectivity in a context where 
individuals are encouraged to deny their frailties, vulnerabilities, and 
dependencies in order to identify with an idealised version of  themselves as 
invincible, independent, and ready to compete. The impossibility of completely 
denying interrelatedness and dependency can leads to such a split, ambivalent, 
and disavowed relationship toward the external social world. Developing a 
similar lines of argument, the critical psychologist Smail (1995, 2005) has identified 
‘magical voluntarism’ as a particular psychological feature of neoliberal ideology; 
this is a form of psychological reasoning which attributes unhappiness and mental 
distress exclusively to the thought processes of individuals (exemplified in 
therapeutic terms bythe use of short term Cognitive Behavioural Therapy), as 
opposed to their material conditions of existence and their place within a wider set 
of social relations, which are structured by relations of exploitation and oppression 
(Fisher, 2014). This might be linked to recent work drawing attention to the 
‘coercive positivity’ operative in activation programmes, whereby individuals are 
encouraged to take responsibility not only for their job search activity, but also 
their attitude and affective dispositions (Friedli & Stearn, 2015). There is a wider 
and emerging literature, on the de-politicisation of mental distress, as well as the 
pressure to present oneself as ‘positive’ in order to remain employable and 
marketable (Berardi, 2009; Cederström & Spicer, 2015, 2015; Ehrenreich, 2010; 
Southwood, 2011).  
For Žižek (2008) disavowal plays an important role in the operation of ideology, 
which he locates at the level of practice, rather than professed belief. For Žižek, 
ideology is properly understood in terms of the unconscious belief which 
underpins practice or action, as opposed to the explicit or conscious articulations 
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of actors. In acting ‘as if’ something were the case, actors reveal the unconscious 
operation of ideology, which is disavowed at the level of consciousness. These 
notions are useful for understanding street-level situations, such as those 
described by Lipsky, where the rhetoric of formal policy and the realities of 
everyday practice don’t necessarily, or even rarely, coincide. In this vein, 
Crawford and Flint (2015) explore the discourse of housing practitioners working 
within a highly constrained environment, in which the explicit aims of their 
organisation and role are, in practice, impossible to meet. They describe just such a 
disavowed relationship to organisational reality in which practitioners both know 
and don’t know, and act ‘as if’ their objectives were a realistic possibility. In this 
situation, the pressure to remain invested in the ‘imaginary system’ of formal 
policy objectives leaves the workers, and their organisation, incapable of 
addressing the realities of the situation as they find it.  
There is a useful psycho-social literature addressing the emotional life of 
organisations, much of which draws on the work of Menzies Lyth (1988) and her 
concept of ‘social defences against anxiety’, developed in her pioneering study of 
the everyday practices of hospital nurses –  a form of work in which there is a 
daily confrontation with powerful, anxiety provoking stimuli. In this work 
Menzies Lyth argued that many aspects of the day-to-day practice of nurses was 
organised around the avoidance of certain difficult feelings their work provoked. 
This idea has influenced studies of a number of different types of organisation 
(Armstrong, 2014b; Hoggett, 2010; Long, 2008), including welfare services, where 
the concept of ‘social defence’  has come to refer to ‘a way of explaining the 
organised but often unconscious ways in which those providing welfare services 
erect defensive systems to protect themselves from their unacceptable feelings’ 
(Hoggett, 2010, p. 203). As Hoggett (2005, 2006) has elsewhere argued, the concept 
of ‘social defences’ resonates strongly with Lipsky’s emphasis on the reliance of 
street-level bureaucrats on coping mechanisms (Lipsky, 1980, p. 82), but does so in 
a way that reconfigures the ‘demands’ placed on street-level bureaucrats to 
82  Chapter Four 
include the feelings provoked by their work. The coping mechanisms of welfare 
workers are not only related to the formal demands of their work (e.g. targets, 
organisational aims), but might also be the result of ‘defences against seeing and 
facing suffering, feeling the suffering or thinking about it.’ (Hoggett, 2010, p. 203). 
Using this concept of ‘social defences against anxiety’, both Hoggett (2010) and 
Long (2008) have explored specifically perverse social defences that can arise in 
organisations, which bear striking similarity to the situation described by 
Crawford and Flint (2015).  Hoggett (2010) draws attention to the role of 
managerialism and the overriding  importance placed in an abstract set of 
performance objectives in generating a perverse attitude toward reality. 
Performance measures, he argues, can come to act as a fetishised substitute for the 
real ‘outcomes’ which they supposedly measure.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the conceptual framework of the thesis, which can be 
defined as ‘psychosocial’. In so doing, it has provided a novel synthesis, building 
on recent theoretical work, of Bourdieu’s theoretical oeuvre with concepts drawn 
from psychoanalysis. This framework, it has been argued, offers a cohesive set of 
concepts through which to interrogate the various concerns of this thesis; namely, 
the way that street-level advisors are invested in and oriented toward their work; 
the way that power operates in both advisors’ and claimants’ experiences of 
conditional activation; and the way that this power might be registered through 
attention to the felt dimensions of everyday experience. 
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Chapter Five – Methods 
Introduction: reflexive ethnographic sensibility  
This chapter describes the key features of my methodological practice, detailing 
the ways in which I sought to answer the research questions. The chapter also 
highlights some of the contingencies contributing to the design and development 
of the research, which draws on data from thirty in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, direction observation, as well as (auto) ethnographic reflection on my 
own experiences as a street-level advisor. 
In some respects the broadly ethnographic approach adopted by the research was 
an explicit methodological choice, in so far as an ethnographic sensibility, with its 
attention to the detail, intricacies, and entanglements of everyday life is 
particularly suited to the critical study of street-level policy-making as a form of 
embodied social practice (Dubois, 2009). In other respects, however, it might also 
be regarded as a necessary consequence of the research questions, conceptual 
framework and, especially, a methodological commitment to reflexive research. 
With respect to the latter, whilst it is a less than straightforward task to specify 
with any precision or exactitude the ways in which my prior direct participation in 
the field shaped the data collection, analysis, and interpretation, it would perhaps 
be more difficult to argue that it did not. This research began, some eight or so 
years ago, with my employment as a street-level advisor; absent this experience 
and the research would not have taken the particular routes through the field that 
it did. Among other things, this chapter seeks to make some of the landmarks on 
this journey clear, such that my presence in the research is reflexively situated and 
to some extent made available as an object in the field alongside others (Bourdieu, 
2003).  
Here it should perhaps be mentioned that I knew several of my participants. This 
is to say, I knew them to a greater extent than would have been possible were they 
84  Chapter Five 
simply recruited for the purposes of interview research. Specifically, I had spent 
nine months working closely alongside eight of the interviewed advisors, in an 
intense and closely-knit working environment. Street-level activation work is often 
highly pressured, emotionally taxing, and stressful. It is carried out in open-plan 
offices, in close physical proximity to others, and there was a strong sense of 
camaraderie among my colleagues. This, at least, was how I remembered things, 
but it was a memory shared and confirmed in many of the interviews. Being of a 
similar age, and in broadly similar circumstances, many of us also spent time 
together socially outside of work. Knowing the participants meant having some 
sense (I would hesitate to say knowledge) of their background, trajectories, but also 
their expressed thoughts, feelings, attitudes, hopes and disappointments, in so far 
as these were presented as part of our shared sociability. This knowledge, or 
rather this sense, undoubtedly informed and influenced the interviews, and this 
chapter later reflects on my different experiences of interviewing former 
colleagues, other advisors, and claimants in different contexts.  
I also knew what it is like to do street-level activation work. This was very much 
an embodied ‘carnal’ knowledge (Wacquant, 2005, 2015), which is to say a ‘feel for 
the game’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), or a practical sense for what street-level 
activation is about. This research was not, however, an ‘enactive ethnography’ 
(Wacquant, 2015) in the sense of an apprenticeship, or the undertaking of an 
embodied journey into a new or strange field registering, through observant 
participation, the effects of the field on habitus. I had already made such a journey, 
and even had my attempts to return to the field for observation been successful (as 
this chapter will describe, they were not), it would not have been as a participant, 
and the journey would not have been the same. Rather, my ethnographic position 
with respect to this research was as an insider (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007; Labaree, 
2002) or as an ‘opportunistic complete member’ (Anderson, 2006). Rather than 
entering and learning about the field as a novice, the reflexive and ethnographic 
challenge of this research lay in making an epistemological break with the 
common sense, which is to say the embodied practical sense, or the 
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‘epistemological unconscious’, of the field (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 
1991) in order to be able to observe and make it an object of interpretation and 
analysis. In this respect the role of theory (as introduced in the previous chapter) 
was important from the outset, and the research pursued an abductive research 
strategy (Blaikie, 2009) moving back and forth between concepts, experience, and 
data (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).  
Although I began the research with a sense of the field, among advisors not 
everyone had the same sense, or experienced the field in the same way. More 
obviously, claimants also occupied very different sorts of position, and had quite 
different sorts of experiences of activation than did I or other advisors. To the 
extent that my experience was of analytic and interpretive use it was often in 
terms of registering and exploring such differences. The value of the insider 
experience of complete membership, for this research, was not that it gave me 
some kind of direct insight into ‘activation’, ‘conditionality’, or ‘street-level work’ 
and what these are like for other people, but that it attuned me to some of the 
relevant and salient differences within the field, and among its participants. The 
research is auto ethnographic, but for the most part not in the descriptive or 
evocative sense (Ellis, 1991; Ellis & Bochner, 2000), but more in the analytic sense 
described by Anderson (2006) where the value of having been a ‘complete 
member’ lies in the opportunities this affords for the specifically theoretical 
exploration of insider meanings and social relations.  
This ethnographic methodological approach can be described as relational 
(Desmond, 2014). A relational approach to social enquiry is one that privileges the 
analysis of relations over entities; in contrast with substantialist methodologies, 
which begin with the assumed existence of entities, relational methodologies 
proceed from the premise that what exist first and foremost are relational 
processes (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Desmond, 2014; Dobson, 2015; Emirbayer, 
1997). A relational ethnography is one that studies ‘fields rather than places, 
boundaries rather than bounded groups, processes rather than processed people, 
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and cultural conflict rather than group culture’ (Desmond, 2014, p. 548). In the 
context of this research this meant attending to the field of activation, rather than a 
single street-level site; studying the limits and boundaries of this field, and the 
conflicts within it; and focusing on the ways in which people became or were 
made into street-level advisors or claimants. In line with this approach, the 
previous chapter outlined a framework composed of relational concepts. 
Moreover, this relational and ethnographic approach is particularly suited to 
street-level research, in which there is a similar emphasis on the conflicts (and 
dilemmas) through which policy is made in practice, as well as on the ways in 
which ‘the claimant’ is processed and socially constructed through encounters 
with street-level agencies.  
Contingent designs   
For nine months during 2008 and 2009 I was an employment advisor on a welfare-
to-work programme, for an employer, ‘Activation Works’, which has delivered 
various welfare-to-work contracts including, later, the Work Programme. In this 
role I was allocated a caseload of claimants, conducted ‘mandatory work-focused 
interviews’, ran workshops, and saw voluntary clients. I searched for jobs, cold-
called employers, wrote and supervised the writing of job applications, CVs, and 
cover letters. In line with the requirements of the role I recorded everything I did 
on caseload management software, from reminder letters and text messages to 
conversations on the phone or in person. From a desktop drop-down menu I 
noted attendance, registered ‘good cause’ or selected ‘failure to attend’. I referred 
clients to English classes, to a resident physiotherapist, a psychologist, and to 
groups and workshops, as well as signposting to other outside services. I updated 
‘personal action plans’ and ran benefits calculations. I filled out paperwork for 
working tax credits, return-to-work credit, in-work credit, and wrote to the local 
authority requesting housing benefit ‘run on’12. I made enquiries and requests for 
                                               
12 When someone’s income changes as a result of going into work this will have a knock-on effect 
for their other entitelements, Housing Benefit being among the most important. ‘Run-on’ refers 
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‘reasonable adjustments’ to the workplace. I also had a personal monthly target13 
of job outcomes and, when I consistently failed to achieve this, started applying for 
other jobs, resigning from the role shortly before my probationary period was due 
to end14.  
When, in 2013, I began this research it was envisaged as an ethnographic project. 
In part this followed from my working background, disciplinary training, and 
methodological commitments. But it also reflected an expressed need, within the 
street-level literature, to understand street-level practice from ‘the inside out’ 
(Brodkin, 2011b, 2012). In particular, the intention was to return to the sorts of 
street-level office in which I had previously worked and observe the day-to-day 
interactions between street-level advisors and benefit claimants. In addition to 
conducting such observational fieldwork it was envisaged that I would be able to 
recruit participants – both advisors and claimants – for interviews through my 
presence in such street-level agencies, perhaps having the opportunity to run 
repeat interviews and document a small number of cases in greater depth. When 
the time came to embark on fieldwork I systematically approached the main 
welfare-to-work agencies in my immediate locale, gradually extending my scope 
to other regions of the U.K. I contacted local Jobcentre Plus offices (or, attempted 
to), then regional offices, but also the DWP. I contacted prime Work Programme 
providers but also a host of smaller, local subcontractors. I wrote emails, left 
messages, and made use of personal contacts; I attended conferences and industry 
events in order to make new contacts, but also to observe the way street-level 
services were depicted by managers in these public contexts.     
                                                                                                                                              
to a four week period during which, following a change in circumstances resulting from a 
return to work, Housing Benefit will continue to be paid at the previous rate. 
13 At the outset this was seven per month but was at some point reduced to six in order to reflect 
the overall low performance of the programme amid the wider economic difficulties of the time. 
14 The probationary period was the standard six months but in my case, and that of others 
recruited at a similar time, had been extended by three months, again to reflect the overall low 
performance of the programme. I resigned without another job to go to. Ironically, even though 
my contract would have ended anyway, by resigning I became ineligible for JSA for a period of 
three months.  
88  Chapter Five 
Through this process I found one small local Work Programme subcontractor who 
was willing (or able) to assist with the research15. Following email correspondence 
and a face-to-face meeting my plans for observation were put to one side, and it 
was instead agreed that I would be able to interview two advisors and 
approximately twelve clients back-to-back over two tightly scheduled days; 
although this meant I would need to continue recruitment and fieldwork 
elsewhere (several interviewees didn’t show up) this organisation was extremely 
welcoming and helpful – exceptionally so, in the context of my broader fieldwork 
experience, which in the case of street-level organisations was largely 
characterised by mistrust and suspicion. Such difficulties of access are a common 
place for ethnographers, especially those with an interest in closed organisational 
spaces (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2010). Similarly, the recruitment of particular 
defined groups (e.g. employees or claimants) can be difficult without the 
cooperation of bodies and organisations through which they might be accessed. 
For these reasons I made the decision to turn to my own personal contacts, 
approaching former colleagues, some of whom also put me in contact with other 
advisors (past and present) that they knew. Similarly, when it came to the 
recruitment of additional claimants I also made use of personal contacts from 
various different contexts. In particular, I was able to recruit three claimants 
through a community drama collective with whom I had the opportunity to watch 
and discuss a performance of the forum theatre play Benefit, several of whose 
members had both experience of and an interest in issues related to the research. 
                                               
15 That many of the providers I contacted might not have been able to grant me access became 
apparent as the fieldwork progressed. It was further confirmed in an interview conversation 
with a former colleague who, in addition to having been a street-level advisor, had also later 
worked in head office as a supply chain manager. He told me that there was a contractual 
requirement to run all such requests through the DWP. Local offices would have been expected 
to check with their head office first, and such requests would certainly be regarded with 
suspicion and, if not introduced and sanctioned by senior personnel in the DWP, automatically 
rejected without consideration. Another participant, with professional contacts among the 
senior management of one prime Work Programme provider, also told me that subsequent to 
recent requests by me but also other researchers, a memo had been circulated to all prime and 
subcontracting providers reminding them that such requests should be referred to the DWP. 
This was after I had already completed fieldwork with the one subcontracting organisation to 
grant me access. My attempts to develop the appropriate gatekeeping contacts within the DWP 
and my enquiries about access to JCP were entirely unsuccessful.   
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Five other claimants were recruited through their involvement with community 
activist organisations and networks. 
In this way, what had been envisaged as a conventional site-specific, perhaps 
multi-sited ethnography, based in one or two street-level offices, instead became 
much more interview focused, but also much less bounded: participants were 
recruited from across the United Kingdom, and their involvement in the street-
level activation field also became more temporally dispersed, with the inclusion of 
both current and former advisors. At the same time, the fieldwork returned me to 
my own experiences in a much more direct way than had been anticipated; 
interviewing former colleagues (including a former line manager) with whom I 
had worked closely for several months inescapably drew my own experiences into 
the research in so far as the interviews often addressed a situation and context in 
which I had also directly participated. This shared context, and my own position 
and experiences within it, also became a point of reference for some participants 
(particularly but not limited to former colleagues) when discussing their own 
positions and experiences. In adapting to the contingencies of the field the 
research design changed throughout the process of fieldwork, but in several 
respects remained ethnographic. Drawing on in-depth interviews with both 
advisors and claimants, the research made reflexive (auto) ethnographic use of my 
experiences as an advisor. Some of these experiences were revisited in interviews 
with former colleagues. In lieu of field notes I was able to make use of personal 
records as sensitising documents, such as diary entries and personal 
correspondence relating to my period of street-level employment. These focused 
on my response to workplace matters, and in particular to management 
communications regarding performance and practice. The research also sought to 
treat the process of interviewing in ethnographic terms, remaining sensitive to the 
specific contexts in which interviews were conducted and the way these contexts 
might have shaped the interview itself.  
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Sample: changing positions in a changing field  
In this section I provide some further details about the sample. This is not, nor was 
it intended to be, a representative sample. In line with the relational research 
methodology, participants were not treated as static members of a particular class 
or group, but as situated and moving participants in a dynamic field. This section 
aims to describe some of the complexity and variation within the sample, and give 
a sense of the different sorts of position within the street-level activation field 
occupied by participants. A total of thirty in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
were carried out (see: Appendix A).  Thirteen of these were with street level 
advisors from contracted-out welfare-to-work providers; of these, three were 
current Work Programme advisors and ten were former advisors. Of the ten 
former advisors, three had only very recently left the role or field (within a month 
of two of the interview), and seven had done so at different points over a period of 
several years. There were a variety of different experiences among advisor-
participants; some had worked as advisors on a couple of different welfare-to-
work contracts (in one case over nearly a decade, since the early 2000s), whereas 
others only had experience of one programme, such as Pathways to Work or the 
Work Programme. The shortest duration of employment as an advisor was six 
months. Some had remained an advisor for the length of their involvement in the 
field, whereas others had remained in the welfare-to-work field but been moved 
or promoted to other positions (as training advisors, to different managerial roles, 
but also to other regional or head office functions). In addition to these advisor 
interviews, I also interviewed one DWP employee who worked as a call centre 
operative, fielding calls from JSA and prospective JSA claimants; this participant 
was also an active trade union member, and the interview touched on current 
issues related to working conditions within the DWP and Jobcentres Plus16. As 
outlined in the previous section, two of the advisor-participants were accessed 
through their employer; eight were former colleagues; four were accessed through 
                                               
16 Unfortunately I was unable to recruit any Jobcentre Plus staff. 
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contacts and snowball sampling. Making up the staff/advisor interviewees were 
ten women and four men. At the time of their employment as an advisor, most 
participants began whilst in their mid twenties, although three advisors had 
started the role later, whilst in their thirties or forties. 
Of the sixteen interviews with claimants twelve were currently claiming JSA, and 
four ESA. Eight (all JSA claimants) were recruited for me by the Work Programme 
provider, with interviews arranged by them, and taking place on their premises. 
The remaining eight (four claiming ESA, four claiming JSA) were recruited and 
had interviews arranged by me as outlined above. The distinction between 
participants who were claiming ESA and those claiming JSA was complicated by 
the fact that, for several participants, this was not their first claim. At least three of 
the current JSA claimants had also in the past claimed ESA. Similarly, at least three 
of the current ESA claimants had previously claimed JSA. As lone parents, two of 
the participants had been claiming Income Support until their youngest child 
turned five, at which point they were transferred to JSA. In terms of their current 
engagement with activation services, nine were currently clients on the Work 
Programme; four had not yet been referred to the Work Programme, but were 
having their claim (and ‘activation’) dealt with by Jobcentre Plus; and two were 
currently on a Community Work Placement, having been referred in one case by 
their Jobcentre Plus advisor, and in another by their Work Programme advisor. 
One ESA claimant was currently in the Support Group, and not required to 
participate in mandatory work-focused activity. Of the claimant interviewees, ten 
were women and six men. Most participants were in their forties, although the 
ages ranged from the early twenties to fifties. Again, this provides a snapshot of 
claimants’ situations and ‘classifications’ at the time of research, but it is important 
to emphasise that there were also past experiences of claiming the same or 
different benefits, as well as past experiences of other welfare-to-work 
programmes. In this way many claimants had been subject to different levels and 
forms of conditionality at different times.  
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Fieldwork: reflexive interviewing in the interview society 
The fieldwork for this thesis, informed by previous experience as a participant, 
was nonetheless focused around interviews. The ubiquity of the interview as the 
preeminent qualitative research method has been much remarked upon, with 
some going so far as to suggest that now, owing to this very ubiquity, it is perhaps 
the case that ‘interviews have a limited usefulness as a means of understanding 
and investigating social life’ (Back, 2012, p. 27). The argument (which is a 
polemical one, albeit more equivocal than this isolated quotation might suggest) is 
that in many respects the interview has become a widely recognised cultural form 
– that we now live in ‘the interview society’ (Atkinson & Silverman, 1997) – with 
its own rules and popular expectations, and the concomitant danger that what gets 
produced in and through  interview encounters are often the very ‘frames of 
reference and social characterizations that sociology produced in the first place’ 
(Back, 2012, p. 26). In this account the interview society can produce a self-
referential trap in which the ubiquity of the form has come to condition what we 
discover (construct or produce) through its use. A kind of common sense faith in 
the interview as method likewise risks the reduction of social encounters to words 
and transcripts, flattening the life contained within them.  
In discussing ‘the interview society’ Atkinson and Silverman caution the social 
researcher against taking at face value ‘the image of the self revealing speaking 
subject’ (Atkinson & Silverman, 1997, p. 322), instead drawing attention to the way 
that interviews can only take place on the condition that one narrates a self, and 
often a particular sort of self – these are necessarily constructed, partial and 
performative encounters. Rapely (2001) has argued that it is also necessary to 
attend to interview encounters as co-constructed, which is to say ‘inherently social 
encounters, dependent on the local interactional contingencies in which the speakers 
draw from, and co-construct, broader social norms’ (Rapley, 2001, p. 303). Here the 
interview is but one kind of social encounter among others, and what is produced 
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in it equally implicates and involves the interviewee, interviewer and their 
situational context.  
In one sense Back’s argument aims at broadening social research’s methodological 
horizons – that is, encouraging it to look beyond the interview, and to develop 
‘forms of attentiveness that can admit the fleeting, distributed, multiple, sensory, 
emotional and kinaesthetic aspects of sociality’, (Back, 2012, p. 28), arguing that 
‘[n]ot being limited to what people say explicitly enables us to train a kind of 
attentiveness to tacit forms of coexistence’ (Back, 2012, p. 29). At the outset this 
research, for different reasons, also adopted a cautious stance with respect to 
interviews; following from its commitments to an ethnographic sensibility, there 
was a caution about avoiding the attitudinal fallacy (Jerolmack & Khan, 2014) and 
the assumption that what people say has any straightforward relation to what 
they do.  
What I want to suggest here is that in this research, interview encounters were 
occasions in which it was possible to attend to such fleeting, emotional and tacit 
forms of coexistence, and that this was often possible precisely because they were 
also interviews in and of the interview society. Rather than producing a kind of 
self-referential trap, the ubiquity of the interview form, in this particular context, 
was a reflexive resource on which the research was able to draw, enabling it to 
reflect on some of the ‘local interactional contingencies’ (Rapley, 2001) shaping the 
encounter. In this way, the research attended to its interviews themselves as 
embodied forms of social interaction and social practice, and not as instances of 
speech assumed to coincide with practices occurring elsewhere (Jerolmack & 
Khan, 2014). This is a reflexive form of attentiveness, which in psychosocial terms 
is also an attentiveness to what, in psychoanalysis, is called transference and 
counter transference (Hollway & Jefferson, 2012). The argument here is that such a 
psychosocial understanding of reflexivity recasts the predicament of ‘the interview 
society’ as an opportunity to interrogate the specific interactional forms brought to 
particular interview encounters, particularly along felt and emotional lines.  
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If you wanted to find an exemplar of ‘the interview society’ then activation 
programmes would be a good place to look. Those organisations and areas of 
social life concerned with employment, employability, and activation are also 
places where ‘the interview’ plays a particularly prominent role and has a special 
kind of importance. They are places where the presentation of the self according to 
formal, codified, and customary rules has been elevated into a (quasi) professional 
practice. This is something that, to some extent, I already ‘knew’ before fieldwork 
began, but it became particularly clear (or was something I began to reflect on 
more) as I went about conducting my own kind of interviews with different 
participants in a number of settings. In the course of this research I interviewed 
claimants who had just arrived from their ‘mandatory work focused interview’ 
and were on their way to, or had been pulled out of, an ‘interview skills 
workshop’. Some claimants came to my interview immediately following either a 
mock job interview or, in one case, a real one. When I interviewed claimants it was 
often about these other sorts of interview they had.  I interviewed advisors in their 
place of work, about their own job interviews and entry into their role, but also 
about the work-focused interviews they had with claimants.  
Without wanting to conflate these different forms of interview (which are different 
forms of social encounter), it remains possible to understand street-level spaces of 
activation as organised around a series of highly structured one-to-one 
interactions (many designated as ‘interviews’). During fieldwork it very much 
seemed that this immediate interactional context had a marked influence on my 
research encounters. It often seemed that participants brought with them an 
expected form to the research interview – which is to say, the visible shape and form 
that individual participants seemed to give to their interviews – and these 
expected forms were in many cases suggestive about the social relations being 
enacted within the research encounter, but also beyond it. In many cases with 
claimant-participants the research interview (especially those on provider 
premises) somehow came to resemble a mandatory work focused interview, job 
interview, or something in between. Some participants seemed to turn their 
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answers to a variety of questions toward recent actions they had taken, as if they 
were providing me with evidence of their job search (I felt as if I had been cast in 
the role of advisor – a role I had experienced, and knew well, but which in this 
context made me feel uncomfortable and, sometimes, frustrated). Other questions, 
against my intention, elicited a potted work history and a breakdown of their 
skills. Interviewing one advisor about their role, in the office in which they 
worked, I felt as if I had been placed in the position of manager or job interviewer; 
their descriptions of working practices and working experiences seemed to take 
the forms taught and encouraged by advisors – myself included – during 
‘interview skills workshops’. Some questions elicited examples of competencies, in 
a form reminiscent of the STAR17 model for answering job interview questions. 
Difficulties, problems, or bad feelings were rounded off with a positive anecdote 
about what they had learnt from the experience. In this case, the participant had 
begun the interview describing their recent experience standing in for a manager 
away on maternity leave; this had been a valued experience, and the participant 
hoped at some point to be able to enter a management position more permanently. 
In this case, it was as if this wish permeated the research interview, which seemed 
to become, in effect, a practice interview or proof of competency for the desired 
management role. In some ways these interactional forms only became visible to 
the extent that they differed from one another: outside of provider premises 
interviews felt much less constrained, and more often took confessional, 
conspiratorial, or testimonial forms.  
Rapley (2001) draws attention to the way in which the interviewer is also 
responsible for producing interviews as particular kinds of social occasion; in so 
far as I was able to observe this in my own research practice, it was in those 
instances where my influence, expectations, or wishes about the interview met 
with resistance, failure and, occasionally, embarrassment. Whereas with some 
former advisors the interview immediately proceeded along confessional lines, in 
                                               
17 Situation, Task, Action, Result.  
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interviews with current advisors, or advisors still committed to the idea of the 
role, my attempts to elicit a more confessional mode of interaction sometimes met 
with a professional rectitude, exposing my own interactional inclinations and 
expectations in the process (to myself, as much as anyone).  In a different way, on 
some occasions the tightly controlled interview forms (those resembling the job 
interview, the mandatory work focused interview, or the demonstration of 
professional competence) broke down or ceased to work fluently in the research 
context. These were revealing, instructive moments. Interviews with former 
colleagues sometimes presented a different problem, in that they required moving 
from more familiar and sociable forms of interaction into a mode that I deemed 
more appropriate for recording, transcribing, and quoting. With many former 
colleagues the most comfortable form of interaction was a form of reminiscence; 
on other occasions, however, I had the impression that being interviewed by a 
former colleague was to be placed in a distinctly uncomfortable and vulnerable 
position (one participant explicitly told me as much); it also wasn’t always clear 
whether my relationship with these participants had another kind of influence on 
what they told me, and how they told it to me: I knew (or thought I knew) more 
about them, but they also knew (or thought they knew) more about me and what I 
might want to hear. Sometimes this resulted in strange interview encounters 
where participants, having read the information sheet, but also perhaps the 
Welfare Conditionality website18, provided what I can only describe as ‘artificial’ 
answers to my questions, in the sense of consciously fashioned or noticeably 
crafted, reproducing an academic or policy jargon with which they were clearly 
both uncomfortable and unfamiliar. I had a similar sense of artifice, although of a 
more defensive sort, in some interviews with claimants (here I am talking about 
those that were recruited for me by the provider), where I sometimes felt cast in 
                                               
18 This research was funded by the ESRC through the Welfare Conditionality: Sanctions, Support, 
and Behaviour Change project. A link to the project website was included in my email 
correspondence with potential participants, and on the participant information sheet: 
www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk  
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the role of nosy or threatening outsider against whom they had been dispatched to 
defend their advisor’s integrity and honour.  
No doubt the differences between all of these interactional interview forms are 
relational, intersubjective, and indicative of other social relations of power, as well 
as feelings of connection, vulnerability, trust, suspicion etc. I would argue that it is 
possible to attend to such interactional interview forms precisely to the extent that 
they are sometimes unexpected, uncomfortable (or, indeed, too comfortable), 
failed, or resisted. In psychoanalysis this sort of attention is understood in terms of 
transference and countertransference19; in sociology it is understood in terms of 
reflexivity. From a psychosocial perspective this reflexivity can also to be an 
emotional reflexivity, attentive to transference (Hollway & Jefferson, 2012, pp. 
157–158), and to the unconscious social forms brought to the interview (which can 
be more or less controlled, and controlled or uncontrolled in particular ways) and 
the affective experiences of the researcher (which might also include things like 
boredom or frustration, being moved or feeling helpless).  In this way the 
interview is always understood to be about more than words; people speak, 
narrate, and discursively construct their ‘self’ in an interview, but there are also 
moments of inarticulacy and uncertainty. People bring their feelings to interviews, 
and interviews are the occasions for feelings, no less important or instructive for 
being mundane (again sometimes my participants seemed to feel, and sometimes I 
felt frustrated, bored, or helpless). They also bring social expectations and 
assumptions about the interviewer, and about what an interview is, or what it is 
                                               
19 Both forms of projection; the analyst attends to the relational forms of interaction that the 
analysand brings to analysis. In so far as the analyst remains largely silent, and is a ‘kind of 
present absence or absent presence’ (Green, 1997, p. 321), these forms indicate other patterns of 
relating that the patient has learnt elsewhere, which they bring to the analysis and project onto 
the analyst. The countertranference refers to the emotions and forms of relating evoked in the 
analyst by the analysand – that which they project onto the patient. The implicit argument here, 
which follows from the framework outlined in the last chapter, is that such forms of projection, 
transference, and countertransference can be understood in a more social, sociological, or 
psychosocial sense; as indicative of social patterns of relating, rather than ‘individual’ or 
psychological ones.  
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for20. In the context of activation programmes ‘the interview’ is indeed a 
ubiquitous form; however, treating this as one more instance of ‘the interview 
society’ risks conflating the very different ways in which we are encouraged, 
taught, and coerced into narrating our selves for others in various contexts, and in 
this research attention to these different forms (of encouraged, enforced, or 
coerced narration) was an important occasion for ‘transferential’ reflexive analysis.  
The interviews for this research were conducted in different settings and locations. 
Those interviews arranged by the Work Programme provider were conducted on 
provider premises, either in a vacant office made available for the purpose, or in a 
public cafeteria located within the same building complex. Otherwise, interviews 
were held in a range of public locations selected or negotiated with the 
participants, mostly in cafes, bars, and fast-food restaurants. One interview was 
conducted in an office on University premises. The interviews were recorded 
using a digital recording device. 
Ethics  
This research followed the ethical guidelines of the Social Research Association 
(“The SRA | Ethics guidelines”) and ESRC (“Research ethics - Economic and Social 
Research Council”). In particular, it followed the principles of informed consent, 
confidentiality and anonymity, and the minimisation of potential harm to 
participants. All participants were provided with information regarding the 
research, in the form of a plain language statement (see: Appendices), and written 
evidence of informed consent was obtained. Participants were provided with my 
contact details, those of my primary supervisor, and of the university ethics 
committee, and made aware of their right to withdraw from the research at any 
stage. In one case the interview was conducted by telephone; on this occasion the 
plain language statement and consent form were sent to the participant as email 
                                               
20 As does the interviewer. As previously described, sometimes my own expectations or wishes 
about the interview only became clear to me when they were resisted or went unfulfilled.  
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attachments. The consent form was also subsequently read to the participant over 
the phone, and verbal consent for the interview (and its recording) captured on the 
audio recording. In order to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of 
participants all names have been replaced with pseudonyms. I have extended this 
principle to participants’ employers or welfare-to-work service providers, and 
have excluded information relating to the location of specific provider offices.  
This research can be justified with respect to its significance for the wider 
community, which includes the scholarly community but also the participants. 
This significance is derived from its focus on the lived experience of certain 
aspects of (ongoing) welfare reform. Its ethnographic and contextualised approach 
has the potential to provide a rich account of the everyday realties and experiences 
of welfare conditionality and activation, from the perspectives of both advisors 
and claimants. This focus provides the basis for detailed, contextualised 
understanding of what conditionality and activation mean to people in practice. It 
provides an avenue through which these experiences might be registered in wider 
policy and political debates. A focus on street-level experience also offers the 
possibility of understanding how activation and conditionality are practiced, with 
potential implications for future policy design.   
There was a risk, in some cases, that research encounters may have touched on 
experiences which participants found uncomfortable or distressing. Some people 
have had very unpleasant experiences of conditionality and activation, 
experiences which are compounded by other experiences of poverty, insecurity 
(e.g. with respect to housing), oppression and exclusion. In some cases interviews 
did touch on upsetting experiences. It was also possible that interviews might 
have been occasions in which participants discussed pressing problems or 
difficulties they were facing. Prior to interviews I made sure I had details, or access 
to details, of relevant local services e.g. the CAB, money and debt advisory 
services, the Samaritans’ phone number, and other local advice services to which I 
could signpost participants, although there were no occasions in which it was 
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necessary to do so. There were occasions during interviews in which participants 
became upset or angry; on these occasions in the first instance I offered support 
and, on one occasion, paused the interview such that I could focus on the 
participant and, later, reiterate the principles of informed consent. While the 
discussion of difficult situations can itself result in emotional distress, the 
interview conversations mostly addressed public interactions; the unpleasant 
feelings and experiences addressed by the research were of an ‘everyday’ sort 
which might reasonably be expected to occur in a variety of conversational 
contexts. The research did not address sensitive or intimate topics the discussion 
of which might result in more lasting distress or emotional harm. The nature of 
participants’ experiences, whether positive or negative, was a key feature of the 
research, and such temporary discomfort as was sometimes produced can be 
justified by the value of making such experiences a feature of the way we assess 
and analyse activation and conditional welfare policy.   
The discussion of client-worker interactions with advisors did carry the risk that 
malpractice might be disclosed. In this context, this risk related more to fraudulent 
forms of malpractice, rather than forms of abusive behaviour, which might be 
more of an issue in other sorts of welfare interaction which are either more 
physical, or intimate in other ways, particularly where the service-user population 
might be defined as vulnerable, which was not the case here. The ethical risk 
posed by disclosure of malpractice is the risk posed to the participant’s security at 
work. Here the SRA guidelines refer to the work of Klockars (1979) who argues 
that in cases where disclosure of harmful or illegal behaviour is the result of a 
moral assumption between the participant and researcher of certain role 
obligations not to disclose, the morally competent researcher is bound to respect 
such obligations. There were no such disclosures during the research fieldwork, 
however on some occasions participants did discuss experiences or practices 
during recorded interviews which they later wished to retract, or instructed me 
not to use for the research; in these cases these parts of the transcript were 
removed and not treated as data.  
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Analysis 
As previously discussed, one challenge posed by the research was how to treat 
and make use of my own past experience (as an ‘opportunistic complete member’) 
alongside subsequently collected ‘original’ data. There is no doubt that my prior 
position, and my existing impressions, experiences, and (pre)conceptions shaped 
and influenced the direction of research (Bourdieu, 1990b). These experiences 
undoubtedly drew me to particular themes, issues, and concepts in the policy, 
street-level, and theoretical literatures that seemed to me particularly resonant or 
apposite. In this way the analysis, as it was conducted for this research, is perhaps 
best conceived as a continuous reflexive process initiated by my ‘full’ participation 
in the field, and extending throughout the duration of research. Here, the reflexive 
(auto) ethnographic approach taken by the research enhanced the depth and rigor 
of data collection and analysis. That street-level participants were aware of my 
employment background aided rapport building, and facilitated the gathering of 
rich data about their day-to-day practices and experiences. It also meant that the 
researcher-participant relationship was shaped by this partially shared ‘insider’ 
status, often marked by the use of jargon and other linguistic, discursive forms of 
short-hand, or reference to assumed or tactic knowledge (Brannick & Coghlan, 
2007). The (auto) ethnographic approach thus enabled (i) transparency about the 
research relationship, and the conditions shaping data collection and (ii) the 
contextualisation of such forms of short-hand and tacit forms of knowledge (Boyle 
& Parry, 2007; Doloriert & Sambrook, 2012), allowing (iii) greater analytical rigor 
and depth. This was a form of ‘analytic authoethongraphy’ (Anderson, 2006) in 
which analysis proceeded throughout the process of data collection. This process 
was aided by the use of field notes (following interviews), documentary records 
and email correspondence, and conceptual and methodological memos made 
throughout the research process (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011).  
The research interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Some of these I 
transcribed myself, and others were sent to professional transcription services. 
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Although I did not transcribe all the interviews myself, I did listen to the 
recordings alongside the transcript and any relevant field notes; in many cases this 
was an occasion for making further memos and notes on the interview, often 
focusing on its overall shape or flow, rather than discrete sections of speech or 
text. Once interviews had been transcribed they were coded using Nvivo software. 
Coding proceeded along two tracks; making use of field notes and conceptual 
memos, the transcripts were coded conceptually; at the same time, the transcripts 
were thematically coded such that new themes or concepts might emerge. 
Following the identification of links and connections among the data, and a 
corresponding plan for writing (in the form of chapter plans), the transcripts and 
codes were revisited and in some cases recoded. During this latter stage some 
techniques from analytic induction were applied, searching for contradictory or 
alternative cases which contradicted the findings (Duneier, 2011; Katz, 2001a). This 
provided an opportunity for further conceptual development and refinement.   
This process of analysis can be described as abductive. This is a process of ‘moving 
between everyday concepts and meanings, lay accounts, and social science 
explanations’ (Mason, 2002, p. 180). Shank (2006) describes the abductive logic 
governing field work as a ‘reasoning to meaning’. This is a form of reasoning that 
makes use of existing theories to follow up hunches, read signs and omens, and 
search for the meaning behind surprising observations. Abductive logic 
incorporates aspects of inductive reasoning, and has similarities to what Katz 
(2001a, 2001b, 2002) calls analytic induction, and O’Reilly (2005) calls iterative 
induction. In each case analysis and data collection proceed together; there is a 
dialectical movement between theory, experience, and data. Abductive reasoning 
during fieldwork can involve the plausible explanation of surprising observation 
using existing theories; or, it might involve the probabilistic inference of either 
causes or consequences of given occurrences. It is a form of reasoning which 
allows the fieldworker to pursue leads and hunches in a theoretically informed 
manner, and to generate new theories and hypotheses on the basis of empirical 
material. The kinds of finding, conclusion, or interpretations reached in this 
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manner might be characterised as weak or ‘peculiarly fallible’ when compared to 
other deductive or inductive forms of analysis (Lipscomb, 2012); however, its 
value lies in the extent to which it is a generative style of analysis and interpretation 
that advances theory and data together, and is productive of novel insights and 
new lines of enquiry. It is a form of analysis particularly suited to ethnographic 
research.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has described some key features of my methodological practice, 
detailing the ways in which it responded to the call, from street-level scholars of 
activation, to attend to the everyday realities of street-level policy-making as it is 
lived and practiced. In doing so it highlighted some of the contingencies 
contributing to the design and development of the research. In outlining the 
reflexive ethnographic approach adopted by the research, the chapter also situated 
my own position as researcher vis-à-vis the field and the research participants, 
drawing attention to some of the ways in which my own experience shaped, 
influenced, and oriented the research. The chapter has also introduced the 
research sample, and described my experiences of conducting fieldwork, 
negotiating access, and undertaking participant recruitment. In exploring its use of 
autoethnography in more depth (its rationale and implications), this chapter has 
also outlined the particular way in which rigour and trustworthiness were 
understood by this research. The use of autoethnography is understood to 
strengthen the reflexivity of the thesis, in terms of situating the researcher with 
respect to the research object, it allowed the research to reflect on the way 
background and past experience informed the research and shaped the research 
process (Berger, 2015). This was an important in terms of reinforcing the 
trustworthiness and authenticity of the research (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985, 1986). This chapter has contributed to the research credibility by 
demonstrating a prolonged engagement with and persistent observation within 
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the field, as well as enhancing its dependability and confirmability through the 
provision of an audit trail and reflexive contextualisation. 
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Chapter Six – Entering, adapting, and exiting the 
field: street-level advisors between illusio and 
disillusionment 
The best and the worst  
It was a role that, as an advisor, that I really, really, really enjoyed. I 
suppose meeting people that I don't normally meet, meeting people that 
I feel like have had a lot of disadvantage, made me appreciate all the 
privileges that I've had in my life in terms of role models and support 
and opportunity, and yeah, it gave me something, I really felt like I had 
something to offer, to instill those kinds of values and aspirations in 
other people. That's why I stayed in that role for a long time and still, 
kind of, work in the area of welfare to work. (Nicola, advisor and 
manager, 2002-2008) 
I went in really hopeful, I went in thinking like, this is the best job ever, 
we're actually going to make a difference, we're going to get people off 
benefits, we're going to help them sustain themselves and their family, 
learn the importance of work, and actually this could change the culture 
of the country in a way, and be really good on both the local level and 
on a wider level. And so I think I went into the job really excited, really 
hopeful, and that didn’t pan out, I became quite resentful, really sad, 
and really like, hating myself. (Emily, advisor, 2008-2009) 
This chapter is about the experiences of street-level advisors, and here Nicola and 
Emily describe very different experiences. For Nicola, involvement in welfare-to-
work was a source of pride through which she had forged a continuing 
professional identity. Emily, on the other hand, resigned after only six months, not 
for another permanent job, but to sign on with a temping agency until she found 
one. Despite its short duration, her time as an advisor still managed to arouse 
strong feelings. ‘I’m ashamed,’ she told me. ‘I’m ashamed of the fact that I was in 
that world, that I used people as a commodity to make money. Yeah, so I don’t 
talk about it. I think it was the worst job I’ve ever done.’ 
Positioned somewhere between Nicola’s enjoyment and Emily’s shame, the other 
advisors I spoke to in the course of this research often had complicated thoughts 
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and feelings about their involvement in welfare-to-work. Most, like Emily, came to 
the role hopefully, looking for something that they could invest in and feel proud 
of. This chapter is concerned with the particular ways that these advisors both 
invested in, and came to disinvest from, the street-level activation role and the 
welfare-to-work field. It looks at the social desires and fantasies which advisors 
brought to the role, the beliefs and points of view mixed up with such desires, and 
the ways in which these were often frustrated, disappointed, and occasionally 
challenged and altered during the course of their work. This chapter, then, 
explores how advisors were invested in their role. It also asks: what conflicts do 
advisors face? How do they cope with street-level conflicts? And, are there limits 
to coping and if so, what are these?  
In answering these questions, this chapter draws on interviews with both current 
advisors (at the time of the research), and former advisors who had left the role, 
often as a result of their disillusionment with this kind of work. In so doing, it is 
able to highlight some of the differences between those advisors who felt able to 
cope in the role, and those who did not. The argument this chapter develops is 
that work-first conditional activation, whilst attracting some employees who have 
a primary interest in providing help and support to individuals, is in fact 
dominated by a marketised logic and the imperatives of profitability. Coping with 
this requires a very specific kind of investment in the role, one which recognizes 
the authority of these imperatives as legitimate. In concluding, the chapter argues 
that the managerial imperatives of the field are a form of symbolic violence 
(Bourdieu, 2000). This is a form of violence which operates with the consent of 
those on whom it is exercised (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). By 
interviewing those who ultimately rejected the street-level activation role, and 
who have questioned its forms of authority, the chapter is able to highlight some 
of the prohibitions and proscriptions of street-level activation work.  
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Entering the field – paternalist imaginaries and the 
activation illusio 
Advisors came to the welfare-to-work field from a range of backgrounds. Some 
were, like me, recent graduates with little prior knowledge or understanding of 
welfare-to-work, whilst others had several years of work history in a related field 
or similar people-facing role. This section explores some of the ways in which 
advisors became, or continued to be, invested in the field and its illusio (Bourdieu, 
2000); it looks at the hopes, motivations, social desires and fantasies that advisors 
brought to the role, as well as some of the beliefs and attitudes mixed up with 
these. Many advisors, whatever their background, talked about being attracted to 
the role because they wanted to do something helpful for other people. This 
emerged as a strong theme across numerous interviews, and here I quote several 
advisors to give a sense of how widespread was this particular form of investment 
in street level activation work: 
I originally took the job because the job advert was all about, do you 
want to change peoples’ lives, do you like motivating people, that sort 
of thing, so that was my initial draw. The salary was good, so that was 
also a draw. (Harry, advisor 2007-2010; other roles 2010-2015) 
The reason that I applied for the job when I saw it advertised was partly 
I was taken in by the advert, so the advert it was about helping people 
to get into work. And I think at the time having worked being an 
advocate with people with learning disabilities trying to get them into 
employment, I saw this on a grander scale of trying to get people back 
into work. (Chris, advisor, 2007-2010)  
It was my friend that said, I think you'd be amazing at welfare-to-work 
for people and help them to get to work and really motivating them, 
giving them confidence. I’d never really heard of it before; so I almost 
got through it through refer-a-friend.21 (Deborah, advisor, 2012-2015) 
                                               
21 This was a scheme, run during a period of rapid recruitment accompanying the roll-out of new 
contracts, whereby existing employees were given vouchers or other rewards when they 
‘referred’ a friend to an advertised position who was successful in getting the job. 
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[My friend] suggested that I apply through the refer-a-friend scheme. 
Because he said that he really enjoyed the job, and that for the reasons 
that I'd gone into teaching, as in helping people, I'd get a real kick out of 
it. So I thought, I was having quite a lot of bad luck with the teaching 
jobs, so I thought well, you know, I need something and maybe this 
could be something I do for a little while before I find a teaching job. 
(Robert, advisor and other roles, 2009-2010) 
I was attracted to it because it was more of an advisory role than I was 
in before [Jobcentre reception]. So it was a lot more one-to-one rather 
than, kind of, crowd control. But, yeah, I got an idea of it…it was 
attractive working closer and being able to work more one-on-one with 
the customers. (Katie, advisor, 2010-2015)  
I think the thing that appealed was that I can work one-to-one with 
people and develop them, it didn’t really matter what their 
circumstances were, I just wanted more experience of that, and that’s 
what that would give me.(Alexandra, advisor 2008-2010, other roles 
2010- 2015) 
I remember exactly how I came to do that job. I was sat in my mate 
Megan's kitchen [another advisor], … complaining about the hell that I 
perceived working in television to be, you know, and I was like, I don't 
like working in television, it's full of idiots and I'm not doing anything 
“real”, and you know, I want to contribute to the world, I want to help 
people. (Jess, advisor, 2008-2009) 
Amid their differences in background and experience, advisors’ accounts of what 
led them to apply for the role of street-level advisor converged around a desire to 
work face-to-face with people in a helping capacity. Advisors tended to have, in 
terms of their basic investment in the game and its stakes (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992), a sense that the field offered the possibility and opportunity to ‘help’ people 
in ways they perceived to be good and worthwhile.  
In terms of the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Four, this investment in 
the activation role might be understood in terms of field, habitus, and social 
desire. ‘Every field,’ writes Bourdieu, ‘is the institutionalization of a point of view 
in things and in habitus’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 99). Individuals select and are selected 
by a field on the basis of their habitus and its dispositions – their embodied habits 
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of thought and feeling. Advisors saw in the field an opportunity to express and 
satisfy some of their social desires (Aarseth, 2016), and the field of activation 
recruited for and made use of these. New entrants are not required to have a 
habitus that is fully formed or completely adapted to a field, but one ‘that is 
practically compatible, or sufficiently close, and above all malleable and capable of 
being converted into the required habitus’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 100). Here, an 
orientation toward working-face-to-face with people, and a sense that the role of 
employment advisor would allow them to do this, seemed to be one element of 
this basic compatibility.  
For Lipsky, too, street-level bureaucrats often have a particular kind of investment 
in their work, and are motivated by the prospect of helping others. This 
foundational belief that a service is indeed helpful Lipsky calls ‘the myth of 
altruism’ (Lipsky, 2010, pp. 71–72). In the case of street-level activation, the notions 
of ‘help’ and ‘helping’ which drew advisors in, and which the field had selected, 
were more specific than an abstract or general orientation to ‘public service’, and 
the myth of altruism accompany this kind of street-level activation work had its 
own specific forms. This can be seen in the quotations opening this chapter, where 
Nicola spoke of wanting to be a role model, ‘instilling values and aspirations’ in 
her clients; similarly, Emily spoke about coming to the role imagining that she 
would be ‘teaching people the value of work’. This desire to help, and the 
imagined or fantasized form that helping would take, were for many advisors 
premised on a very particular understanding of the problem(s) associated with 
‘being on benefits’, which were variously imagined to be ones of culture, 
motivation, confidence, or aspiration. This kind of paternalist social imaginary was 
widely shared among advisors, which I again illustrate with quotations from 
several interviews:  
I think the main difficulty with [clients] is lack of expectation of 
themselves and no-one ever, yeah no-one expected anything of them, 
they therefore not expecting anything of themselves. (Nicola, advisor 
and manager, 2002-2008) 
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Yeah so I had a few clients that just lived in areas where nobody 
worked, so I didn’t just have to convince them, I’d have to convince the 
whole block that they, that it was good for all of them, to go back to 
work, or I’d have to find the one that was most motivated so they could 
promote the benefits of work and motivate the other individuals, so 
yeah. (Harry, advisor, 2007-2010) 
It’s a culture sometimes, isn’t it? They haven’t really had a job before, 
their parents might never have had a job, their friends don’t have jobs, 
so why would they? But then, in that is also mental health and comes as 
part of that maybe. I don’t know. It’s a whole big picture of why people 
claim benefits. (Simone, advisor, 2007-2010) 
I think the drudgery of work can be a big off putting one. Because work 
is not fun a lot of the time. And it's not necessarily because someone is 
lazy, it's often because they've had no other example of teaching, and 
habits set in hard and fast. You know, when you are growing up in that 
environment and you've done that your whole life, to try and change 
that behaviour, it can be a real hard task. Now, of course, there'll also be 
a portion of people that have cottoned on to the fact that they are 
probably financially probably just as well off if they sign on, and of 
course those people should be challenged and you know, I guess 
encouraged or forced or whatever you want to get back to work and 
contribute but...I mean why else are people not in work? (Jess, advisor, 
2008-2009) 
Many advisors’ expressed beliefs about the field and its ‘objects’ were largely 
congruent with the ideological constructions of the welfare claimant and their 
situation outlined in Chapter Two. Advisors spoke in terms broadly in tune with 
‘anti-welfare common sense’ (Jensen, 2014), and its notions of dependency 
(Murray et al., 1999) or demoralization (Mead, 1997). As such, the desire to help 
that advisors brought to the field was often a form of social desire organized 
around a very particular kind of social imaginary, a fantasy about the helping 
situation and their potential role within it. 
As a condition of entry to a field and participation in its illusio, Bourdieu argues 
that entrants hold to the particular construction of reality organizing the field, one 
‘grounded in a prereflexive belief in the instruments of construction and of the 
objects thus constructed’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 99). Similarly for Lispky investment 
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in street-level work as a form of ‘help’ is founded upon the belief that a particular 
service model benefits clients (Lipsky, 2010, p. 71). In their accounts of embarking 
on street-level activation work, advisors exhibited a belief in the existence of a 
population of welfare claimants whose needs might best be understood as 
problems of ‘culture,’ ‘motivation,’ ‘confidence,’ and ‘aspiration,’ to be addressed 
by forms of paternalistic moral education of the sort exemplified by Emily’s notion 
of ‘teaching people the value of work’, or Nicola’s idea of being a role model and 
‘instilling values and aspirations’. This was a largely prereflexive belief that the 
problems of poverty and unemployment which the activation role was ostensibly 
designed to address were significantly attitudinal, behavioural, or cultural, to be 
remedied through various forms of individualized motivational and edificatory 
interventions. To the extent that advisors were aware of problems of inequality, 
structural advantage or disadvantage, these were often imagined in terms of role 
models, expectations, aspirations, or their lack. As such it was possible for 
advisors to conceive that they were in a position to address such problems by 
embodying for others the advantages they perceived themselves to have had, in 
terms of paternalist role models. As such, these imaginaries are also the expression 
of advisors’ sense of their own social position and competencies. The social fantasy 
which advisors brought to the role often positioned them in a paternalist relation 
of supervisory guidance over subjects perceived to lack certain moral or cultural 
orientations, which advisors imagined they both possessed and were able to 
‘teach’ or otherwise impart. 
However, returning to Emily and Nicola, and the quotations opening this chapter, 
whilst both spoke of a moral or paternalistic investment in the role, for Nicola this 
remained relatively untroubled, and even reinforced and rewarded in the course 
of her work (‘it gave me something, I felt like I had something to offer’). For Emily, 
on the other hand, as for some other advisors, this form of investment was 
altogether more difficult to sustain. In the course of performing their role some 
advisors became disillusioned with the job, their position, and its capacity to 
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‘helpful’. That is to say, in the course of doing their jobs some advisors came to 
question either the potential of the role to be helpful in the ways they had 
imagined, or more radically and reflexively, to question some of the premises on 
which their notions of help had been based. Such forms of reflexive questioning in 
the habitus usually arise from some form of conflict or crisis, in terms of a lack of 
fit between habitus and field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) or intra-habitus 
conflict (Mouzelis, 2007); for Lipsky the contradictions of street-level work, 
specifically those which force the worker to subordinate their orientation to what 
he calls ‘advocacy’, can likewise lead to alienation (Lipsky, 2010, p. 71).  Below, 
these dynamics are understood and explored in terms of disillusionment. The next 
section looks in more depth at the ways in which advisors became (reflexively) 
disillusioned with their role, and how this disillusionment related to specific forms 
of street-level conflict revolving around the targeted nature of the job, and 
conditional, work-first activation. The concept of disillusionment draws attention 
to some of the limits to coping in street-level work, a theme that is explored 
throughout the remainder of this chapter.  
Between illusio and disillusionment  
‘To be become disillusioned,’ writes Crossley, ‘is to lose one’s “belief in the game”, 
to cease to experience it as worthwhile or meaningful’ (Crossley, 1999, p. 815).  The 
advisors that I interviewed had varying degrees of investment in the welfare-to-
work ‘game’, which is also to say that they exhibited varying degrees of 
disillusionment. At the time of the interviews some, like Emily, had broken with 
and withdrawn from the field, going on to find altogether different sorts of work. 
Others, like Nicola, although no longer working at street-level, were still deeply 
invested in the field, the role, and its worth. I also interviewed recent leavers and 
current advisors who were – in a very practical sense – still invested in their 
(former) job, but who nonetheless held some reservations and criticisms about 
street-level activation and their involvement with it.  
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In this section I discuss advisors’ different degrees of disillusionment before 
exploring how, despite holdings reservations, some advisors managed to adapt to 
the field and make compromises with it – not as they had imagined or wished it 
might be, but as they encountered it in practice. Initially entering the activation 
work with vague but idealized notions of providing ‘help’ or ‘support’, the 
practical realities of doing the job often forced on advisors a confrontation with 
what ‘help’ and ‘support’ were going to mean in practice. Whether this resulted in 
disillusionment and withdrawal, or adaptation and compromise, in looking more 
closely at these investments and their vicissitudes it is possible to explore in 
greater depth what constitutes the street-level activation illusio in practice, and at 
the dilemmas, conflicts, and contradictions this holds. This section, then, begins to 
answer the question of what conflicts street-level advisors faced, and how they 
coped with these.  
Of the various difficulties and dilemmas that advisors faced, two in particular 
stand out. These are the performance-driven, targeted nature of their role, and the 
focus on conditional work-first activation. The relationship between these different 
aspects of street-level activation work is also important, and some of the more 
fraught dilemmas facing advisors were the compound problems of both targets and 
work-first conditional activation. Some of these compound problems will be 
mentioned later in the chapter, but first I want to address each issue separately. 
The purpose here is twofold: firstly, to offer some descriptive contextualization 
about target-driven work-first activation, and then to explore these issues 
theoretically in terms of what they meant for advisors’ investments, 
disinvestments, adaptations and compromises.  
Targets and performance management 
Contracted out welfare-to-work services are paid on the basis of their performance 
in terms of ‘job starts’ – a job start being when, during the course of their 
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engagement with a provider22, a client starts work and stops claiming an out-of-
work benefit (either ESA or JSA)23. When organizations bid to deliver the Work 
Programme (or other welfare-to-work contract) they do so knowing the rates of 
payment and have a delivery plan including projections of how many outcomes 
they will achieve over the duration of the contract. There will be defined number 
of outcomes the organization needs to achieve to make the contract profitable or, 
in the case of non-profit organisations, financially viable. Organizational targets 
are passed down to advisors as monthly individual performance targets, which 
are closely monitored and tracked. Usually the contract of employment will be 
conditional on performance measured in terms of job starts – in the organization 
for which I worked successful completion of the six month probationary period 
was conditional upon meeting this target, as was continued employment in the 
role once the probationary period had ended. Failure to meet the target meant 
failing to pass probation or, for those who had already done so, a period of 
intensive managerial supervision – ‘performance support’ – ending either in 
improved performance or the termination of their contract. 
Although the target of ‘job starts’ was by far the most important indicator of 
performance, it was by no means the only measure against which advisors were 
judged. Performance management featured prominently in advisors’ descriptions 
of their role, both as a form of surveillance, and as an administrative burden – the 
recording of information for contractual purposes took up a large amount of 
advisor time, something which they often resented, and viewed as detracting from 
                                               
22 Although not necessarily. As described in the introduction, in my office advisors were 
encouraged to hunt through their caseload looking for ‘outcomes’ which had either already 
occurred, or were about to, without the direct involvement of an advisor– this might be with 
newly-engaged or yet-to-be-engaged clients, or clients who were no longer active on a caseload. 
Such practice was largely rationalised in terms of ‘sustainment’: if we could make contact with 
someone who had recently or was soon to start work, then we could offer them ‘in-work 
support’.  
23 During the Work Programme contactors’ performance was also measured in terms of 
sustainment, defined as sustaining employment for at least six months. Over successive waves 
of contracting-out the amount of money paid to providers up-front (before outcomes) was 
steadily reduced, and the amount tied to outcomes and sustainment outcomes (employment 
lasting six months) increased.  
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a focus on individual clients. The information recorded for contractual and 
organizational purposes was also used to monitor individual performance. Here, 
Judy describes the different ‘minimum service levels’ (‘MSLs’) against which her 
performance was measured, telling me that in her workplace there was: 
…a lot of monitoring, an awful lot of monitoring. There's also things 
that [the prime], that, you've got to, it's called an MSL list, there's a list 
of about fifteen MSLs but we've got to record, we've got to make sure 
that we're compliant to ninety five percent, everyday. So it’s things like, 
the MSL 4 is to ensure that every client on your caseload has a future 
appointment. Ok? MSL 11 is, you have meaningful contact with every 
client on your caseload within the last two weeks; and if your MSLs 
drop below the ninety five percent, well, it's just we can’t, you know? 
(Judy, advisor, 2010-2015) 
Judy also told me about her struggle to keep up to date with these various 
measures. Although ‘best practice’ was to record each of her actions at the moment 
they took place, the reality of her face-to-face work with clients meant that this 
wasn’t always possible. Sometimes appointments with clients might involve 
difficult or emotional conversations; she might be interrupted at any moment with 
a phone call, or need to take time and prepare for her next appointment. Making 
sure future appointments were booked within the required timeframe was often 
complicated by the need to reschedule appointments. The administrative duties 
associated with the role were widely experienced as burdensome by advisors, but 
were important in organizational terms because they were the means by which the 
provider demonstrated that it was meeting its contractual requirements. However, 
these measures also served an important function in terms of monitoring and 
managing particular offices and individual employees. Nicola, an advisor who 
later became a manager, spoke about the role of such measures in ‘optimizing’ 
advisors’ performance: 
It was about trying to achieve our operational target because that was 
my job.  And in doing that, I needed to get everyone to optimize their 
own job outcomes, and the same with the other KPIs [key performance 
indicators], the engagement, you know: new customers onto the 
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caseload; customers attending, you know, customers attending 
appointments, all of that. (Nicola, advisor and manager, 2002-2008) 
Focusing on the ways in which such monitoring was used to manage advisors, 
among the various measures described by advisors were: how many client 
appointments advisors had in a day; how frequently they were in contact with 
clients; how many job interviews had been secured; and even how many mock 
interviews had been undertaken. In the office in which I worked such proxy 
measures were referred to as ‘activity levels’; if you weren’t ‘performing’ in terms 
of your main target of ‘job starts’, then managers would routinely pull information 
from the database about these other proxy measures in order to identify discrete 
ways in which this main target might be achieved.  
The managerial focus on ‘MSLs’ (or ‘KPIs’) other than ‘job starts’ had 
consequences for street-level practice. A great emphasis was placed on the number 
of appointments booked or completed per day; consequently advisors were 
routinely encouraged to increase ‘engagement’ and ‘activity’ by booking in 
additional appointments with clients beyond their stipulated mandatory 
minimum. During my own time as an advisor the double booking of clients was 
also actively encouraged. The logic here was that missed appointments would not 
result in wasted time. If both clients did turn up then we could direct them to the 
‘job station’ or give them tasks to do while they waited. Double-booking, although 
stressful for advisors, and disrespectful and inconvenient for claimants, was 
nonetheless seen as a straightforward way to increase ‘activity’. Seeing groups of 
clients together was similarly viewed as good practice, and the need to make high 
volumes of applications was emphasized. Common practices included printing 
out lists of phone-numbers (from the yellow pages or other directories) for clients 
to cold-call looking for work; or, providing them with a list of postal addresses 
and printing out hundreds of ‘spec letters’ (speculative applications consisting of a 
CV and cover letter) for them to send. These activities and practices were referred 
to in terms of ‘high activity levels’, and seen as ‘good advisor behaviours’ and the 
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key to ‘high performance’. It is in this sense that the disciplinary regime of 
activation works on clients through advisors (Soss et al., 2013): the ‘activation’ of 
clients follows from the ‘activation’ of advisors, and advisors are similarly 
subjected to an individualized ‘behavioural’ logic, and viewed as either more or 
less ‘active’. The intensity of activation experienced by claimants (e.g. pressure to 
attend ‘extra’ appointments) can be viewed, in part, as a consequence of the 
intense (micro) managerialism to which advisors are subjected.  
The various practices which resulted from an overriding organizational focus on 
defined and measureable actions can be described as forms of routinisation and 
simplification. Whereas Lipsky describes routinisation and simplification as a 
common street-level coping strategy (Lipsky, 2010, pp. 83–86), here it is a managerial 
strategy with which street-level advisors also have to cope. The managerial 
imposition of routinisation, and the logic behind it, is described in some detail by 
Harry, who pejoratively referred to it throughout his interview as ‘the science’. I 
asked Harry to describe for me what he meant by this term: 
So the business decides that there are various, well not even the 
business, the contract and the business decides that there are a number of 
quantifiable metrics that, if followed, will end up with the end result of 
[clients] not being on benefits anymore. So what does that mean? That 
means that an advisor sees x amount, or a certain amount of clients, 
because if they see a certain amount of clients – sorry, we’ll go back one 
step – if an advisor books in appointments with a certain amount of clients, 
because if they do that a certain amount will turn up, that certain 
amount of clients turn up, because if they all turn up, then a certain 
amount will be engaged with the programme, so you’ve got a certain 
amount that are engaged with the programme, and that basically 
assumes that if they’re all engaged then a certain amount of people will 
be making x amount of job applications, and if they make those job 
applications they’ll have x amount of interviews, and if they go to those 
many interviews then they’ll get a job. So that’s the sort of ‘science’ 
that’s been built around it. (Harry, advisor, 2007-2010; other roles 2010-
2015) 
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Harry describes a quasi-Taylorist production line in which the pathways to 
successful performance were defined in terms of quantified metrics – the volume 
of clients, the volume of appointments, and the volume of applications. Harry was 
an advisor who prided himself on being attentive to each of his clients as 
individuals; he saw ‘the science’ as something encouraged by managers, also 
adopted by other advisors, but that he strove to resist. In this sense, although 
Harry was dominated by the managerial regime, he remained invested in 
activation work, but struggled from within the field to define its stakes and aims 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 102).   
To the extent that advisors had entered the role with notions of working one-to-
one with individuals in a helping capacity, then the focus on targets and other 
proxy measures of performance was sometimes experienced as disillusioning. As 
Harry describes, such a focus encouraged advisors to think, not in terms of 
individual clients, but rather in aggregate terms – about their caseload, 
appointments booked, the overall number of clients seen, and the volume of 
applications made. Such a focus, ostensibly introduced to make sure that 
‘minimum service levels’ were met for all clients, resulted – from the point of view 
of some advisors – in a de-personalized and ineffective service. In addition to 
reducing their autonomy, this focus was often felt by advisors to be in direct 
contradiction with their initial reasons for wanting to do the job. It was quite 
common for advisors to contrast their initial expectations of ‘helping’ people with 
the realities of working in a targeted environment: 
Alexandra: So I think I just expected a softer environment, and it was 
really quite jaded and hard. 
Jim: Can you explain what you mean by softer and by hard? 
Alexandra: So by softer I mean maybe I expected a little bit more 
counselly, like career counselly, so it was more of a discussion and it 
was really taking on board what the person wanted and not just, here’s 
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a position you can do, so do it24. That’s what I was expecting, and by 
hard I suppose I just mean it was very target driven, so it was almost 
taking emotion out of it and processing. You have to hit four in a 
month, so who’s top of the league in your caseload and what are you 
going to do? It was very processy, more than you do the right thing and 
eventually it’ll happen. So I suppose that’s what I mean by soft and 
hard. (Alexandra, advisor and other roles, 2008-2015) 
Alexandra makes clear the pervasive influence of targets in street-level activation 
work – not simply a feature of the job, but something that defined the atmosphere 
and environment in which the work was done. She also points to the way that a 
focus on outcomes entailed a form of client-processing which was less attentive to 
the client and what they wanted than she had expected. There is also a suggestion 
that this contributed to a more authoritarian and paternalist advisor style – 
instructing clients to do things without necessarily listening to them. Where Harry 
identified a strong managerial regime and its rationale – ‘the science’ – Alexandra 
describes some of its effects on advisor-client relations. Advisors often spoke about 
the limitations that a focus on ‘performance’ placed on the ways that they 
approached and interacted with individual claimants. In particular, it limited the 
scope of appointments to a short-term focus on job outcomes: 
I thought I would get the opportunity to really spend time with people, 
understand what it is about them that was causing difficulty in their 
lives, and get the opportunity to work with them in a meaningful way. 
The time constraints and the scope, and the remit of the job meant that 
was impossible. The focus always had to be about how are we going to 
get them back into work? Voluntary work wasn't really an option. 
Getting them training wasn't really an option. (Jess, advisor, 2008-2009) 
I wasn’t one of those advisors who could do sixteen clients a day. See 
them, assess what they needed, and send them off to do it. I was more 
of an advisor having come from a support background as a support 
                                               
24 Welfare-to-work organizations are not in a position to hand people jobs; rather, they are largely 
focused on helping clients make applications to publicly advertised positions (and while they 
might negotiate with large employers with numerous vacancies to give interviews to a group of 
selected ‘pre-screened’ clients, these clients will still need to go through the interview process). 
What I take Alexandra to mean here is that the client is shown a job vacancy that they are 
instructed to apply for.   
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worker, as an advocate, where I did things for people who needed 
things doing for them. I was more somebody who wanted to help 
people get what they actually wanted, rather than the target driven 
culture which … I was told regularly, just get them a job, get them a job. 
(Chris, advisor, 2008-2010)  
Returning to the theme of investment and disillusionment, the advisors who 
found the targeted aspect of the role particularly challenging were those who were 
more invested in their role as being akin to what Chris refers to as ‘support work’. 
Chris in particular thought that his role should be defined primarily by the needs 
and wishes of his clients. ‘I saw it as being helping people back into work, and 
didn’t realise then the amount of pressure that would then come with that.’ From 
this perspective, the pressure to achieve targets led to a situation in which the 
needs and wishes of clients were subordinated to the needs of the organization. 
Chris further describes how the focus on targets shaped the sorts of job that 
advisors would encourage clients to apply for: 
So the difficult part was actually having to get people into jobs that they 
didn’t necessarily didn't want, that I didn’t necessarily think were good 
for them. Even though yes we could argue that employment is good, 
and any employment, and money. But I also found that I think we were 
operating under a bigger picture, which was: get people into work, get 
them off benefits, get them off benefits, get them into work. Reduce 
housing benefit, reduce this, reduce that. Whereas I went into the job to 
get people their dream jobs and achieve positive outcomes for them. 
(Chris, advisor, 2008-2010)  
Here Chris articulates his disinvestment from and growing disillusionment 
(Crossley, 1999) with the welfare-to-work field. He entered the field wanting to 
help people find jobs that would be good for them, believing that this is what the 
field – and his role in it – would be about. The pressure exerted by targets to move 
people into jobs that, in his judgment, were not necessarily suitable for them led 
Chris to reassess the nature of the field itself, which he began to perceive as being 
more about ‘getting people off benefits’ as an end in itself, rather than about 
finding people work in order to improve their situation and wellbeing. In so far as 
he remained within the field, Chris struggled to realize his own vision of what 
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‘activation’ was going to mean (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 102). Here, there is 
a lack of fit, and a struggle, between Chris’ habitus – his embodied inclinations, 
dispositions, and expectations – and the field of activation. This experience, which 
Bourdieu calls hysteresis (2000, p. 160), has been identified among employees of 
changing organizations, particularly as they become dominated by new 
managerial and performance regimes (Artaraz, 2006; McDonough & Polzer, 2012).  
Here I suggest that this experience can also result from confounded expectations – 
when the reality of a situation and its requirements is found to be at odds with the 
expectations and dispositions brought to it. Advisors tended to remain engaged 
and invested in activation work to the extent that this conflict and struggle seemed 
worthwhile, or even possible. However, as the next section will explore, there 
were certain conditions under which it became very difficult for advisors to 
maintain or even believe in the possibility of such a position.  
Targets and performance management encouraged forms of working and 
interacting with clients for which many advisors were unprepared. In recent 
literature these features of street-level work tend to be addressed in terms of their 
‘calculative’ dimensions and effects (Brodkin, 2011a, 2013c; Fletcher, 2011), such as 
their encouragement of the de-personalised approach to caseload management 
and client processing outlined above. What I would also like to highlight, 
however, are the implications of targets for how advisors felt about their role and 
working environment. Above I quoted Alexandra, who spoke of the target regime 
permeating through the working environment and its ethos. Similarly, other 
advisors spoke of the target regime as a constant presence that threatened and 
loomed over them, and the resulting stress and anxiety were widely remarked 
upon in interviews: 
It was stressful because of the targets. So you always had in the back of 
your mind, you know you could be changing someone’s life but unless 
they started a job and you had the piece of paper to prove it, and the 
box was ticked on that piece of paper to prove it, it didn’t mean 
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anything. So you always had that hanging over your head. (Harry, 
advisor, 2007-2010; other roles 2010-2015) 
The dilemma, I suppose, is, you know, that you're not going to meet 
your target, and you know what impact that's going to have on you 
personally, because it was always that your job was on the line. So, as a 
personal dilemma, that's the stress, and that's the impact. (Isabelle, 
advisor, 2008-2012) 
It was, yeah, a bit sickening actually, in a way, to just constantly have 
this pressure of, you know, looking at the board and your numbers are 
down, your numbers are low, and just feeling like I'm not going to 
make it. (Emily, advisor, 2008-2009) 
In these different descriptions of the targeted working environment there is a 
similar emphasis on targets as both pressure and threat. Forms of performance 
measurement and monitoring saturated the everyday working lives of street-level 
advisors, many of whom spoke about stress, anxiety, and feeling sick. In large 
part, such stress and anxiety resulted from the direct threat to advisors’ own job 
security should they fail to perform. However, as the following section will 
explore, it could also result from a felt sense that they were under pressure to act 
against their own dispositions and judgments – against their habitus – in ways 
which they sometimes felt to be unethical and damaging to claimants.  
Street-level work often involves a proliferation of different organizational and 
administrative demands (Lipsky, 2010), and activation work is no different. 
However, it is clearly not the case that street-level advisors negotiate between 
these different demands under conditions ‘freer from supervisor scrutiny than 
most organizational jobs’(Lipsky, 2010, p. 50). Rather, advisors were subject to 
intense and quite prolific forms of managerial monitoring. This is highlighted 
elsewhere in the literature (Brodkin, 2011; Fletcher, 2011; Soss et al, 2013), and was 
in Chapter Three discussed in terms of changes to operational governance, 
marketisation, and new public management in welfare services. During fieldwork 
interviews a turn in the conversation toward the various administrative measures 
and metrics to which advisors were subject was liable to produce a sharp intake of 
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breath, or a roll of the eyes. This was a situation commonly bemoaned among my 
colleagues and in interviews – both in terms of the burdensome and time-
consuming requirement to record innumerable small actions and interactions in 
very specific ways, but also in terms of the felt sense of constantly being watched 
and monitored.  
There are two things it is worth highlighting here. Firstly, the extent to which 
management and the surveillance of street-level advisors is itself one of the major 
pressures with which they must cope – advisors must actively participate in their 
own management and surveillance through the intricate recording of work 
activity. Interestingly, as will become clear in Chapter Seven, in this respect the 
situation of advisors mirrors that of the claimants who they, in turn, monitor and 
survey. Secondly, the requirements of monitoring were often felt by advisors to 
take precedence over the ostensible aims of their work, and their particular 
investments in it – namely, providing ‘help’ and support to individuals. In the 
remainder of this section I further draw out some of the consequences of this 
situation. In particular I draw attention to the way that several advisors held 
reservations about targets – and found them disillusioning – not only because they 
prevented them from doing certain things (e.g. in terms of personalized 
interactions), but also because of the things they felt compelled by them to do – 
namely, to put undue pressure on their clients. This sort of dilemma, or conflict, in 
its most acute forms, was not simply the result of performance management, but 
of its combination with work-first conditionality. After exploring this combination 
in more depth, the chapter will turn to address the question of street-level coping. 
The argument I will develop is that the ability to successfully cope with activation 
work depended to a large extent on advisors’ habitus, and in particular whether 
they were able, in terms of their dispositions and proclivities, to seriously invest in 
activation as a game structured around performance measures and work-first 
activation – whether, in other words, they were able to take performance 
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measurement and its illusio seriously (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 11; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). 
Conditionality and work-first activation 
Targets became especially problematic for some advisors in the context of 
conditionality and a work-first approach to activation. Advisors from different 
programmes judged that some of the clients referred to them should not be 
required to look for or prepare for work given their health conditions or other 
circumstances. Whilst not expressing disagreement with conditionality in 
principle (most advisors expressed support for conditionality in principle), in 
practice they found that it created situations they found uncomfortable and 
disillusioning. Again, this was a widespread experience among advisor-
participants, and here I quote from several interviews to give a sense, both of the 
breadth of this feeling, but also to introduce the significance of the work-first 
approach for advisors’ discomforts and disillusionments: 
I thought that I would try and get jobs for the people that were able to 
potentially get one. But there was a lot of the time that it was 
disillusioning because you were forced to make plans for people that I 
genuinely didn’t think it was going to work for. ‘No’ wasn't really 
allowed as a concept there either. So everybody had the potential to 
work. And I'm sure that's what management were trained as, 
management were trained to say that.(Jess, advisor, 2008-2009) 
I think some of the people that are being referred here definitely 
shouldn’t be here because… we've got two years to work with clients, 
and to move them into work or they're here for two years. Some of the 
people that come, that are on health related benefits, they're not going 
to move on, towards work, in that time, and they shouldn’t be here, 
they should be left to deal with their illnesses and their health issues. 
(Judy, advisor, 2010-2015) 
You had your job security on one side, and also your ego as well, I 
mean to do well, and all that kind of stuff … But equally you’re with, 
there’s people who have got loads of, who just aren’t job ready, or 
willing to work, or have issues and family, you know, loads of issues, 
and you just … And sometimes, if I'm really honest, I probably pushed 
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it too far. Kind of pushed and pushed and pushed … And I felt guilty 
after. But that’s because you have the target in the back of your head. So 
you have to put pressure on someone to work when they weren’t 
actually really ready. (Simone, advisor, 2008-2010) 
Being an employment advisor suited me in terms of the, I had a natural 
desire to both help the people who came to see me and my team mates 
… [but] ultimately the commercial side of it and the targets did not suit 
me, and that’s why I became an engagement advisor25. I didn’t want to 
push people to work if I didn’t feel they were ready. I was risk averse, 
and I wasn’t a hungry enough salesy type person to go and do that. 
(Robert, advisor, 2008-2010) 
Here, several advisors describe an uncomfortable situation created by the 
combination of targets and performance-driven working practices, conditionality, 
and a work-first approach to activation. In each of these interview quotations 
advisors describe a complex nexus of forces, resulting in a double coercion: 
advisors felt pushed and coerced, by the managerial regime of activation, into 
pushing and coercing their clients. The resulting discomfort can be understood in 
terms of a mis-match between habitus and field (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 160), and it is 
important that this feeling of compulsion was closely linked to the sense of having 
to act against their own judgments, inclinations, and dispositions. In particular, 
one important element of this dilemma was the advisor’s own judgment that the 
condition of mandatory participation was, for specific individuals under specific 
circumstances, inappropriate. Added to this was a narrow focus on paid work (a 
‘work-first’ approach). Jess in particular describes having to make plans for people 
regardless of whether she thought them realistic or appropriate. Similarly, Judy 
perceived that there were people on her caseload for whom a work-focused 
service was ill-conceived. Simone indicates that the problems clients faced, and 
which rendered the work-first ethos misguided, were not limited to health, but to 
a whole host of situations and problems. Advisors coped with this nexus of 
                                               
25 This was a role created by Robert’s employer in 2008. Previously, there had been a single client 
facing role – that of advisor. However, at the time it was felt that there was too much diversity 
amongst referrals to the programme, and the ‘engagement advisor’ role was created to screen 
clients before they were allocated to employment advisors. This role did not hold a monthly 
target in terms of job outcomes.  
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pressures in different ways. Jess describes trying to focus her attention only on 
those clients she thought realistically could get work, but was frustrated in this 
approach by an ethos which held that ‘everyone could work’ regardless of their 
circumstances. Simone, rather differently, describes going along with the ethos of 
work-first activation, sometimes ‘pushing things too far’, feeling guilty as a result. 
Robert, under the same set of pressures, took an opportunity to change roles 
within the organization, removing himself from the need to meet targets and 
situations where he would have to directly act contrary to his own dispositions 
and ‘push people to work’.  
The understanding of this street-level activation dilemma as the product of both 
an organizational set of goals and pressures, and the dispositions and investments 
of advisors, offers a new perspective on a widely-perceived problem in street-level 
activation services, namely ‘creaming and parking’ (Carter & Whitworth, 2015). 
This is usually understood according to the principles of rational choice; advisors 
‘cream’ the most job-ready clients in order to meet their targets, and neglect or 
‘park’ those with greater needs and difficulties. Looked at from the perspective of 
these advisors, however, a different set of issues and ‘calculations’ emerge, ones 
which are not so easily reducible to a single, universally applicable ‘street-level 
calculus of choice’ (Brodkin, 2013; see also, Chapter Three), but which can only be 
understood by taking the dispositions and investments of advisors into account. 
This comes across most clearly in the above quotation from Jess, where she 
describes adopting ‘creaming and parking’ as a strategy, not to meet her targets, 
but to act in a way congruent with her dispositions and what she perceived as 
realistic, reflecting either the needs, wishes, or capabilities of her clients. Here 
creaming and parking is both a strategy to make life easier, in the sense of working 
in a way congruent with her dispositions and judgments, but also a strategy to 
maintain her investment in the field by focusing on individual clients, their needs 
and capabilities. The alternative, as Robert and Simone indicate, was to push 
people in ways which might be harmful. Here, ‘creaming’ is also the exercise of 
judgment with respect to what the service can realistically achieve for someone; 
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‘parking’ might, in this context, be a understood as a form of protection, a way of 
sheltering clients from the harsher aspects of work-first activation, and of 
surreptitiously easing the conditional requirements that (some) clients faced.  
‘Creaming and parking’ describes a form of caseload management, and caseload 
management practices among advisors were complex, and not easily reducible to 
a single model of incentives and disincentives; such practices inevitably implicate 
advisors’ dispositions – what they felt comfortable or uncomfortable doing – 
including their perceptions and judgments. Whilst all advisors were subject to the 
same pressures vis-à-vis targets and performance management, but also with 
respect to the broad mix of individuals on their caseloads, both of these aspects of 
the street-level situation could be viewed and approached differently, depending 
on a particular advisor’s dispositions and investments in their role. The argument 
here is not that ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ was motivated in every case by the same 
dispositions and concerns guiding Jess or these other advisors; undoubtedly some 
advisors did adopt an instrumental approach to their caseload, looking at it 
through the lens of their performance objectives. Rather, what I want to suggest is 
that street-level practices such as ‘creaming and parking’ do not always have a 
uniform meaning; indeed, it is possible that such practices can be overdetermined, in 
the sense of being the solution to more than one sort of problem, dilemma, or 
conflict. Here the problem, from these advisors’ points of view, is the lack of fit 
between the client (their position and situation) and the service. As this chapter 
will explore further below, advisors often wanted to be helpful and assist their 
clients, but in so far as their envisaged actions were not focused on the short-term 
goal of work, they were discouraged or unable carry them out. The tendency to 
construct creaming and parking as a problem of preferable or inequitable 
treatment tends to assume that the ‘resources’ of a service, and the attentions of 
advisors, are benign: for these advisors, this was not always the case26.  ‘Creaming 
                                               
26 On the other hand, whilst many advisors talked in terms of sheltering some claimants from an 
intervention they thought limited and inappropriate, on other occasions advisors identified 
clients who they thought should be doing more, and who weren’t ‘engaging’ or ‘active’ enough. 
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and parking’ was a solution to more than one problem; it helped advisors manage 
their caseload in order to help meet their performance objectives; but it was also a 
form of discretionary practice which allowed them to temper what they perceived 
as the potentially harmful features of the activation programme, thus allowing 
them to maintain the myth of altruism and ideology of benign intervention 
(Lipsky, 2010), and their investment in the role.  
This argument highlights the importance of advisors’ judgments of clients and 
situations (the two cannot be separated); judgment, from the perspective adopted 
here, is seen as an expression of habitus. It relates to how the advisor sees the 
world, but also to their practical dispositions. Advisors’ judgments about 
claimants often took complex forms in which normative values and practical 
considerations were intertwined in a way suggestive of the embodied, positional, 
and dispositional nature of judgment (Ignatow, 2009; Lawler, 2004).  There were 
two groups of clients in particular for whom advisors felt the conditional 
requirements of mandatory participation to be inappropriate: older claimants with 
a long work history who advisors judged as having ‘made their contribution’, and 
those who, despite having been assessed as ready to seek or prepare for work, had 
health conditions that advisors thought should exempt them from conditionality. 
Both were groups advisors frequently judged as ‘deserving’ of less conditional 
forms of entitlement: 
There's people that have worked all their life. Worked, they've 
contributed their whole life. They're six months, eighteen months away 
from retiring, and they're mandated to come here, they've never 
worked a computer, they've never, you know, and I think, that's a 
bloody sin. (Judy, advisor, 2010-2015) 
You were always encouraged to see what somebody could do. Now I 
completely understand that that is a good way of approaching a 
                                                                                                                                              
To understand the treatment of these clients as ‘preferable’, in terms of the focus, time, and 
resources devoted to them, likewise assumes the benign nature of the intervention; however, if 
it is possible to understand ‘parking’  as ‘protection’, then preferable treatment, or ‘creaming’ 
might also in some cases be a punishment. This is a theme taken up in Chapter Eight. 
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problem, but realistically I felt that with a certain percentage of people, 
and a small percent, but especially the ones with entrenched physical 
and mental illness, which were the ones that we were specifically 
getting, the idea that asking them to go back to paid work was 
unrealistic. And I couldn’t see them sticking it out. Having met with 
them you could see that their motivation was at an all time low, and 
seeing me, which was also associated with a sanction in their benefits, 
wasn't really doing much for their motivation. (Jess, advisor, 2008-2009) 
Advisors often spoke in very clear terms about the problems of conditionality and 
work-first activation as applied to older claimants and claimants with health 
problems. Judy felt that the expectations of the activation programme were ill-
suited to older clients with a long history of work. Activation programmes largely 
focus on encouraging clients to make large numbers of applications to a range of 
different jobs. These are often ‘entry-level’, low-paid, service sector jobs. Clients 
are encouraged to have a range of ‘job goals’, and to diversify these with a view to 
entering work as soon as possible. One frequently repeated mantra of activation is 
that any job is better than no job, and that once in work it will be easier to find 
other, more preferable work. Whilst with younger clients advisors tended to view 
this as a plausible working ethos, with older clients the potential humiliations of 
such an approach were more clearly perceived. With respect to clients with long 
term physical and mental health difficulties, advisors also perceived potential risks 
and dangers in pressurizing them to return to work – as Jess suggests above, there 
was the risk that they would not be able to sustain the job. Moving in and out of 
work like this could have serious consequences for people’s income and 
circumstances. Ending a claim for benefits has consequences for other 
entitlements, most importantly housing benefit and tax credits, both of which 
involved complicated and bureaucratic processes which were often liable to go 
wrong.  
There were also situations that advisors found more difficult to describe; earlier 
this chapter quoted Simone describing clients ‘who have got loads of, who just 
aren’t job ready, or willing to work, or have issues and family, you know, loads of 
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issues’. There was sometimes a reticence in addressing or describing the 
complexities of clients’ situations in so far as this might lead advisors to give the 
impression that someone was unemployable. As Jess has already indicated, the 
ethos of work-first activation was that everyone referred to the programme had 
both the capacity to work and the moral obligation to pursue it. Whilst advisors 
often brought their own qualifications to this ethos – in terms of health, or age – 
these qualifications can also be seen as ways of sustaining their investment in the 
ethos; they were ways of making it acceptable by making it accord more with their 
own judgments of what was reasonable or realistic. However, among advisors 
who had made a decisive break with the role, there was less reticence about 
describing someone as unemployable: 
Sometimes you could see when somebody walks thought the door... I 
mean the idea was, the idea was that you would think that no one is 
unemployable, but when someone walks through the door and they’re 
homeless, they have a drug problem - I had a guy living on Harley St, 
drug problem, really nice guy, but he was never going to find work, 
and having to inform on him to say that he...and I use the term inform 
and I know that seems really, really, like negative but in essence … in 
essence you were having to let people know that they weren't turning 
up for their appointments. (Chris, advisor, 2007-2010)  
The confrontation of complex situations and problems was potentially the most 
disillusioning aspect of the role, especially for advisors who did not see the formal 
outcomes as adequate measures of their work, or as reflecting the ends which they 
entered the role to fulfill. Complex situations, of the sort described here by Chris, 
were ones in which the limitations placed on their ability to ‘help’ became most 
apparent; these were the situations where a short-term focus on work seemed 
most inappropriate and where advisors’ own judgments – about ‘deservingness’, 
and about what could or should be expected of someone – came up against both 
the demands of the organization but also the rationale for activation, and the 
ideologies underpinning it. The perception of some individuals as ‘unemployable’ 
was an explicit contradiction of the activation doxa (Bourdieu, 1977). Whatever 
someone’s situation or circumstances, and however they would be judged by 
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potential employers, the ethos of the organization held that someone could always 
be moved ‘closer to work’. Ostensibly advisors were there to provide wide-
ranging support, but in reality they had neither the time, resources, expertise, nor 
encouragement (from management) to do so.  In these situations advisors were 
confronted with the possibility that their involvement in the field was not only 
ineffectual (‘a waste of time’) but actively threatening and potentially harmful. 
One of my former colleagues, Jess, later went on to train as a health practitioner. 
During our interview she looked back on her time as an advisor through the lens 
of her more recent training, and the experiences it had given her: 
And having gone on to do professional training in healthcare, I really 
feel that now, that for anybody going along to that environment 
[welfare-to-work] with their mental illness or...who's been through the 
system for a long time, it was actually quite a threatening environment 
for them, really. And it wasn't particularly supportive, and you didn't 
have management that were [supportive], because the more that you go 
along that path and knowing what it's like to work with people with 
difficulties like that, you realise that there is no one size fits all blanket, 
and no work is not therapeutic for all people. (Jess, advisor, 2008-2009) 
Here, Jess articulates a vision and understanding of the welfare-to-work field that 
directly contradicts her original investment in it. Rather than support and 
assistance, Jess suggests that for those with the most difficulties, the service 
presented a threat.  For Jess this threat arises from the combination of an 
inappropriate goal (paid work), rigidly and uniformly applied (‘a blanket 
approach’).  
This section has explored some the conflicts, tensions, and contradictions of street-
level work as it was experienced by advisors. It has argued that these conflicts 
involve the aims and objectives of the organization, the complexity of real life 
problems, but also the investments and dispositions of advisors themselves. These 
conflicts weren’t the same, or experienced in quite the same way for everyone. As 
the next section will explore, for advisors who invested in and conceptualized the 
field as organized around the imperatives of business, the focus on targets and 
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performance measures was much less problematic. However, some advisors did 
not always perceive these measures to have legitimacy, viewing them as poor 
reflections of what they had understood their work to be about. Focusing largely 
on these advisors, this section has argued that targets and conditional work-first 
activation were often experienced by advisors in terms of a conflict between 
management and its demands, and their own dispositions and judgments. Targets 
and conditional activation created conflicts to the extent that they created 
situations in which advisors felt that they were being more harmful than helpful.  
Compromise Formations 
Whilst all advisors spoke about the target-driven and work-first nature of their 
role, some advisors were more inclined than others to accept this as a legitimate or 
necessary feature of their work. Where some regarded it as obvious and 
inescapable, for others it was a surprise, and something they saw as antithetical to 
the role as they had imagined it. The quotations below from Jess and Katie 
illustrate these different and opposing attitudes toward targets: 
Our job was to give [clients] support, is what I was led to believe, to 
encourage them back into work. I guess the thing that was not sold 
within the interview, or at all within the job description, was that it was 
a purely target-driven organization where a theoretical and idealistic 
concept is then morphed into something that is target driven, and you'll 
lose your job potentially if you do not meet the target. (Jess, advisor, 
2008-2009) 
It’s part of the job and you’re never under any illusion that it’s [not] a 
targeted environment. I don’t think there’s any job you can go to where 
there’s not any targets. I don’t think any business would work that way. 
I know it is a person-centered thing but there needs, you’re there, it’s a 
contract. You’re there to deliver. (Katie, advisor, 2010-2015) 
These two quotes illustrate some differences between advisors’ orientations 
toward targets, both in terms of their expectations about the role, and in terms of 
whether they accepted targets as having a legitimate place in the field. They also 
point to a difference in orientation which had important consequences for whether 
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an advisor felt able to adapt, cope, and compromise with their role and its 
requirements. Jess distinguished between what she was ‘led to believe’ (as she put 
it) being an advisor would be about, and what it turned out to be in practice. She 
had imagined it would be about providing support, but instead it was ‘really’ 
about performance outcomes. In this account, the description of the role as 
supportive or encouraging was seen as a falsehood concealing its true aims and 
purpose; Jess understood the focus on outcomes to be antithetical to a focus on 
support. Jess’s suggestion of deception was not unique among advisors. Her 
remarks echo those of another advisor, Chris, quoted earlier in this chapter, 
describing how he had similarly been ‘taken in’ by the job description. To be 
‘taken in’ is one of the ways Bourdieu describes a habitus coming to invest in a 
field, a game, and its illusio (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 153; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 
98). Both Jess and Chris, in speaking of the way they were taken in, led to believe 
things, speak from a position of no longer believing, of no longer being taken in: 
this is a reflexive position, from which they are describing their disillusionment 
with the field and its illusio. For Jess, as for other advisors, the disillusionment she 
experienced had a great deal to do with targets and performance measures, and 
the style of working they encouraged. 
For Katie, on the other hand, still an advisor at the time of the interview, advisors 
such as Jess and Chris were simply mistaken – ‘under an illusion’ – about the 
nature of the role when they applied and took the job. For Katie, targets are 
integral to the game and her investment in it. While Katie acknowledged a tension 
between the focus on outcomes and providing support (what she called ‘the 
person-centered thing’) this was not perceived to be an outright contradiction in 
the way it was for Jess. Katie had, or had made, a rather different sort of 
investment in street-level activation, which is to say that her expectations about it 
were different. Whereas Jess perceived the conflict between support and targets to 
be fundamentally contradictory, Katie was able to work with the idea that ‘the 
person-centered thing’ was, ultimately, subordinate to the imperative to operate as 
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a successful business. This difference is telling, because elsewhere Jess spoke about 
imagining the role in more therapeutic terms; it was precisely the subordination of 
support to market-oriented demands which left her feeling disillusioned, and 
which she ultimately rejected. She had not, at the outset, recognized the 
marketised imperatives operating in the field. Katie, however, spoke of being 
unable to imagine the role without targets; moreover, what goes unsaid (or 
unimagined) in her account is the possibility that the field might be organized 
according to other, non-market principles. She had invested in the field as being a 
business-like, marketised field from the outset. This is a point and argument to 
which this section will later return: ultimately advisors’ ability to cope with the 
role and its conflicts required something like Katie’s form of investment in it, with 
the clear understanding that ‘support’, however conceived, is fundamentally 
subordinate to performance targets. This is to say, in order to cope advisors had to 
make accommodations with the specifically marketised logic of the field where 
certain welfare needs became subordinate to the imperatives of profitability.  
In speaking of the way that socialized desire becomes invested in a field and its 
illusio, but also disciplined by it, Bourdieu uses a psychoanalytic idiom: when a 
habitus makes a libidinal investment in a field and its illusio, the result is not an 
equilibrium – a perfect adaptation or static fit – but a dynamic compromise 
formation (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 165). For advisors who remained invested in the 
field, a compromise had to be reached between their initial desire – most often in 
terms of the wish to provide ‘help’ – and the imperatives of the field as they were 
encountered in the form of targets, organizational objectives, and conditionality. It 
has already been mentioned how some advisors resolved the conflict between 
their habitus, its dispositions, and the field by simply leaving. Whilst this option 
might also have been attractive to other advisors, it wasn’t always possible. When 
I asked one advisor, Judy, how she would approach her work differently if there 
were no targets, and her manner of working was entirely up to her, she said 
simply, ‘If it were up to me I wouldn’t be working on this programme!’ The need 
to keep their job meant advisors had to find ways of adapting to or compromising 
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with the field, even when they might wish to leave. Such compromises entailed 
changes to habitus; these changes were experienced both as impositions from 
without, and as processes into which advisors entered as agents:  
Now, four five years ago I would never have dreamt I would even, I 
mean, thinking about sanctioning somebody. So your mindset you've 
got to change because, you've got to move these people on. If I don't 
move people on or get them closer or get them into work, I'll not have 
my job, because I've got targets to meet. That's a really, really harsh 
thing to deal with because you've got to change as a, you've got to 
toughen up as a person. Or maybe this isn't the right type of working 
environment to be in. (Judy, advisor, 2010-2015) 
Judy returned throughout the interview to her discomfort at having to become a 
harder, tougher sort of person. Changing her working habits to suit the field went 
to the core of who she was. Similarly, Nicola told me that 
I think the change that's happened to me is, now I make, I'm not so 
precious about my, kind of, well I am precious about my core values but 
I have to not be, I have to not be, I have to think, no, this is a business and 
we have to run this business, so this is what we need to do and, yes 
we're not necessarily giving what I or any of the advisors would want 
to be giving, but that's what we're being paid for. (Nicola, advisor and 
other roles, 2002-2008) 
Nicola appeals to the imperatives of ‘business’ (as did Katie earlier in the chapter) 
in order to explain or justify the changes to her habitus following from her 
involvement in the field. It is interesting that for both Nicola and Katie the 
invocation of ‘business’, and by implication the market imperatives of profit and 
profitability, serves as a form of unquestionable authority; this would seem to be a 
particular form of street-level illusio. Notably, both Nicola and Katie expressed 
fewer reservations, doubts, and disillusionments. They spoke of being happy in 
their involvement with the field, and of enjoying the advisor role. However, as for 
Judy, there is some ambiguity as to whether the changes Nicola has experienced 
are ones that have been imposed from without, or driven from within. Viewed 
from the perspective of ‘business’ Nicola’s core values seem (to her) ‘precious’ and 
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as something which she must resist or fight against; nevertheless, she still 
describes them as her core values, and remains precious about them. There is the 
suggestion of ambivalence in this ambiguity; of a conflict left unresolved. In a 
slightly different way, another former colleague, Simone, described her experience 
of street-level activation work in terms of having two personalities, or being two 
different people at once:  
It’s like a split personality there actually… I actually often felt like that 
when I was there. I was like, who am I? Am I a sales person? Or am I a 
caring, more support workery, interested in people with mental health 
person? Am I a people person?  And we got given the role, yeah, very 
much this is more sales. (Simone, advisor, 2008-2010) 
Whereas Judy and Nicola speak of changing as a person, Simone felt like two 
different people. However, all three describe their experience of street-level 
activation in terms of a conflict within themselves (or between parts of 
themselves). What I would like to suggest here is that these kinds of experiences 
can be understood in terms of the conflict between a habitus, its dispositions, and 
the imperatives of the field. There were subtle differences in the way this conflict 
was experienced by advisors, differences attributable to their particular habitus 
and the form of its dispositions. However, what I also want to suggest is that to 
some extent these conflicts are also the internalization of conflicts pertaining to the 
field itself; as such, there are similarities in the forms of conflict that advisors 
describe, and in the ways they might be resolved. Judy felt the need to become a 
tougher, harsher sort of person, more willing to accept the need to sanction 
someone in the pursuit of ‘moving people on’; Nicola spoke of having to 
compromise – or not be precious about – her core values in order to maintain the 
proper business-like orientation to the contract (‘what we’re being paid for’); 
Simone described a conflict between being ‘a people person’ or a ‘sales person’. In 
each case the conflict or dilemma related to dispositions as they were when they 
entered the field, and the dispositions required to remain in it. For both Simone 
and Nicola this is expressed in terms of accepting and adapting to market-
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imperatives (sales, business). For Judy it was about developing a more 
authoritarian disposition specifically in order to meet performance targets and 
contractual requirements. Emily, who as I have already described made a quick 
exit from the field, similarly described her own experience of this conflict in terms 
of the opposition between people and money: 
Emily: I guess that is the reason why I left, because I thought actually, I 
don't like the person that I'm becoming. 
Jim: Who were you becoming? 
Emily: I was becoming...I was probably one of those evil corporate 
people who didn't care about the person, it was all about the end goal, 
which was all about meeting the target and about bringing in the 
money. (Emily, advisor, 2008-2009) 
Chapter Four introduced the notion of compromise formation in the sense of field 
and habitus taking advantage of one another, of being intertwined (Bourdieu, 
2000, p. 160,165). It is therefore not surprising that advisors should experience 
their involvement with street-level activation as something that changes them 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 161). These changes were experienced in different ways, and 
reacted to quite differently; what Nicola and Judy describe in terms of a 
submission to the imperatives of an unquestionable authority (business, the 
contract), Simone and Emily speak about with more reflexive agency, in terms of a 
choice about who they were or might become. Nonetheless, whether negotiated 
through submission or resistance, there remains the sense that the field requires 
something very specific from them, which goes against their initial dispositions 
and inclinations.  An interesting feature of the way in which some advisors 
described this experience was the reference to ‘types’. For Judy it was the ‘tough’ 
advisor or the ‘softly-softly’ advisor; for Simone the ‘people person’ or the ‘sales 
person’; for Emily the fear was that she would become a kind of ‘evil corporate 
person’. In these accounts, these different types name a space of possible positions 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 116) (albeit some more difficult to occupy than others, in the 
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circumstances); they are felt to be different positions open to the same habitus, or 
even different descriptions of how the same habitus acts or has acted. Such ‘types’ 
also played a prominent role in other interviews, but rather than describing a 
sense of different positions that the same ‘self’ or habitus might occupy, were 
instead used to describe a perception of objective ‘types’ of advisor ‘out there’ in 
the world. Here Alexandra describes the different types among the advisors she 
worked with: 
The team I worked with? You had your counsellors who never hit their 
target, but they would spend an hour and a half talking to someone 
about their love of photography or something. The poor quality of 
notes, poor quality of anything, they weren’t doing anything, they were 
just having a chat, making sure they felt okay, so softer, a little bit. You 
had your hard-nosed bitches, essentially, who didn’t care, it was all 
about the numbers, it was all about hitting the target. They probably 
would be really good in a sales role or recruitment where it was just a 
very cold environment. And then you had your grafters, I suppose, 
which I’d kind of put myself in that category. (Alexandra, advisor and 
other roles, 2008- 2015) 
Again we find the appearance of a soft kind of advisor, a people person, as well as 
a hard, target-focused advisor. Interestingly, the soft kind of advisor is described 
as being ineffectual and unsuited to the field. Here what Judy described from 
within, in terms of a mutable identity, and needing to toughen up to be suited to 
the role, is described from without as a more or less static position. Unlike other 
advisors, Alexandra adds the third mediating category of ‘grafter’, or hard worker, 
neither too soft nor too uncaring. Despite this third in-between category however, 
the available space of positions appears very similar, and remains so even when 
advisors look on it from different perspectives and with different judgments. 
Emily feared being too target driven, and disparaged advisors who were overly 
focused on outcomes; her sympathies lay with the sorts of advisor that Alexandra 
disparages as too soft and ineffectual. On the other hand, Jess described one 
particularly hard-working ‘high performing advisor’, Leanne, in highly pejorative 
terms: 
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Leanne, who was the one that I saw that was really into it. And actually 
she was the only one that I saw that was really good at it. And she was 
a sociopath. She was an out and out sociopath. Seriously. She showed 
no emotion. She saw people as numbers. (Jess, Pathways to Work, 2008 
- 2009) 
In her ethnography of a similar work-first activation programme, Watkins Hayes 
(Watkins-Hayes, 2009) describes three types of advisor: counselors, 
administrators, and survivalists. Like Alexandra, Watkins-Hayes sees these figures 
as particular types, or rather, as identities, and in the conceptual language adopted 
by this thesis, as types with particular dispositions and orientations to their role. 
Watkins-Hayes also describes the way that these identities are mutable; both 
administrators and counselors might become survivalists: exhausted by the 
difficulties of performing their preferred role, they opt to merely get by and keep 
their jobs. However, where Watkins-Hayes largely focuses on these types as 
expressions of a more or less stable street-level identity, in this research I would 
like to draw attention to the experience of mutability, and to the pressures that 
people felt to change who they were and how they acted. From the perspective 
adopted by this research, these ‘types’ referred to possible spaces within the field, 
each with their attendant dilemmas and difficulties. I would also suggest that such 
positions are also, to some extent, the projections of advisors. The disparaging of 
‘soft’ advisors can be seen as the active disavowal of certain more empathic modes 
of interaction. Similarly, Emily’s identification of a cartoonish ‘evil corporate type 
person’ is as much the projection of her own disavowed involvement in the role 
onto others, or onto another imagined potential self, as it is the identification of an 
actually existing type. Whilst advisors often spoke in terms of ‘types’ in my 
experiences advisors often adopted – and had to adopt, as part of their role – a 
range of different positions and interactional styles with claimants. The 
identification of ‘types’ into which they could project the more uncomfortable 
aspects of their practice was one form of coping with the role. These ‘types’ did, 
however, bear some relation to the space of possible positions, each with its own 
particular difficulties.  
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The difficulties attendant to ‘softer’ more ‘people-focused’ positions was failure 
and ineffectuality with respect to targets and performance measures; the 
difficulties with respect to ‘harder’ more target-focused positions was 
compromised integrity – quite literally, in the sense of a fragmentation or division 
within the self. This sense of fragmentation was most acute for advisors investing 
in and conceiving of the role in ‘softer’ more ‘people-focused’ terms; for those 
already invested in the field as a business, or who accepted (and submitted to) the 
authority of the contract, this kind of dilemma was often much less personal. Here, 
Isabelle describes some of the dilemmas which, for other advisors, were registered 
as intensely felt personal conflicts. In this section of the interview we had been 
talking about what Jess earlier described as the difficulty of ‘making plans for 
people who it just wasn’t going to work for’. For Isabelle this was also a perceived 
problem, but her orientation to the role as the fulfillment of a business contract 
rendered it much less pressing: 
I think you have other welfare concerns about an individual, and 
potentially, those things need to be addressed, and those, quite often, 
were beyond your remit as an advisor to address. So, yeah, you kind of 
thought to yourself, well, I'm being told I have to get all these people 
into work, but actually, all these people need other interventions before 
they're ready for that.  So I suppose in that sense there is a dilemma. But 
I was there to do that job, which was to get people into work. (Isabelle, 
advisor, 2008-2012) 
Ultimately, for Isabelle, she was there to do a job, just as Katie and Nicola were 
there to fulfill a contract. This recognition of the authority of the contract was 
accompanied by a concomitant withdrawal of recognition from individual 
claimants, in the sense expressed here by Isabelle – from this position the 
difficulties of particular claimants fell beyond the remit of the advisor, who need 
look no further than their immediate task of getting people into work. For some 
advisors this was the orientation with which they entered the field, having a sense 
of the game and its illusio as a kind of business game. For other advisors, however, 
such an orientation and sense of the game was antithetical to their prior 
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dispositions and investments, and their initial sense of how the game might be. 
However, such advisors were, in Katie’s words, ‘under an illusion’ in the sense of 
mistaken about the street-level field and its illusio. For advisors with these kinds of 
investments adaptation and compromise with the field entailed orienting 
themselves more toward targets, and accepting or submitting to the field as 
dominated by market imperatives. For some advisors this was too difficult, and 
consequently they left the field. Others continued to struggle with this situation, 
changing in the process.  Attention to these forms of conflict within the field, and 
within advisors, suggests that whilst street-level activation tended to attract some 
people who considered themselves to be ‘people-oriented’, the kinds of 
dispositions accompanying this were often a poor-fit with the requirements of the 
role, which demanded more instrumental and authoritarian forms of relating to 
clients, as well as a less expansive sense of what ‘support’ and ‘help’ were going to 
mean.  
‘“No” wasn’t really allowed as a concept’ 
One interesting aspect of street-level activation services is that they are sites of 
prohibition; these were described by advisors as prohibitions of speech, and 
particularly kinds of spoken reasoning or explanation. Certain forms of thought 
and perception were tacitly understood to be out-of-bounds and, when voiced, 
pathologised. These prohibitions apply to the way that advisors understood the 
both their own situation and those of their clients. These prohibitions were not 
explicit, but rather tacitly understood, becoming visible when transgressed. Here, 
Alexandra explains to me the sorts of things that you weren’t allowed to say as an 
advisor: 
If we were underperforming we weren’t allowed to say, it’s because 
there are no jobs out there. And this is because, and I understand why, 
it’s because that’s an easy excuse to make, but it’s also a fact. Less jobs, 
less numbers of people in work, more competition for jobs, people with 
reasons why they can’t work such as health benefits and CV gaps, less 
likely to get jobs because they’re in a more competitive pool, it’s a 
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complete no brainer. But it wasn’t accepted as an excuse at [Prime] 
because it didn’t help them meet their targets so.(Alexandra, advisor 
and other roles, 2008- 2015) 
Similarly, here is Simone: 
There was no let-up, there was no, you could never give a reason as to 
why you hadn't met your target. It was just that you weren't doing the 
right things; you clearly weren't displaying the right behaviours, as far 
as they were concerned. (Simone, advisor, 2008-2010) 
These articulations of prohibition might be understood as the reflexive 
descriptions of the symbolic violence operative in the activation field, what 
Bourdieu calls the ‘gentle violence’ of management (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 205) the 
power and force of which is secured by the semi-concealed threat of redundancy. 
Advisors, as this chapter has shown, are required to adjust their habitus and 
orientate towards the attainment of outcomes at the expense of exercising their 
own dispositions and judgment with regard to claimants and their circumstances. 
This process requires advisors to engage in processes of adaptation and 
compromise, often experienced in deeply personal terms as having to become a 
different kind of person, one that recognizes and accepts the authority of the 
financial imperatives of the activation contract.  
Bourdieu defines symbolic violence, of which ‘the gentle violence of management’ 
is but one example, as ‘the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or 
her complicity’(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 167). Advisors were subject to a 
form of symbolic violence that had the power to redefine the nature of their 
investment in the field, but also their understanding of the kind of person they 
were, or wanted to be. Symbolic power, the violence it wields, and the domination 
it exercises, gains its efficacy through the consent of those over whom it is 
exercised. This is possible because symbolic power is, in part, the power to define 
how people see the world, and what they recognize as legitimate. In recognizing 
the organizational imperatives as legitimate – targets, conditionality – advisors 
thus consented to their own domination by those imperatives, and the reshaping 
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of their habitus and dispositions in line with them.  However, as this chapter has 
argued, not all those admitted to the field remained invested in it; most of the 
interview participants were advisors who had become disillusioned to some 
degree. It is as a result of the lack of fit between field and habitus, and the ensuing 
crisis, that advisors were able to articulate some otherwise unspoken premises of 
activation (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 131; Mouzelis, 2007). In articulating 
these prohibitions, these advisors demonstrate the extent to which, for them, their 
legitimacy – and the view of the world they express – has been called into 
question. For these advisors this is no longer a ‘gentle’ form of symbolic violence, 
but something altogether less subtle.  
Targets and forms of performance management dominated the field of activation, 
and this domination was registered in the experiences of advisors, and is evident 
in different ways in which they talked about their work. One interesting effect of 
performance management and targets, noted by several advisors, was that it 
expressly prohibited certain forms of talk, certain forms of explanation, and by 
extension certain forms of thought and perception. These prohibitions applied to 
advisors’ understanding of their clients’ situations, but also their own. The regime 
of performance management is a particular regime of power that can be 
understood in terms of symbolic violence; as such, it is effective to the extent that 
it is accepted and recognized as legitimate. Although dominated by targets, this 
aspect of the street-level activation field was also a point of struggle and 
contestation through which some advisors came to question the legitimacy of the 
principles which govern it. However, the power exercised by performance 
management is effective to the extent that it makes street-level sites of activation 
inhospitable to those who would question its legitimacy.  
Conclusion 
To do the job of an employment advisor required at the very least a minimal belief 
in the value of work – either its practical value to peoples’ welfare in terms of 
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income, or its moral value, perhaps both. It also required a belief that people are in 
need of some kind of support that advisors are in a position – or, with some 
training and organisational input could be in a position – to provide. Without these 
minimum beliefs, it became very difficult to perform the role. In the course of their 
work many advisors came to question the legitimacy of both performance 
management and targets as a way of organizing a person-focused service, but also 
of conditionality, and the requirement that claimants be either seeking working or 
‘making steps to move closer’ to work. 
The focus of this chapter has largely been on advisors who became disillusioned 
with welfare activation work. Many started out as street-level advisors under the 
misapprehension that the welfare-to-work field was fundamentally about – as in 
organized around, or structured by – the needs and wishes of unemployed 
claimants. What they found instead was a street-level situation dominated by the 
imperative to achieve targets. This chapter looked at the ways that advisors made 
compromises between their own hopeful investments and the demands of their 
employer, and argued that to participate in the welfare-to-work field is to be 
subject to the symbolic violence of performance management, and domination by 
its logic. In the next chapter, the thesis turns to consider how conditionality and 
work-first activation were experienced by claimants. 
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Chapter Seven – Welfare traps and protection rackets: 
suspicion, surveillance, and the propagation of social 
insecurity 
‘Caught in the middle’ 
If I go up to my advisor, this is the one that’s always wanting to 
sanction me, and if I says to her, I can just leave that and I’m going to 
leave it, she’d probably say to me, you’ve got to do it. And then you go 
to another advisor that’d say you don’t have to do it. But then again, 
you’re scared they tell you [that] you don’t have to do it, you have, and 
they sanction you. So you’re caught, caught in the middle. I don’t know 
if that can happen but…I don’t know. (Bridget, JSA claimant) 
Bridget, a JSA claimant, describes being caught in a situation of threat and 
uncertainty. Whilst Bridget is certain about the nature of the threat – being 
sanctioned – she is uncertain about its potential trigger. Together, threat and 
uncertainty produce a stressful situation of insecurity, which is also experienced 
by Bridget as a trap – something in which she finds herself caught. This is her 
experience of attending Jobcentre Plus, where she routinely meets with various 
different advisors. Bridget is keen to find work, and voluntarily made the transfer 
from ESA to JSA, thinking that if she did so she would be given more support 
finding the right kind of job. Changing benefits, however, hasn’t resulted in a 
change in support so much as a change in expectations: a change in conditionality. 
Because she is still experiencing the health problems she had when claiming ESA, 
Bridget has her own conditions and requirements that any potential job would 
need to meet. The inconsistency she experiences at the Jobcentre – in terms of 
seeing different people – means that she is not always certain that these conditions 
and needs are understood or recognised; the risk of being misunderstood and 
misrecognised is also the risk of being sanctioned.  
This chapter addresses the theme of welfare traps, but not in the sense commonly 
associated with the term, as used to describe a situation of perverse incentives 
where welfare recipients are ‘disincentivised’ from pursuing paid work due to the 
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supposed pecuniary rewards obtained through state support. This notion of ‘the 
welfare trap’, along with its related cast of characters – the lifestyle claimant, the 
malingerer, the shirkers and the scroungers – though subject to continued 
empirical criticism, is a much repeated trope in the discourse around welfare 
reform, often used in justification of the policy measures studied here (Wiggan, 
2012). Against this notion of the welfare trap, this chapter argues that it is in fact a 
policy focus on symbolic victories, guided by zombie concepts, to catch out a cast 
of imaginary monsters (Macdonald et al., 2014), which constitutes a trap. This is a 
trap generated by the intensification of conditionality, and the various forms of 
surveillance and monitoring that go along with it. This chapter argues that 
behavioural conditionality can take the form of a protection racket, wherein 
suspicion and surveillance, underpinned by a threat of sanctions, push claimants 
into defensive activity aimed at warding off threats of stigma and sanction. 
Activation is, in this way, the activation of stigma.  
This chapter asks: how do claimants experience activation and conditionality? 
What are some of the relational dynamics of activation? What do conditionality 
and activation mean for claimants in practice? How do claimants experience 
street-level advisors? Because the dynamics of this process traverse both the social 
and psychological domains, and the argument is a psychosocial one, this chapter 
begins with an in-depth account of one particular interview in which I trace some 
of the complexities of one claimant’s experience, showing how many important 
aspects of this experience operate ‘beneath the surface’(Clarke & Hoggett, 2009). 
This chapter draws on the psychosocial framework outlined in Chapter Four in 
order to understand some aspects of welfare-recipients’ agency introduced in 
Chapter Two. The dynamics of the activation protection racket are explored, 
starting with one particular case – that of Elizabeth – before indicating how each of 
its constituent dynamics were present, in different ways, for other participants. In 
addressing the common experiences of suspicion and surveillance, it is shown 
how these work to activate stigma amongst participants. In its final section the 
chapter turns to participants’ experiences of uncertainty, and highlights a 
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tendency toward a compliant ‘getting by’ (Lister, 2004) in these situations, which 
might be seen as coming at the expense of more assertive claims to rights, 
entitlements, or expressions of need.  It is argued that conditionality and 
activation, rather than helping claimants negotiate their respective situations and 
difficulties, can instead present but one more (set of) problem(s) with which they 
must cope. 
Elizabeth 
Elizabeth is a lone parent with two children, and has been claiming JSA and 
subject to conditionality for nearly three years. Before that she had been claiming 
Income Support after her partner left the relationship. Both her children are over 
five years of age, meaning that she is required to claim JSA (rather than Income 
Support) and be actively seeking and available for work. Her previous jobs were 
as an administrator and purchaser in the hospitality and gaming sectors, which 
had sometimes involved long and unsocial hours, and Elizabeth worried about 
being able to find a job that she was able to make fit with childcare.  
On being introduced, Elizabeth was smiling broadly and seemed full of self-
confidence. She was dressed smartly as if for a job interview, wearing dark colours 
of caramel and black. As it turned out she had only that morning been offered a 
job interview for a part-time administrative post, one with good pay, and hours 
that suited her. She seemed full of hope and optimism, a mood which, along with 
laughter, seemed to permeate the first half of our interview, during which she told 
me how attending the provider had given her new found confidence. She spoke of 
how she had been coming to a group for lone parents at the office, and that while 
somewhat sceptical and resistant at first, she had come to appreciate being made 
to attend, finding a sense of strength and self-esteem in the fact that she felt able to 
help other, less confident members of the group: 
When Fiona says to come in twice a week, she wanted me twice a week, 
and then had put me on the lone parent employability group, I was like, 
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three times! Three times a week! No way. And I did have a bit of a huff 
about it. But then when I started coming I enjoyed it, and I saw the 
method to their madness in a way, especially with the lone parent 
employability group. Because I saw what they were trying to do with 
that was, you know, because of being a lone parent is isolated, and the 
lack of confidence and that, they were trying to get women who were in 
similar circumstances to … ones that had strength and things to bring 
the others out of their shell. (Elizabeth, JSA claimant) 
During the interview Elizabeth spoke of her initial trepidation on claiming and 
going to the Jobcentre for the first time, and of the confusion, humiliation, and 
dismissal she had experienced there. On being referred to the Work Programme 
her expectations were initially coloured by these experiences, and she again had a 
period of being passed around different advisors, until finally being assigned to 
Fiona, who Elizabeth described as taking a strict and almost authoritarian 
approach to their appointments, mandating Elizabeth to attend the provider 
several times a week. Characteristically, Elizabeth laughed when she told me 
about her initial ‘huff’ at this. She said that while advisors needed to have 
empathy and show sympathy, she felt that for herself, she now preferred Fiona’s 
strict approach to one that was too ‘softly softly nice,’ although she conceded this 
could work well for others.   
Elizabeth seemed keen to tell me a transformative story about herself, about the 
way that her appointments with Fiona had helped to boost her confidence and 
broaden her sense of what was possible. She liked being around other people, and 
being able to speak regularly to someone who listened and who, she felt, 
understood her situation. She also spoke about periods of demoralisation and 
disappointment, and about the frustration of constantly looking for work without 
sign of reward (neither job offers nor interviews; an experience Southwood (2011) 
calls ‘non-stop inertia’, and Wright (2016) ‘activity without results’), but recently 
things seemed to have turned a corner, and with the forthcoming job interview 
Elizabeth was again hopeful that she would soon be in work. For most of the 
interview I had no reason to review my first impressions of Elizabeth as someone 
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relaxed, confident, and at ease with herself. Unlike some of the other claimant-
participants recruited for me by the provider, Elizabeth seemed more than happy 
to talk at length about her experiences.  
Whilst she spoke about difficult circumstances and unpleasant experiences – 
especially of the Jobcentre – Elizabeth’s story as she told it was a positive one, and 
it seemed evident that she’d had a good experience of attending the provider, and 
felt herself to be in a better place than some months past. Curious about 
Elizabeth’s remarks about preferring a strict approach – wanting to be ‘pushed’ – 
and about having overcome an initial resistance to mandatory activity (coming to 
see a ‘method in their madness’, as she put it), I asked her more about the 
mandatory aspects of claiming. In her answers, it was noticeable that Elizabeth 
often adopted the perspective of advisors, and sought to explain to me what they 
were trying to do. In describing her initial resistance to mandatory participation, 
she did so looking back, seeing her feelings of indignation and resistance as 
belonging to a past self who had not yet understood what her advisors intended. 
There was a sense that Elizabeth had previously seen her advisors as (potential) 
adversaries or antagonists, whereas she now saw them as being on her side (and 
her on theirs). I asked her what was mandatory about her involvement in the 
Work Programme, and she told me that although there were definite minimum 
requirements (a fortnightly appointment) sometimes advisors mandated 
additional activities on top of these. I asked why an advisor might do that, and 
what it depended on: 
I think it depends on. I don’t know what it depends on. Obviously 
they’ve got the, they try and get everyone onto all the different sessions 
they hold like when they have their sessions for interview techniques or 
interview questions where they go over the competency based 
interview thing, because more and more companies are using the 
competency based interview style. So, they do try and get everyone on 
that. Application forms as well, that’s another one … Those, they tend 
to try and get everyone on those types of workshops, and they set them 
up throughout, and obviously they’ve got so many clients they try and, 
they do, I have been on ones that have been really quite varied, but then 
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I’ve been on ones where I’m the only forty year old in there. I feel like 
I’m sitting in there with my son and all his pals [laughs]…But they do 
try and vary it up, and then sometimes like with the lone parents they 
have specific ones that are all, sort of the same age bracket, looking for 
the same hours, same types of work … And they do make them 
mandatory, to get at least the basics covered. 
For advisors, group sessions were one way that they could meet their various 
performance targets using minimal resources (of time), a strategy also identified in 
a US context by Brodkin, who also found that such sessions were often ritualistic 
in nature, possibly offering ‘affective benefits of hope and support for some 
clients’, but frequently ‘strikingly disconnected’ from the realities of the labour 
market (Brodkin, 2013c, p. 155). Elizabeth also suggests that such programmes are 
primarily designed to help advisors manage their caseloads (‘they’ve got so many 
clients’), and she also mentions the varying quality of workshops, as well as her 
discomfort in attending some sessions (of being in a group with the young men 
she said, ‘I’m like, oh my God they’re going to drive me crazy!’). However, 
Elizabeth didn’t speak as someone who was being made to do something against 
her will, or that she felt was pointless; rather, she spoke as someone who went 
along with the mandatory ‘requests’ of her advisors, and tried to look at things 
from their point of view. She also found value in the groups where she was with 
people she perceived as peers, people in similar situations and facing similar 
circumstances to herself.   
Something about Elizabeth’s measured attitude, admitting to negative experiences 
whilst also emphasising the positive, and as well her apparently open, 
forthcoming, and relaxed demeanour, and the ease with which our conversation 
seemed to be going, meant that the turn then taken by the interview caught me 
entirely by surprise; moreover, it seemed to take Elizabeth  by surprise too. I had 
followed up my questions about mandatory participation by asking what 
happened if she couldn’t attend a mandatory appointment or activity. Elizabeth 
said that while there was an expectation to attend, ‘if it’s something that’s beyond 
your control like [laughs] you’ve been hit by a bus [laughs] or your child’s sick 
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and you don’t have anyone to look after [them], they’re usually quite flexible.’  She 
also recalled a time when she had been unable to make an appointment: 
I have once had that, it was a hospital appointment and I’d been given – 
you know, someone had had a cancellation – and I’d been called for a 
hospital appointment and I tried – I did try and contact here on the 
Monday before it, but my advisor wasn’t in so I left a message and I’d 
sent her an email. And on the Tuesday, I only got an email off her after 
I’d come back from the [hospital] appointment, saying to get an 
appointment card or letter … but by the time she sent it at quarter to 
nine I was already on my way. So I didn’t come in that Tuesday, and I 
got a letter from the DWP for, that I had missed a mandatory 
appointment, like a sick thing, a sick note to fill in type thing. But I’ve 
only had that once. I didn’t think it was particularly fair because I was 
able to show through my Universal Jobmatch that I still went in and 
applied for jobs that day, even though I didn’t come here for the jobs 
searching session. When I got home that night, I still did go in [logged 
in to Universal Jobmatch] and do what I would have done here anyway 
during the day, so. But that was just the once. I’ve not had any other.  
Compared with (and perhaps in some way desensitised by) other participants’ 
stories of being sanctioned, having their benefits stopped for unknown reasons, or 
suffering the indignities of attending Work Capability Assessments, Elizabeth’s 
story about receiving a letter from the DWP seemed – to me, at the time of hearing 
it – unpleasant but relatively innocuous, although as Gathwaite (2014) has shown, 
even the mundane experience of waiting for mail can, in the context of 
conditionality and activation, be fraught with fear and anxiety. Nevertheless, 
during the interview I did not immediately grasp how significant receiving that 
letter had been, or the powerful feelings of insecurity, unfairness, and hurt that it 
aroused. I did notice the emphasis Elizabeth placed on having done her job search 
despite her hospital appointment, which I found interesting in terms of her 
acquiescence to the Work Programme and its demands. Although not knowing the 
reason for her hospital appointment, it nonetheless seemed more than reasonable 
to me that the requirement to complete a job search might be waived on a specific 
day. Elizabeth, rather than questioning the demand, emphasised her compliance 
regardless of that days other events, as well as her repeated efforts to inform her 
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advisor. With my mind still on these thoughts, I asked her how she felt when she 
received the letter: 
I was a bit annoyed, because I felt that, OK, I could understand if it was 
something that I had done, you know, on a regular basis or things like 
that, but it was the first time I’d ever, in a year, and…I’d even phoned 
in and said, or sent an email and phoned in, trying to advise them 
beforehand that I wouldn’t be making it. And I felt that it was, you 
know, it wasn’t just for something willy nilly, it wasn’t somebody’s 
birthday party or something, you know…I had got an opportunity, it 
was short notice, but I’d got an opportunity to move an appointment 
up, so I thought that get it out the way. So yeah was a bit frustrated 
because it didn’t stop me, I felt it was OK if it was like a hospital stay 
where you weren’t able to get online and do the job search, so I just, I 
did get a bit frustrated, I was a bit annoyed at that because it didn’t 
prevent me from doing, because that day I had done, it was just a job 
searching session… 
At this point in the interview a purely textual focus on the transcript becomes 
highly misleading. Whilst Elizabeth’s words sought to qualify, lessen, and 
diminish her feelings (‘a bit annoyed’, ‘a bit frustrated’) as she spoke she had in 
fact become increasingly and visibly upset. With my mind elsewhere, and also 
conscious of the time (the next interview was scheduled to start shortly), this 
realisation came quite suddenly. By the time she repeated the words ‘a bit 
frustrated’ and ‘a bit annoyed’ Elizabeth was in streams of tears and her words 
had become choked. We both started looking for tissues, rooting through our bags, 
and as an embarrassed silence descended I made the decision to pause the 
interview letting Elizabeth regain her composure.  
After a break Elizabeth told me, ‘I just don’t know where that came from, I didn’t 
realise that was something I was holding onto,’ and laughed. Behind this 
comment, which Elizabeth went on to repeat, there might be interpreted a 
disavowal of her knowledge about what had made her upset. In what follows I 
want to draw attention to the ways that Elizabeth chose to make sense of her 
feelings to me during the remainder of the interview, and what she came to 
identify as their source. At first Elizabeth expressed embarrassment, and sought to 
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distance herself from what had happened by apologising for getting upset. I 
attempted to reassure her, telling her there was no need, but also suggesting one 
possible interpretation of why she’d become upset:  
Jim: No, no need to apologise. It’s…it’s quite an emotional situation 
isn’t it?  Because as you’ve been describing to me you’ve been trying 
very hard and it didn’t seem fair or like it really… 
Elizabeth: Yes you see that’s why it feels, that’s why I said, it feels 
demoralising sometimes. When you’re doing everything you can, and 
everything that you’ve been told to do, and I think it’s just…don’t 
understand why you don’t have a job yet, you know? Yeah that’s what 
it is. That’s what. Demoralising. 
At this point, with the next scheduled interview fast approaching, and wanting to 
leave some time to check that Elizabeth was ok and round things off, I decided 
that I would close the interview after one last question. When later I listened back 
to the recording two things struck me. The first was something I had missed at the 
time, probably because it wasn’t anything ordinarily noticeable: either as a slip of 
the tongue or as a result of lowering her voice, Elizabeth had omitted, or the 
recording had failed to pick up, the subject in the sentence ‘…don’t understand 
why you don’t have a job yet.’ Listening back, I couldn’t decide what she had 
meant. Who didn’t understand? Did she mean ‘they (her advisors) don’t 
understand?’ Or did she mean ‘I don’t understand?’Or both? 
The second thing I had noticed at the time, and listening back I remembered how 
uncomfortable it had made me feel. My last question to Elizabeth was the 
standard last question, if there was anything else she wanted to say that I hadn’t 
asked her about, or that she thought was important. Once more picking up my 
interpretation of why she might have become upset, Elizabeth again proceeded to 
agree with me, only this time more forcefully, and at greater length, and in doing 
so imputed to me some thoughts and ideas that I had not voiced, and did not hold:  
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No I’m not, not really. Basically you just summed it up there in the last 
sentence you says to me about it, that’s the hardest thing about it, is you 
know, as I say, you see them, people that are wanting ‘here you go 
there’s a job’ and are not doing much, and it’s frustrating that you’re 
doing everything you can, by the book, and… I think it’s that stereotype 
that because you’re on benefits you’re scum like, you know? [Pause]  
You know all these stupid programmes that they make, Benefits Street 
and this and that, and you’re going, I don’t… Yes I know they exist 
but…it…and I feel the people that are really trying and want to get 
ahead are being tarred with the same brush. And that’s I think the most 
frustrating thing about it, even from the Government itself, of how, you 
know, yes, with the cuts and things, yes there are people that are 
scamming or have in the past been able to scam the system and things 
like that…But people that are genuinely on the system the way it’s 
supposed to be, I find they’re the ones that end up penalised more. 
Because they don’t have, what’s it called? Street smarts or whatever it 
is.  You know a lot of that are on these programmes, I feel like they 
classify everyone under, you know, the shoplifting and things, they’ll 
always find a way to survive …But there’s a lot of people that aren’t 
like that, and with the Government cutting, cutting certain benefits, 
making it push, push, push. I can understand doing that, but there’s 
people that are pushing themselves, you know genuinely trying, they’re 
going, what else can I do? And they say you’re not doing enough, not 
doing enough, not doing enough. It feels a bit…that’s what’s 
demoralising. You’re going, I am doing that! You know, I’m doing 
everything, what else can I…? Tell me another way to do it or 
something else and I’ll do it, but I don’t know what else I can do…? 
Misrecognition, protection rackets, and the propagation of 
insecurity 
Like Bridget at the start of this chapter, Elizabeth also found herself caught in an 
impossible situation, in this case the situation of stigma, and feeling unable to 
satisfy the relentless demand to continually prove her deservingness (a demand 
which was experienced as coming from various directions). In some ways, 
Elizabeth’s interview ended up in a very different place than it started. An initially 
measured emphasis on positive experiences, optimism about the future, and a 
story about development and transformation had given way to an angry 
indictment of the political and media stigmatisation of claimants, a sense of 
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fruitless and unrecognised efforts, and a story about being stuck under a distorted 
political-media lens with nowhere to hide from others’ disapproving gaze.  
However, it also seemed that Elizabeth wasn’t just telling me a story about her 
experiences, but was actively enlisting me into it. Among other things, the 
interview was also about the need to be seen as deserving, as making the greatest 
possible efforts, and as being committed to paid work at all cost – in other words, 
the need for recognition as a particular sort of deserving person. At different 
points during the interview Elizabeth employed alternative strategies to try to 
secure recognition as a deserving claimant. To begin with she emphasised her 
compliance and then enthusiastic participation with the Work Programme 
provider, distancing herself from initial reservations and resistance. She presented 
herself as a good welfare-to-work subject who had engaged with the programme 
and been transformed by the process. Later in the interview, however, Elizabeth 
recalled a time when this strategy had failed, and this memory seemingly 
threatened to overwhelm her in the present, threatening her sense of self. Though 
the event of receiving a warning letter was in the past, the feeling that it evoked 
was still very much present as something that Elizabeth was holding onto, or that 
was holding onto her. Such a psychosocial interpretation of this research 
encounter (as outlined in Chapter Five) draws attention to some of the 
psychosocial dimensions of activation. As discussed in Chapter Two, activation 
has been explored in terms of its coercive emphasis on positive affect and feeling 
(Friedli & Stearn, 2015), and to some extent this is also visible in Elizabeth’s 
account of her experiences. As the interview progressed, and turned to the 
difficult feelings provoked by the letter, Elizabeth also engaged in the sort of 
‘othering’ practices described in the literature on claimants’ experiences of welfare 
stigma (Garthwaite, 2014; Patrick, 2014; Shildrick & MacDonald, 2013). Here, 
conditionality and activation both create and intensify situations in which 
‘othering’ is necessary as a means of defence or coping. Adopting the psychosocial 
concepts of introjection, projection, and splitting (Thompson & Hoggett, 2011) 
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outlined in Chapter Four, Elizabeth experienced receiving the letter as an 
introjection – cast under suspicion, she had been identified by the letter as a ‘bad’ 
claimant. This provoked both anger and shame, which Elizabeth was able to deal 
with by suggesting that the proper target of the letter were other ‘bad’ sorts of 
claimant.  
What I would most like to draw attention to in this account of Elizabeth’s 
interview are the ways that the system of welfare conditionality both subjects 
Elizabeth to continual scrutiny, experienced in terms of suspicion and accusation, 
but also, and simultaneously, offers her some limited means with which to defend 
herself, both in terms of concrete practices (compliance with ‘work-focused 
activity’), but also symbolic representations and fantasies into which she can 
project the worst aspects of her experience.  This develops recent accounts of some 
of the potentially ‘perverse’ effects of activation, introduced in Chapter Two, 
where it is shown to be potentially demoralising and deactivating (Wright, 2016b). 
My suggestion is that the organisational implementation of behavioural 
conditionality can take the form of a protection racket, in which the claimant 
experiences a default assumption of guilt (of scrounging, shirking, malingering), 
accompanied by the threat of violence (sanctions, but also the symbolic violence of 
misrecognition), which they are able to forestall only by consenting to 
participation in a seemingly interminable performance of deservingness for their 
advisors (and for various social others, imagined and real, including research 
students). As Elizabeth’s story shows neither consent nor enthusiastic 
participation was ever quite enough to secure definitive proof of deservingness. 
Although ‘deservingness’ as a project (rather than adjective) predates the advent 
of activation and behavioural conditionality (see: Howe, 1990), these policies make 
this into a more formal and ‘official’ project, tapping into and enlisting common 
ideological representations, worries, and fears. In this account, one of things that 
activation acts on, or activates, is stigma.  
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At the Jobcentre: first encounters 
As outlined in Chapters Two and Three, the street-level landscape of activation 
involves both the publicly run Jobcentre Plus, and private and voluntary 
contracted-out providers. The former administers and processes peoples’ benefits, 
but is also responsible for the delivery of employment support and activation, in 
most cases for approximately two years, before referrals are made to the 
contracted-out providers of the Work Programme. That activation takes this form, 
and is divided between different services, has important consequences for 
claimants’ experiences. For one thing, it means that there are a number of possible 
journeys through the field, which will depend on the duration of a particular 
claim, but also location (in terms of where someone will be sent). It is also 
important in another sense, in that for claimants referred to contracted-out services 
there are (at least) two organisations with a role in their ‘activation’ and claim for 
benefits. Among other things, then, this chapter explores some of the 
consequences of the governance of activation (see Chapter Three) for claimants’ 
experiences. Before considering the experiences of contracted out services, this 
section first looks at claimants’ experiences of Jobcentre Plus. In later sections it is 
argued that these initial street-level encounters have an important role in framing 
later experiences of contracted-out services; that is, the experience of Jobcentre 
Plus teaches ‘political lessons contributing to future political expectations’ (Lipsky, 
1984, p. 9) and ‘socialize citizens to expectations of government services and a 
place in the political community’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. 4). 
Classification and deficient subjects 
Underlying Elizabeth’s repeated emphasis on the many and various ways in 
which she sought to comply with the demands of conditionality there lay a 
powerful fear that her efforts would go unrecognised, and that she would be 
identified as in some way undeserving. She explicitly linked this to the television 
programme Benefits Street and ‘all these stupid programmes that they make’ also 
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seeing media attacks on welfare claimants as taking place in tandem with 
government attacks. These were literally described as stigmatising by Elizabeth 
when she spoke of being ‘tarred with the same brush’ as the sensationalised 
depictions of claimants on TV programmes and in politicians’ speeches. This 
remark found an echo in the words of Greg, also a JSA claimant who, in talking 
about his experiences of visiting the Jobcentre told me 
I think everybody’s classed the same. They know nothing, totally 
nothing about you. You’re just classed as a scrounger. (Gregg, JSA 
claimant) 
This sense of visiting the Jobcentre as an experience of being classed by others 
indicates also the significance for claimants of what Tyler calls ‘classificatory 
struggles’ (Tyler, 2015). Claimants often experienced welfare services in terms of 
being classed and identified by others, subject to the weight of others’ judgment, 
perhaps also their own. These judgments were nearly always negative, and in 
particular two things stood out about claimants descriptions of their encounter in 
Jobcentre Plus: being subjected to suspicion and disbelief, but also being treated as 
if in some way deficient, child-like, or stupid:  
You feel as though you’re a wean back at school, about to get into 
trouble for something, that’s how you feel.(Lisa, JSA claimant) 
They treat you as if you don’t have two brain cells to rub together! 
(Sybil, ESA claimant) 
These kinds of judgement and treatment were sometimes explicitly linked to a 
sense of the power imbalance in their relationship with advisors. For Bridget, this 
imbalance was not something she immediately recognised, but became apparent 
more slowly, obscured by her initial perceptions of her advisor as being a nice 
person: 
Just the advisor I’ve got just likes to sort of… she’s in power. At first I 
thought they were nice and, I was like that, I was fine for the first 
couple of weeks I’d signed on, I was fine. And then after it I was like, 
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there’s something not right here. And its because, it was just, she’s in 
power and she can tell you what to do and what have you. I don’t 
mind, advise me, but don’t treat me like a stupid wee, a wee lassie, 
when I’ve been through things in life you shouldn’t have been through. 
That’s what I’m getting at, you know what I mean? (Bridget, JSA 
claimant) 
Like Lisa and Sybil, Bridget felt infantilised and treated as if she were stupid, but 
here these judgements, rather than being strictly interpersonal, are explicitly 
linked to the form of the claimant-advisor relationship when it is based on 
conditional, work-first activation, where the advisors has the power to issue 
instructions. Knowing her advisor had this power diminished Bridget’s sense of 
being a peer or equal, and she felt that, although her advisor was a nice person, the 
fact that her advisor could exercise this power in effect diminished important 
dimensions Bridget’s life experience and identity.  
Suspicion and surveillance 
Claimants’ experiences of being treated as deficient subjects in Jobcentres were 
accompanied by the sense that they were under suspicion, and routinely 
disbelieved. Jill, a young JSA claimant, told me a story about an early visit to the 
Jobcentre, when she needed to provide them with some basic personal 
information: 
The people in there are quite snappy with you, quite rude. I had a 
woman in there, it was Christmas Eve, I had to go in because they had 
stopped my money even though they weren’t supposed to and it 
caused a lot or problems with my housing benefits. I made an 
appointment which had got cancelled so I had to go in on Christmas 
Eve and the woman was arguing with me saying, we can’t find you on 
the system anywhere. I went, I’m on the system, and she was talking 
down to me. She was like, what’s your date of birth? I went 1993 and 
she went, are you sure it’s not 1996? I was like, I’m pretty sure what 
year I was born in. They could find a Jill for 1996 but not for ’93. She 
was quite rude as if I don’t know my own age. (Jill, JSA claimant) 
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Jill’s story is about both being patronised, but also suspected of lying. Claimants 
were sometimes subject to two quite different kinds of negative identification, 
which made it hard for them to know how to act. On the one hand they were often 
treated with suspicion as if they are cheating or somehow fraudulent, and 
therefore as being in some way crafty or smart; on the other hand, they are also 
infantilised and treated as if they are stupid. For Jill this was a quandary: she 
worried about going to the Jobcentre in case she got into trouble. I asked her why 
she thought she might get into trouble: 
I don't know. The way they look at you, you feel quite bad and they 
make you feel quite small, like a bit of an idiot and it's quite 
embarrassing. You won't tell them everything because they'll be 
thinking they're just lying about that or they're just saying that… If the 
person was not nice I would worry and then I would end up thinking, 
oh God, I'm just not going to go in so I don't get in trouble about it. (Jill, 
JSA claimant) 
In particular, Jill doubted that advisors at the Jobcentre would believe the 
difficulties she was having with her job search, and this doubt made her inclined 
to withdraw from the ‘service’ (putting her at risk of getting a sanction) rather 
than seek help for her problems. As someone with dyslexia and problems with 
literacy, Jill found the requirement to log her job search onerous, and she worried 
that any mistakes she made would be looked at unfavourably, as evidence of 
fraudulence, rather than as something for which she might be provided with help 
and support. Likewise she worried that articulating her problems would be 
interpreted as making excuses, and as further evidence of her dishonesty. 
Similarly, Greg describes the reaction of his advisor when submitting his job 
search log: 
If you’re on the Universal Jobmatch and you’ve applied for jobs, you’ve 
done your job search history, they’ll check out what you’ve been doing 
all week before … and then they’ll go, there’s a vacancy there. They’ll 
turn the computer round to you, and I’ll say, I’ve applied for that. 
When did you apply for it? I said Tuesday, check my job search, you 
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should already know. And they’ve went through the job search and 
went, oh aye, there, it’s there. (Greg, JSA claimant) 
The suspicion that clients routinely encounter in their Jobcentre interactions is also 
tied to forms of monitoring and surveillance. Here, Greg describes being 
disbelieved until his job search record has been checked. In their encounters with 
Jocbentre Plus, claimants tended to describe a series of encounters focused on the 
forms of evidence they were expected to produce:  
From my experience they don’t do anything at all apart from keep an 
eye once a fortnight on their claimants. You know, and report back to 
the government if they see anything that they consider to be indicative 
of someone being a benefit scrounger. (Sybil, ESA claimant) 
Distrust was central to claimants’ experiences of Jobcentre plus, and this cut both 
ways. One the one hand, there was the experience of being routinely, even 
systematically distrusted by Jobcentre staff. The focus on monitoring job search 
activity fed into this, producing encounters which seemed to be largely organised 
around checking, or checking up. On the other hand, claimants also felt distrust of 
the Jobcentre and its staff. They did not always feel like they or their problems 
would be listened to or believed. For Sybil this distrust took the form of a 
suspicion that Jobcentre staff were waiting for the sign that they could administer 
a sanction. Negative experiences of the Jobcentre were nearly universal among the 
claimant-participants. The exception was a single JSA claimant who had only 
recently (within the last six months) started claiming. In contrast with the other 
participants, Frank described his experience of the Jobcentre in positive terms: 
The process was very quick, it was very salient as well, I had no 
problems with it whatsoever. The meetings I’ve had since then have 
been excellent. My supervisor’s been absolutely brilliant, she’s advised 
me about jobs, as long as I’ve supplied the information and keep in my 
diary, then it’s been OK, and they’ve actually given me lists of work, 
they’ve been very supportive, very encouraging, and they’ve got a job 
to do, they need to get you off unemployment, that stigma, that kind of 
self-fulfilling prophecy, that poverty trap. So they have got a job that’s 
difficult and it’s up to the individual people to really make the effort to 
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secure employment and do their utmost to meet the criteria that they 
require for you to continue getting the benefits. (Frank, JSA claimant) 
In contrast with all other participants, Frank both trusted the Jobcentre, and 
described it as helpful and encouraging. He also identified with its staff, their aims 
and difficulties. Perhaps one reason for this stark difference might have been that 
Frank had been claiming for a shorter duration than many of the other participants 
(most of whom were, at the time of the research, on the Work Programme, or had 
complex situations where different claims and breaks in claims meant they had 
not yet been referred). He also did not expect to be claiming for long, and 
throughout the interview was keen to discuss a variety of different projects and 
activities in which he was engaged, and through which he hoped to find work. 
Unlike most of the other claimants, Frank was also educated beyond degree level 
(holding a postgraduate qualification) and had, until recently, been employed in a 
professional role.  
Not all claimants experienced their interactions in the Jobcentre in the same way, 
as Frank’s very different account shows. Nonetheless, among the claimants 
interviewed for this research, most spoke about the Jobcentre in negative terms as 
a kind of processing centre, or a gauntlet through which they had to pass. By 
contrast, most of the participants – though not all - had much better experiences of 
contracted out services (although see Chapter Five for access and sampling). In the 
next section some of these experiences are explored in greater depth, drawing 
attention to two features of claimants’ experiences of the Work Programme: firstly, 
despite the worries and concerns of advisors discussed in the previous Chapter, 
here Work Programme advisors were valued to the extent that they were more 
inclined to listen and try to understand claimants’ situations. Nevertheless, many 
of the participants suggested that their Work Programme provider, whilst more 
understanding than the Jobcentre, was still in many important respects, 
ineffectual. The next section seeks to situate claimants’ experiences of contracted 
out services within the wider street-level landscape of activation, alongside 
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experiences and expectations that have been produced elsewhere, notably those of 
Jobcentre Plus described above.  
The Work Programme 
I actually really like coming here because it helps. Before I started 
coming here I had quite a lot of problems with the Jobcentre because I 
can’t keep up with my job searches the same way as I can here now. 
Also being able to come here I have an online diary now instead of 
having to write it down and maybe losing it. It’s more helpful coming 
here than it was before. (Jill, JSA claimant) 
Earlier in this chapter it was described how Jill had considerable worries about 
attending the Jobcentre, because she thought that she would be disbelieved, and 
taken for a liar. As a consequence, Jill was reluctant to tell the Jobcentre about her 
problems (with literacy) or seek help for them. Her experience of the Work 
Programme could not have been more different, and in her interview she 
emphasised the different forms of help and support she received, specifically but 
not limited to help completing her job search, and with writing cover letters and 
applications. This section describes participants’ experiences of the work 
programme, focusing first on their encounters with advisors, then turning to their 
perceptions of the service specifically as an employment service. Whilst Work 
Programme advisors tended to be viewed as more approachable than those at the 
Jobcentre, there was also a sense that with respect to help with finding work, they 
were to some extent ineffectual. 
‘It’s a bit more friendly and helpful’ 
One important difference between Jobcentre Plus and contracted out providers is 
the flexibility of the latter to organise and arrange their service delivery. In the 
previous chapter it was seen that in contracted out services advisors are under 
considerable pressure to ‘engage’ as many clients as possible, and also to increase 
the numbers of appointments they have with individual claimants. From the 
claimant’s perspective, this situation can be valuable; advisors are unlikely to 
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refuse an appointment, and to varying degrees will be flexible if a client wants to 
come in and use the computers, or ask for help with an application. In contract, 
appointments with Jobcentre Plus are rigid and highly structured; advisors have 
much less freedom to organise their diaries, and Jobcentre Plus does not operate 
on a ‘drop-in’ basis. The comparative friendliness and helpfulness of their Work 
Programme advisors was emphasised by several claimants, albeit occasionally 
with qualification: 
Maria: It’s a bit easier coming here. 
Jim: In what way? 
Maria: It’s a bit more friendly and helpful. They give you a bit more 
advice than just the Jobcentre, so a bit more helpful. (Maria, JSA 
claimant) 
No they’re quite good because they’re quite supportive, they even help 
you out. I was still going for interviews, if you go for an interview they 
expect you to pay for the travel expenses and then they refund 
you….Yeah, there is an element of somebody rooting for you, that kind 
of thing. Where you’re just getting rejection after rejection after 
rejection, there is somebody there, they’ve got a nice attitude, like a 
supportive attitude. (Paul, JSA claimant) 
The dealings that I have had, I’ve dealt with three people in here and 
they have all been the same. They take their time and they listen. They 
are here to help you. They always stress that. They are here to help. 
Because obviously they want, the more people get back to work, the 
better for themselves. That’s their job.(Sam, JSA claimant) 
Maria, Paul, Sam and Jill were all claimants who were recruited, and whose 
interviews were organised for me, by the Work Programme provider; as such, I 
expected them to have been selected with some kind of criteria in mind, and to be 
positive about the provider. In this respect the thing I found most surprising about 
these interviews was the way the positive aspects of claimants’ experiences were 
often muted and highly qualified. Nevertheless, the favourable comparison of the 
provider with Jobcentre Plus was a theme across all of these interviews, and was 
also echoed by Bridget (in an interview not arranged by the provider) who 
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contrasted her (brief) positive experience of one other contracted-out provider 
with those of the Jobcentre: 
Jim: So what kind of help have they [JCP] given you trying to get back 
to work? 
Bridget: The Jobcentre? No. The Jobcentre doesn’t do that now. It’s all 
left to [Activation Works] and [Work First]. They send you there. 
Jim: What do you know about those? 
Bridget: Well I went there. I enjoyed that. It was at the beginning of this 
year, but you’re only allowed to go there for, you go there for about 
three months. But you’re only allowed to be on their system for six 
months. I didn’t know that at the time, so I can’t go back. But I found 
that very helpful. (Bridget, JSA claimant) 
Not all claimant-participants found their encounters with contracted out services 
helpful; notably, the ESA claimants I interviewed, who were not recruited through 
a provider, made much more critical remarks27. Nevertheless, whilst I suspected 
that many of the Work Programme participants had been selected for me on the 
basis that they might give a good impression, I had little reason to doubt what 
they told me for this reason; their experiences, whilst perhaps ‘curated’ for me, 
were nonetheless important, and there was a degree of consistency in the way that 
these participants talked about the differences between Jobcentre Plus and the 
contracted provider, also echoed by Bridget. 
                                               
27 The data from interviews with ESA claimants are markedly different to the data from interviews 
with JSA claimants. These deserve consideration in their own right, but owing to constraints of 
time and space are not discussed here. Notably, however, with respect to the argument 
developed in this chapter, ESA claimants were more likely to view and recognise conditional 
activation along the lines proposed here: that is, as a protection racket. JSA claimants tended to 
identify with the ‘job-seeking role’, partly it seemed in order to affirm their deservingness; more 
often than not, ESA claimants felt that they were already deserving on account of their health 
condition, and thus adopted a more critical stance with respect to the requirements of activation 
and ‘work preparation’. Their experience was, in these terms, less subject to splitting and 
disavowal; they recognised themselves as the targets of conditionality and its threats, which 
they saw as illegitimate, where JSA claimants tended to see conditionality and sanctions as 
legitimate – just not for them. 
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It is interesting to consider in greater depth what it was about the Work 
Programme provider which these claimants valued. Returning to Jill’s comments 
which open this section, it seems that what she found most helpful about 
attending the provider was help with her job search, and the requirements of 
monitoring. Whilst it was undoubtedly true that Jill did find her appointments at 
the provider useful, what I want to suggest is that part of this usefulness had to do 
with negotiating (and avoiding the worst consequences of) the suspicion, 
insecurity, and threat produced by mandatory work-first activation and 
conditionality.  
It is in this sense that claimants sometimes found themselves caught up in a 
protection racket, where the ‘protection’ came from those individual named 
advisors, often at providers, who had more time for them, and showed more 
understanding. I think that this might explain something I noticed throughout the 
interviews arranged by, and conducted on the premises of the provider, which 
was that praise or expressions of usefulness were often muted and equivocal. 
Here it is also interesting to note the way that the experience of providers was 
often articulated through a comparison with Jobcentre Plus. Experiences of the 
Work Programme are, in important ways, framed by the ‘political lessons’ and 
expectations set through initial encounters with Jobcentre Plus. These are 
predominantly low expectations; of being classed and categorised, treated with 
suspicion, and demeaned and diminished. Jobcentre Plus also introduces 
claimants to the importance of surveillance and monitoring. It is against these 
expectations that the contracted out providers are experienced, in some cases, as 
comparatively more helpful, friendly, and understanding. As Paul said of his 
provider, ‘they’re quite supportive, they even help you out’.  
‘I don’t really know how much they can do to help me’ 
Whilst Work Programme advisors tended to be experienced as friendlier or more 
understanding, the help that claimants described often related to support meeting 
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their mandatory conditions. This ‘support’ was experienced as valuable and 
useful, particularly in a context where failure to meet these conditions results in a 
sanction. When it came to the perceived role of the provider in actually helping 
them secure employment, claimants were sometimes less certain about their 
usefulness. Paul, an unemployed IT worker in his 40s with twenty years 
experience, told me that he made sure he did what he was instructed, and that as a 
result his advisors tended to leave him alone. About the help on offer, he said: 
I don't know if it really helps somebody like me, so much. I can 
understand if somebody doesn't have a job and they got to the 
Jobcentre and, after a year, right you've got to go to this thing here and, 
maybe it's for younger people that have never had a job, they don't 
really know what they’re doing. They come here and I can understand 
why [Work First] would be good because, I've worked for 20 years and 
I know all about this, job interviews and jobs and training and courses, I 
know all this stuff. But, say you were 16 or 17, you've just left school 
with no qualifications, you just sign on and they say you've got to go to 
this. I can see how that [Provider] would be good for a young person... I 
don't really know how much they can do to help me.(Paul, JSA 
claimant) 
Here Paul explains and rationalises the requirement to participate in the Work 
Programme by reasoning that, although of little use for him, it might be more 
helpful for other sorts of claimant. The sense that the mandatory requirements of 
activation – attending appointments and workshops – were a pointless waste of 
time emerged across several interviews. However, rather than express opposition 
to these requirements, many claimants instead expressed resignation. Like Paul, 
several other participants reasoned that such requirements might serve a purpose 
with respect to other kinds of claimant. Maria, a woman in her 40s was made 
redundant from an administrative role in a bank in 2006; since then she had done 
various temping jobs, but been unemployed since 2012. She told me that she 
appreciated being able to ask for help from her advisor when she needed it. She 
particularly appreciated being able to ask for help with interviews, which she felt 
was an area that she needed to improve (she had, within the past year, had ‘five or 
six’ interviews, but no job offers). However, when it came to being asked to attend 
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the office in order to do her job search there, in a monitored environment, she 
emphasised that had her own computer at home, and would rather do it there: 
I know there are people that don’t do the work but, like myself, I’m 
doing the work because I want to get a job, and dong the work 
myself….I’ve been doing the work and applying for jobs. It’s somebody 
to give me a little bit of help with my application and saying the right 
thing in the interview [that I need]. Saying ‘mandatory’ is not releveant 
to what help I actually need, it’s a bit down-grading. (Maria, JSA 
claimant) 
Whilst Maria felt that it was valuable to be able to approach her advisor for 
specific advice around interviews, the requirement to attend monitored 
workshops was experienced as an inconvenient imposition. It is also interesting to 
note the way that looking for work is here understood as a form of work itself – 
satisfying the requirements of conditionality is seen as a job, one which Maria is 
happy to do, but preferably under her own direction. Like Paul, she imagines that 
there could be a reason for such an imposition in the case of other claimants, those 
‘that don’t do the work’. Here, it is worth highlighting the role that these ‘other’ 
claimants play in Maria’s explanation for why she is forced to attend. As in 
Elizabeth’s story about receiving a warning letter, this might be interpreted as a 
form of disavowal – although the letter is addressed to her, its message is initially 
read as having another intended recipient, and meant for someone else.  
This specific mixture of resignation, disavowal, and indignation also arose in an 
interview with another participant, Michelle, also in her 40s and also recently 
made redundant from an administrative role in a bank. In her case this had been 
within the last year. Michelle, like Maria, had her own computer, felt competent 
managing her own job search and applications, and though resigned to the fact, 
felt inconvenienced that she was made to attend appointments at the provider: 
Jim: So perhaps you can help me understand a bit more about [Work 
First] and what happens when you come here? 
Michelle: Not a great deal to be honest. 
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Jim: What does it do for you, for what’s the set up? 
Michelle: We did have, there have been general groups with more than 
one person, one was how to do a CV but I knew how to do a CV before 
that. So they do have groups and then they point things out, you have 
space to do things et cetera, but generally, at the moment, I have to 
come once a week. 
Jim: OK 
Michelle: And that, basically, is just to use the computer and access jobs, 
which I could actually do at home, but I have to actually physically 
come down here. (Michelle, JSA claimant) 
Michelle emphasised throughout the interview that many of the things she was 
asked to do, she felt able to do at home in her own time. She repeated to me that 
despite this, ‘you literally have to come here or you have your Jobseekers docked’, 
digging out her appointment letter for me to read to emphasise her point. This 
included the standard warning about sanctions 
If without good reason you fail to attend or participate in the Work Programme 
your Jobseekers Allowance and National Insurance Credits will be stopped (or 
will be paid at a reduced rate depending on your circumstances) for: four 
weeks; or thirteen weeks if the DWP have previously decided on one or more 
occasions that your JSA should be sanctioned because you failed to comply with 
your Work programme requirements, or you committed any of the failure listed 
below, within 52 weeks (but not within two weeks) of your last failure. 
When I had finished reading, Michelle suggested, 
But I think it’s really for someone who abuses the system a lot, with 
everybody else, obviously if you’re ill, if you phone in there wouldn’t 
be any problems. She has told me that, if you’re ill for any reason phone 
in and let me know. (Michelle JSA claimant) 
In these and other interviews at the provider there was a sense of resignation, but 
also, occasionally, mild indignation and resentment about the mandatory 
requirement to participate. This was linked to the perception that the activities 
were pointless, and that advisors, whilst nice and well-meaning, were not always 
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in a position to really help them find work. Again, where advisors - and good 
relations with advisors – were useful was in meeting conditional requirements and 
avoiding sanctions.  
There is also in Paul, Michelle, and Maria’s descriptions of the Work Programme a 
sense that is not really meant for them. Paul thought it might be more useful for a 
younger, less experienced person. Maria thought that the conditions and 
mandatory requirements were ‘down-grading’, and appropriate for others who 
‘weren’t doing the work’ as she was. Similarly, Michelle reacted to the threat of 
sanctions by explaining to me that it was really meant for others, ‘someone who 
abuses the system a lot’. However, as explored in the first section, Elizabeth also 
thought that the system of conditional requirements was for ‘others’ until she 
received a warning letter. The sense that they were perhaps an exception, or 
somehow caught up in a system that wasn’t really meant for them, might be 
interpreted as one way of dealing with the feelings of being demeaned and ‘down-
graded’ by the coercion inherent to mandatory participation. This was both 
acknowledged by claimants, but at the same time denied; which is to say, the 
experience of being subject to mandatory participation and conditionality was 
disavowed.  
This disavowal might be understood as an important means through which the 
consent of claimants is gained and maintained. In characterising the system as a 
disciplinary regime, really meant for ‘other’ bad claimants, some participants 
spoke of being willing to ‘go along’ with it, because they saw the need to discipline 
these others. This type of consent relied upon a sense that they were not the 
system’s real targets. One JSA claimant, Sam, felt it unjust that he was subject to 
suspicion and surveillance because of these others, but responded by expressing a 
wish that the system were harsher, to further underline the distinction between 
deserving and undeserving:  
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Sam: I think there should be more mandatory stuff. To be honest with 
you, yes.  
Jim: Yes.  
Sam: I mean at the end of the day. I am just going from my perspective. 
I don’t want to be unemployed.  
Jim: No.  
Sam: I want to go out and work. And I think the problem is that there is 
that many people who have exerted this way of life, being unemployed 
and the benefits system and all the rest of it, and that’s the ones that 
they are trying, maybe they are making the most of mandatory. Things 
that have got to happen... I am not saying it is going to happen 
overnight, but that might ease it up for people who are genuinely 
needing help and genuinely looking for work, to get themselves into a 
better situation.(Sam, JSA claimant) 
Whilst many claimants resented the level of scrutiny they were placed under, 
some nonetheless came to appreciate it for the reason that it enabled them to 
demonstrate their deservingness, or distinguish themselves from ‘bad’ others. Sam 
thought that more ‘mandatory’ activation would encourage, or force, the 
‘benefiters’ (as he elsewhere put it) to ‘do something’ and that as a consequence 
things would ‘ease up a bit’ for people like him. When Elizabeth came home from 
the hospital she still logged onto Universal Jobmatch to complete her day’s job 
search, making sure it was recorded. This might be interpreted as being about 
providing proof and evidence as much as it was about the likelihood that these 
actions, undertaken on this particular day, were going to help her find a job. To 
the extent that claimants therefore see the imposition of mandatory action, 
conditionality, and the associated threat of sanctions as legitimate, it might also be 
understood as a form of symbolic violence, through which their domination is 
secured through consent (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192; see Chapter Four). However, 
from a psychosocial perspective this consent is also ambivalent; it is given on the 
basis that conditionality really targets others (Thompson & Hoggett, 2011). It is in 
this sense that I argue that activation, when implemented as a system for 
172  Chapter Seven 
monitoring behaviour, activates stigma and pushes claimants into defensive 
activity designed to ward it off, involving the mechanisms of splitting (of their 
own experience), projection (of the experience of being disciplined onto others), 
and consequently disavowal (recognising they have been targeted; denying that 
they are the true target). These kinds of defensive positions might also be 
understood as forms of coping, or with respect to the model of agency introduced 
in Chapter Two, as a form of getting by (Lister, 2004), where what is being coped 
with is to the conditional benefit system itself. In this situation the system of 
conditionality and activation makes use of and reinforces widely recognised 
ideological tropes about deserving and undeserving claimants.  
Activating stigma  
The use of stigma as a social and political tool has become a topic of increasing 
concern both to social policy researchers and to sociologists with an interest in 
class and its representations, and has been addressed both in terms of cultural 
political economy and the politics of representation (Jensen, 2014; Jensen & Tyler, 
2015; Tyler, 2008, 2015), and the lived experience of claimants (Garthwaite, 2011; 
Patrick, 2016). There has been a proliferation of stigmatising media representations 
of poverty more generally, and of welfare claimants specifically, which is an 
important feature of the political and cultural context for claimants’ experiences of 
street-level interactions (see Chapter Two). During the course of the research it 
became clear that such representations were more than context – in the sense of 
setting or backdrop – for interactions, encounters, and lived experiences: rather, 
they were often at the forefront of claimants’ minds and could be seen as 
animating forces shaping the ways in which claimants interacted with advisors, 
services, but also with me as a researcher. Elizabeth’s keen awareness, during her 
interview, of the classifications and media representations of shirkers, scroungers, 
and ‘hard working families’ – the doxa (Bourdieu, 1977) that Jensen (2014) calls 
‘welfare commonsense’ – was also evident when she imputed to me a discourse 
contrasting the compliant and hardworking versus those who expect something 
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for nothing. In this chapter I have argued that activation, and behavioural 
conditionality, in subjecting the claimant to suspicion and continuous surveillance, 
often activated these representations, putting them to work on claimants and 
helping to secure their compliance, often gained precisely through claimant’s 
struggles against identification with such representations, and against stigma. 
This chapter asked: how do claimants experience activation and conditionality? 
What are some of the relational dynamics of activation? What do conditionality 
and activation mean for claimants in practice? How do claimants experience 
street-level advisors? Activation and conditionality produce complex subjective 
and relational dynamics – these dynamics weren’t simply about the adjustment of 
incentives, but involved worries, fears, and stigmatising representations of 
claimants. The lived experience of ‘activation’ cannot be separated from wider 
discourses and narratives about dependency. There was sometimes a disavowed 
relationship to conditionality and activation, where these were seen as legitimate 
and appropriate for others, but not for the self. Some claimants spoke of feeling 
demeaned and diminished, not only by their interpersonal experiences at 
Jobcentres and Work Programme offices, but by the form of these relations – that 
is, the fact that they were coerced.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that ‘activation’ can be the activation of stigma. It has 
been suggested that this activation takes the form of a protection racket whereby 
the regime of conditionality both accuses and threatens the claimants, but also and 
simultaneously offers them some means by which to prove their deservingness 
and protect themselves. This relational dynamic plays a part in the ways that 
consent for activation and conditionality are gained and maintained. In this case, 
‘activation’ is more about the production of compliance than ‘enabling’.  In this 
protection racket the accusation is experienced through the focus on supervision 
and surveillance, and as in tune with wider media narratives about dependency; 
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the threat is a sanction. The protection is provided by certain ‘good advisors’ who 
recognise the claimant as legitimate and deserving, and by services which offer 
them the means and support to complete their conditional requirements. Threats 
produced by the regime of conditional activation can therefore be ‘contained’ by 
good relationships with particular advisors, but this also makes advisors 
potentially powerful and threatening figures. Consequently, advisors were often 
valued to the extent they showed understanding. Less value was placed in advisors 
as someone who might help with finding work: there was a widespread sense that 
advisors were largely ineffectual in these terms. In the following chapter, the thesis 
returns to some of the themes and issues raised by the previous chapter, 
concerning advisors’ investments in the street-level field and the activation illusio. 
In so doing, it draws attention to some limits placed on advisors’ ability to 
demonstrate the forms of understanding which claimants valued.  
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Chapter Eight – Benign cruelty, bad magic, and 
‘barriers’: exploring the conditions of punitive 
practice and social sadism 
Belief-talk 
I genuinely believe…that anyone can achieve anything they want to. So 
if someone has, if someone is really committed to something they want 
to do, then they can do it… provided that they’ve got the self drive 
themselves, they’re half-way there.  (Harry, advisor, 2008-2010; other 
roles 2010-2015) 
One curious feature of my own disillusionment with the field of activation was an 
uncertainty about the extent to which the investment and belief exhibited by other 
participants in the field (colleagues at the time, but also managers, directors, and 
people I have subsequently met) was either authentic, or else a form of bad-faith, 
or cynicism (cf: Crawford & Flint, 2015). For the most part I found it easy to accept 
that others remained invested in the field, and saw it quite differently to me. 
However, there were some aspects of this investment which, from my point of 
view, were quite difficult to understand. Something I found particularly odd and 
incongruous while still an advisor was the extent to which the outcome-focused, 
stats-driven organisation for which I worked was also, at the same time, suffused 
with a secular language of faith and belief. Whilst the object of our everyday 
activity as advisors was very clearly defined and given an unambiguous 
numerical value (in the form of a target), the means by which we were to attain it 
were often much less clear. It is true that managers often spoke about ‘the high 
performing advisor’ and their ‘behaviours,’ which we were encouraged to 
emulate, but rather than any specific form of expertise that we might learn, what 
the high performing advisor exhibited was an ability to do the very same things 
we were already doing (seeing clients, cold-calling, sending out ‘high quality’ 
applications), but with greater speed and intensity. Emulating these behaviours 
didn’t always produce corresponding changes in ‘performance’. In these instances, 
managers also emphasised the supposedly inspirational and charismatic qualities 
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‘high-performing’ advisers. These were people, we were told, who ‘believed’ and 
were able to ‘inspire belief’ – they believed in their clients, and were able to inspire 
clients to ‘believe in themselves’. During one performance review meeting - it will 
be remembered that my own performance was consistently low – after a 
discussion of my caseload, I was asked by a senior manager whether I truly 
believed in the programme. Whilst what she called my ‘integrity’ was not in any 
doubt, she nonetheless had reason to doubt the extent of my belief. Was I, she 
asked, with them or against them? At the time I struggled to understand what was 
being asked of me. What, I wondered, did it mean to be ‘with them’, and in what, 
precisely, was I being asked to believe?  
At the time I found this sort of talk, about belief and charisma, with its passionate 
investment in what I considered to be the facile and spurious nostrums of self-help 
(see: Ehrenreich, 2010) not only embarrassing but also, when contrasted with our 
dull corporate surroundings and my own more mundane estimations of some of 
the ‘high-performing’ advisors I knew personally, faintly comic. I was often 
reminded of the grandiose delusions animating the character of David Brent28 in 
The Office, and to a certain extent this and other kinds of popular satire on the 
contemporary workplace meant I was already primed for a more or less dispirited 
resignation to such hyperbolic but unavoidable features of modern office life and 
managerial culture. What I did not expect, however, was the devout and earnest 
seriousness with which such notions of ‘belief’ and ‘inspiration’ were handled, 
their centrality to descriptions of our work, and to the expectations set out for us 
as employees. More than simply a contingent and symptomatic delusion, 
individual or collective, dreamt up, as it might be in The Office, to cover up 
insecurities and alleviate the ‘boredom, banality and the pettiness of office life’ 
(Brabazon, 2005), ‘belief’ and ‘inspiration’ talk as I encountered it seemed central 
to the activation enterprise, and as such, a matter of policy-in-action. It featured 
not only in everyday, informal interactions with my managers (when they were 
                                               
28 David Brent is a character played by Ricky Gervais in the BBC sitcom The Office 
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offering on the spot ‘coaching’ and advice), but also in the more formal 
conversations I had in supervision and performance appraisal meetings.  
Among other things, this chapter develops out of these questions I had as a street-
level advisor, and argues that what I was being asked to believe was, in a way, the 
power of belief itself. Believing in one’s clients, and eliciting belief from them, was 
seen within activation services as a crucial step in helping someone ‘move into 
work’. As such, our success, and the remedy to problems of unemployment and 
ill-health, was inferred to hinge upon a form of faith. In exploring this theme, this 
chapter asks: how do advisors process their clients? And, what does ‘activation’ 
mean to advisors? This chapter therefore returns to some of the concerns explored 
in Chapter Six, to what constitutes the street-level activation illusio (Bourdieu, 
2000; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; see also Chapter Four), exploring some of its 
constituent features in greater depth. In particular, it picks up the analysis of 
street-level prohibitions as a form of symbolic violence (see: Chapter Six), but 
attempts to understand more about these prohibitions from the ‘inside’ – the way 
that, for some participants, they seemed to make sense. In doing so it also 
addresses some of the specific content, in the context of activation services, of what 
Lipsky (2010, p. 71, 119) calls the myth of altruism and the ideology of benign 
intervention.  What is the ideology of benign intervention, as it is found within 
activation services? For Lipsky this ideology and myth is important for the ego 
and self-regard of street-level bureaucrats, and Chapter Six already pointed to 
some of the ways in which advisors make use of discretionary power in order to 
maintain the sense that they are acting in benign ways (that is, to maintain their 
investment). However, Lispky (2010, pp. 151–153) also draws attention to the way 
that street-level workers can maintain this myth, not only through practice, but 
also by altering their conceptions of this practice, and of the clients they see. Such 
modified conceptions – of their role, and of clients – he describes as ‘cognitive 
shields, reducing what responsibility and accountability may exist in the role 
expectations of street-level bureaucrats’ ( 2010, p. 153). In this chapter it is not so 
much the practices of street-level advisors which help to sustain myth and 
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investment, but rather the conceptions they have about their clients and practices. 
Here, the chapter picks up some of the themes developed by literature exploring 
what happens when there is a disconnect between a practice and its stated aims, or 
between what people say (or wish) they were doing, and what actually they do 
(see: Chapter Four). In this sense, the chapter is about the ‘rational fictions’ and  
‘imaginary systems’ (Crawford & Flint, 2015) of activation, which it understands 
using the concepts of ‘social magic’ (Bourdieu, 1991) and ‘magical voluntarism’ 
(Fisher, 2014; Smail, 1995). However, whereas Chapter Six largely focused on the 
struggles of advisors to ‘retain a concept of their own adequacy in the job’, 
including a concept of their own ethicality, in this chapter I draw attention to some 
of the ways that activation (and its street-level myth, ideology, and illusio) 
produces the conditions for certain types of harm, punishment, and social sadism.  
Agency absent structure: two instances of magical thinking 
The critical psychologist David Smail defines magical voluntarism as the view that 
‘with the expert help of your therapist or counsellor, you can change the world you 
are in the last analysis responsible for, so that it no longer causes you distress’ 
(Smail, 2005, p. 7). Smail views this as an ideological proposition derived from the 
social relations of liberal capitalism, wherein relations of exploitation, 
disadvantage, and oppression are subject to ideological effacement through the 
valorisation of the private individual and their agential capabilities. More recently, 
the theorist and cultural critic Mark Fisher has argued that magical voluntarism 
‘constitutes something like the spontaneous ideology of our times’ (Fisher, 2011) 
and is a central feature of what he calls ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009). This latter 
term describes a diffuse sense – at once political, experiential, and aesthetic – 
within neoliberal society that ‘there is no alternative’, and that the broader social 
and economic conditions in which we live our lives cannot be made the subject of 
change; rather, we must learn to change and adapt our selves, becoming ever more 
competitive and entrepreneurial subjects in order to survive. Among other things, 
this chapter argues that activation programmes utilise and propagate such a 
Benign cruelty, bad magic, and ‘barriers’  179 
magical voluntarist and capitalist realist perspective. In practice this means 
excluding from purview some of the contextual and structural factors which 
contribute to situations which are experienced, by individuals, as problems. 
Magical voluntarism is particularly apparent at street-level in the way that 
advisors (are encouraged to) view their clients and caseloads. Before exploring 
these dynamics, however, I want to first indicate some of the ways that these 
forms of thinking are not confined to street-level activation, but circulate more 
widely within the activation field, arguing that certain kinds of magical thinking 
are constituent of the way that more elite activation actors think about – and by 
extension, shape – street-level practice and its conditions. To this end I present two 
instances of ‘magical voluntarism’ observed in the discourse of senior managers 
and directors involved in the broader activation field.  
The importance of belief  
As an attempt to cultivate gate-keeping contacts within street-level organisations, 
but also in order to understand more about how street-level activation was 
discussed and represented by more elite policy actors, during fieldwork I attended 
two public events at which were present various  people involved in one way or 
another in the delivery of street-level activation services. On one of these 
occasions, in May 2016, after I had completed my interviews and as I was 
beginning data analysis,  some remarks made by the speaker  reminded me of my 
past observations on the role of belief in street-level activation services. This was a 
public lecture, part of a series, organised and chaired by a senior academic with 
research and commercial interests in employability and employability services.  
The invited speaker was the regional director of a prime Work Programme 
provider. I went to the lecture with a colleague who was particularly curious 
about the promise of seeing ‘extensive data captured by [the provider] on more 
than half a million clients who have been supported on employability 
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programmes over the last 15 years across the UK.’29 As it turned out, this promise 
went unfulfilled, and the lecture mainly drew on some widely available figures 
about the number of referrals received and ‘placements’ made by the provider. 
The lecture’s main focus rather seemed to be what had been advertised as 
‘operational insight’, by which was meant something like the ‘ethos’ of activation, 
and in this way the lecture became a platform for the speaker to make an 
unashamedly promotional case for the work done by providers of welfare-to-work 
services.  
By way of introduction and illustration of the speaker’s main point of focus – his 
‘operational insight’ – we were shown a short, four-minute testimonial video 
(produced by the provider) focusing on one client, who spoke movingly about her 
descent  into depression after losing her job as a result of a workplace injury.  She 
described how, at the point of her referral to the Work Programme she was feeling 
very low, ‘useless, and like nobody wanted me, nobody cared’, and as if ‘really 
and truthfully, the Jobcentre had had enough of me’. She spoke in warm terms, 
however, of the staff at the Work Programme, who she came to view as ‘an 
extension of my family, because they lifted me so much.’ She explained that ‘if it 
was a job interview [for a job] I had never even thought of, they taught me to 
believe in myself. The reason why I could do it is because I knew that my advisor 
had faith in me. She didn’t see me as someone who couldn’t do anything; she saw 
the potential what I had.’ 
After showing this video, during the remainder of the talk, the invited speaker 
emphasised the importance of street-level staff having faith and believing in their 
clients. During my own time as an advisor this was a mantra often repeated by my 
line managers and other senior staff, and it was interesting to hear it voiced by 
someone more distant from street-level delivery: successful activation required 
both a belief in one’s clients, but also the ability to inspire this same belief in them. 
                                               
29As the ‘eventbrite’ description for the event put it.  
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As an advisor I was told that for people to get jobs it was necessary to really and 
truly believe - not that someone could get a job, but that they would. One of the most 
powerful tools you have as an advisor, my manager told me, is the relationship 
you have with your client, and in particular their desire to please you. It was my 
job to set high expectations, demonstrate an unwavering belief, and to inspire my 
client to want to fulfil and justify that belief. As an advisor I had wondered about 
the extent to which this focus on belief had been merely a local phenomenon, or 
whether it was constitutive of a more general activation ethos. Some seven years 
after leaving the role hearing it emphasised again during this lecture by a senior 
director, and indeed elevated to the level of guiding principle, suggested that it 
was not simply an idiosyncrasy of my own local management, but of more 
significance.   
Competition without context 
The second such event was not a lecture, but an industry conference at which were 
present all the main regional Work Programme providers, but also representatives 
from the DWP, Jobcentre Plus, subcontracting agencies, and also other interested 
parties such as third sector organisations, academics, and charities. Again, this was 
an occasion where I was able to hear more senior policy actors discuss their 
thoughts and perceptions about street-level activation services. As such, I attended 
several panel events, one of which was focused on ‘future developments and 
challenges’. The panel of managers and directors, drawn mainly from Work 
Programme providers, were discussing their predictions about possible future 
contractual developments, and there was a sense that sustainability and in-work 
progression were going to become increasingly important in future contracts. In 
particular, those present suggested that in future, payments might be tied to 
longer-term sustainability outcomes than was presently the case (six months). 
There was a shared sense that current issues in the labour market posed particular 
problems for providers: an increasingly polarised labour market in which job 
growth was occurring at the top and the bottom meant that there were more ‘bad 
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jobs’ – low paid and insecure – into which most activation-clients would be placed, 
and fewer ‘intermediary’ positions into which they might progress (and for which 
they would have to compete from a position of disadvantage). This situation was 
agreed to pose a problem for providers, in the sense that the labour market 
conditions made it both more difficult for clients to sustain and progress in work, 
and therefore for providers to claim sustainment outcomes.  
The solution to this problem, from the point of view of the managers and directors 
present, was to increase the scope of in-work support. This is the continuing 
support that providers are meant to provide to clients once they have entered 
work. It was suggested that providers ought to lobby, in the discussions 
surrounding future contract development, for the period of in-work support to be 
extended, and possibly made conditional through Universal Credit and the 
extension of conditionality to those claiming in-work benefits (see: Dwyer & 
Wright, 2014). In this way providers might ‘support’ clients to continue making 
applications for other, better jobs once they had entered work. In effect, the 
problem of labour market polarisation was left unaddressed; the solution was to 
accept these wider labour market conditions and focus on ‘activating’ clients to be 
more competitive within them. The horizon of discussion was drawn very close, 
making no reference to industrial policy or other measures which might address 
the wider structural context. For these managers and directors, the only 
imaginable solution to this problem was to increase the duration and scope of 
activation – for activation services to reach more people, and for longer periods of 
time.  
The feature of this discussion which I found striking was its similarly ‘magical’ 
attribution of agency to the actor in question: in this case, the activating 
organisation. Either with respect to the client, their advisor, or the provider, the 
consideration of a wider constraining context of structural factors which might 
limit and frustrate individual agency was unaddressed. In both cases there was an 
implicit logic that it is the desire, belief, and activity of job-seeking agents or 
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organisations which somehow creates the job. Given the opportunity to support 
clients for longer, it was assumed that these clients would then be more likely to 
‘progress’ in work – even though the context for this discussion had been the 
increasing absence of such ‘intermediary’ positions. Attending these events, 
having also worked at street-level, it began to seem that the world as it is imagined 
by those heavily invested in activation policies and services is one in which there 
are only agents – a world without structures, without macro-economic factors or 
forces, in which anything is possible for the agent if only they believe and are 
prepared to act on that belief. This focus on the quasi-magical agency of 
individuals might be seen as one consequence of a wider policy-emphasis on 
activation as a ‘supply-side measure’, largely divorced from demand-side 
considerations (McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005; Webster, 2005). The next section turns 
to look at what happens when a concept explicitly formulated to address the 
interaction between individuals and a wider constraining context becomes applied 
at street-level.  
 “Barriers to Work” 
One way to approach this meeting of magical voluntarism, neoliberal ideology, 
and street-level practice is through the idiom of ‘barriers to work.’ Like ‘creaming 
and parking’, the language of ‘barriers to work’ enjoys a double life, in academic 
discourse and in street-level organisations. It is both a conceptual and operational 
idiom. Considered only in terms of its academic usage, the concept of ‘barriers to 
work’ might seem an unlikely vehicle for the forms of magical thinking outlined in 
the previous section. In academic discourse the concept of ‘barriers to work’ is 
closely aligned with that of ‘employability’ (McQuaid & Lindsay, 2002, 2005). 
There is considerable debate surrounding this term, its conceptual definition, and 
its meaning as it figures in the discourse and practices of policy makers. For some, 
a supply side focus on ‘employability’ stands in opposition to a demand-side focus 
on ‘employment’(Lister, 2001).  As such, it has been argued that a focus on 
employability draws attention away from the labour market, and focuses blame on 
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the perceived failings of the unemployed (Peck & Theodore, 2000; Serrano Pascual, 
2001). However, as others argue, in some contexts the concept is used to register 
precisely the kinds of relationships and interactions between individual agency 
and wider structural and contextual factors that magical voluntarist thinking 
erases and ignores, and the concept of ‘employability’ is one that acknowledges 
‘the importance of both supply-side and demand-side factors affecting the labour 
market outcomes experienced by individuals’ (McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005, p. 198). 
Here, ‘employability’, or its lack, is understood as a complex problem, ‘the 
outcome of a complex of different factors, located in the labour market, in schools, 
in the recruitment procedures of businesses and in the economic policies 
implemented by the government’ (Kleinman & West, 1998, p. 174) as well as 
factors more properly pertaining to the individual. The most up-to-date 
definitions of the concept: 
have emphasised the need to understand the interaction of individual 
and external factors affecting the individual’s ability to operate 
effectively within the labour market. The focus of such analyses is on 
‘interactive’ employability in its truest sense – the dynamic interaction 
of individual attributes, personal circumstances, labour market 
conditions, and other ‘context’ factors (McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005, p. 
207) 
Using this framework, the ‘barriers30’ an individual faces in finding employment 
are understood to operate at a range of scales, involving the agency of multiple 
actors, both individual and collective (such as government, employers, 
educational institutions, etc). There is, therefore, within this definition of 
‘employability’,  and in the notion of ‘barriers to work’, an insistence on the 
importance of ‘demand-side’ interventions (but also on the importance of other, 
                                               
30 McQuaid and Lindsay (2005) provide an extensive breakdown of such barriers, sorting them into 
the categories ‘individual factors’, ‘personal circumstances’, and ‘external factors’. These range 
across things like work experience and skills, personal attributes, access to transport, 
emotional/caring commitments, employer discrimination, local and regional labour market 
demand, through to macroeconomic stability.  The point here is the insistence on a range of 
factors operating at different scales, which exist in relationship to one another and that interact: 
even individual factors such as particular skill-sets can vary in their effects on employability 
when other factors, such as the local demand for such skills, is taken into account.  
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non-economic, collective forms of intervention, such as combating discrimination), 
and the structural factors involved in unemployment. Those making use of the 
terms in an academic context have ‘stressed the need to avoid an approach that 
involves “blaming the victim”’ by focusing solely on ‘supply-side’ interventions 
(McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005, p. 206), although it is argued that this is largely the 
side on which policy makers have indeed focused (Lister, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 
2000; Serrano Pascual, 2001), with activation services such as those studied here 
providing one example. As such it can be argued that the concept of 
‘employability,’ as it has been applied by policy-makers, has been ‘hollowed out’ 
(McQuaid & Lindsay, 2005, p. 205). The next section, then, will explore the way 
that ‘barriers to work’ are conceptualised in street-level activation services, 
through some of my own observations and data from interviews with street-level 
staff.  In this section it is argued that what fills the hollow space left vacant by 
neglect of ‘demand-side’ measures is magical voluntarism and victim blaming of a 
sort that the concepts of ‘employability’ and ‘barriers to work’ are, in their 
academic usage, meant to avoid. In practice, however, as I will argue below, this 
highly individualised victim-blaming is often framed and justified using precisely 
these concepts.  
“Barriers” and the anti-sociological imagination: turning 
public issues into private troubles 
“Barriers to work!”  It’s all coming back to me now. That was a real 
buzzword wasn’t it? Barriers to work. (Simone, advisor, 2008-2010) 
Interviewing advisors about the nature, purpose, and everyday activities of their 
role, nothing arose so consistently – in terms of specific phrasing – as the term 
‘barriers to work’. For Simone, recalling the term was the spark that lit her 
memory, prompting a burst of detailed recollection. The term was used 
consistently across interviews with advisors from different offices and providers. 
Its use among my former colleagues, and other interviewees who had worked for 
the same provider organisation, wasn’t surprising to me, as the notion had been 
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central to the little training we had been given, and was used repeatedly in team 
meetings and supervision. We were often told that the essence of our role, as 
advisors, was to ‘address’ or to ‘challenge barriers’ – an important difference, 
which this section will explore.  
In some respects, the version of ‘barriers to work’ that was presented to us was not 
all that different from the one outlined above. We were made to understand that 
each individual would face highly specific and possibly multiple ‘barriers to work’ 
particular to their own situation. These might range from problems with their 
health, with their housing, transport, caring responsibilities, and a host of other 
complex ‘contextual’ factors. The difference perhaps lay in the degree of emphasis 
given to individual factors, factors to do with motivation, perception, and attitude.  
In training, the advisor role was constructed as a sort of barrier-clinician. Here is 
Simone, describing her role in this way:  
So you'd try and get that out of them, what their, what's stopping them 
from getting, from starting work. Whether that's anxiety, whether that's 
concern about benefits, will they be better off, worried about housing or 
all of this, loads of things like that. And their depression. And so you 
would talk to them, identify that, and then whatever it was, whether 
that's referrals, even referrals to the gym, referrals to outside agencies, 
Access to Work – that was another one. So yeah. Try and identify it, and 
then work on it. (Simone, advisor, 2008-2010) 
Our job was to first identify the barriers someone faced, and then to help remove 
that barrier so that someone could return to work. Although the distinction was 
never clearly drawn for us, we were presented with two different ways in which 
we could do this: for those barriers it was beyond our scope to address (housing, 
health, debt, substance use problems etc), we could refer on (or ‘signpost’) to other 
services who might ‘address’ the barrier31. In other instances, where the barrier 
                                               
31 I often felt that most useful work I did – sometimes the only valuable work that I could do – in 
this role was to perform a sort of rough and ready triage, and act as a signpost to other services, 
whether or not this would help someone ‘move into work’ in the short or long term. This sort of 
work, which you could attempt to justify in the workplace in terms of the discourse on barriers, 
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was seen as predominantly ‘individual’ (having to do in some way with attitude 
or motivation) we were to address the barrier by ‘challenging’ it – by trying to 
alter the claimant’s perception in some way. I draw this distinction here because it 
helps to understand some features of advisors’ talk below, despite it not always 
being a distinction drawn within services (or by advisors) themselves. In fact, one 
of the main arguments made by this chapter is that often activation services blur 
this distinction, and encourage advisors to construct any and all barriers as 
individual barriers – that is, to transform a whole range of contextual, situational 
factors into individual matters of motivation and attitude, and thus make any 
situation amenable to magical voluntaristic action. In this way, activation services 
encourage an anti-sociological imagination (Mills, 2000), turning public issues into 
private troubles.  
The transformation of complex situations into individual problems of attitude can 
be seen in a number of quotes taken from my interviews with advisors. In advisor-
talk there was often a slippage where the identification or articulation of ‘barriers’ 
by the client (in more everyday terms, talking about problems they were facing) 
comes to be seen as the barrier itself – and something to be challenged. Often this 
slippage was made possible with reference to (a sometimes implied) concept of 
‘employability.’ For example, here is Robert,  
So people who weren’t confident with themselves or who brought up 
barriers to work would act in an unconfident kind of way, and therefore 
wouldn’t engage in processes, and I knew they’d be bad in the 
interview. So I guess you’d challenge that unconfident behaviour. 
(Robert, advisor, 2008-2010) 
For Robert, a client who comes across as lacking confidence presents a problem, 
because just as he has identified this lack of confidence, so might an employer at 
interview. Robert doubts that someone who appears to lack confidence in an 
                                                                                                                                              
was often not something that would help you meet target. Sometimes it was seen as a 
distraction. More target-focused advisors did less of it. Another participant, Robert, describes 
viewing his role in much the same way – saying the most useful work he did was to ‘signpost’.  
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appointment with him will be able to present themselves well to an employer32 – 
and so, the lack of confidence is itself identified as a ‘barrier’ which limits the 
claimants’ employability. In this quotation Robert also brings together, or 
associates (on some level, equates) the client who lacks confidence with the client 
who ‘brings up barriers,’ which is to say, who articulates to him a series of 
problems they face which make it difficult to get a job. A lack of confidence, seen 
as a ‘barrier’ in itself (and not as symptomatic of other problems), is equated with 
‘bringing up barriers’, also then seen as a barrier in itself. Here it is the symptom of 
other problems, or even the act of raising problems that is seen as the problem – any 
specific underlying difficulties are not mentioned. These equivalences, which 
Robert leaves implicit, were stated much more clearly by Deborah, when I asked 
her if there were any types of client she found difficult to work with,  
I think a lot of people that were on ESA, as much as they were on it, I 
think they wanted to work. But then there can be some that try not to. 
They'll say things like, I've got arthritis, I've got a bad back. And they 
try to distract the appointment talking about their issue, as opposed to 
what can they do. So I would always be like, okay, so you've told me 
about that, that's great. Let's look at what you can do then. There's 
always that focus on what they can't do. That's the main barrier. 
(Deborah, advisor, 2012-2015) 
Here Deborah explicitly identifies the presentation of problems by clients as being 
itself the ‘main barrier.’  In particular it is clients’ articulation of their health 
problems – and she is talking about ESA claimants, whose claim is based on their 
having a health problem – that is viewed as an attempt to ‘distract’ the 
                                               
32 This kind of assumption was explicitly encouraged. We were told that our perceptions 
(prejudices) were likely to be shared by employers (in many cases this was likely correct, but 
with regressive consequences). The equation was often drawn between attending an 
appointment with us, and attending work – a link explicitly made by some advisors in their 
interview, but also by some claimants, such as Maria in the previous chapter (see: p.168). It was 
suggested that clients who were late to see us would likely be late for work too – so we needed 
to challenge this lateness and set expectations just as an employer would. In setting these 
expectations with clients, we would be in a much better position to assess their employability. 
Obviously there are differences between attending a welfare-to-work appointment and going to 
work, but we were supposed to actively minimise these differences by telling our clients that 
they were to treat an appointment with us as if it was work, and even to dress accordingly. This 
was seen as an essential part of ‘preparing’ someone to return to work.  
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appointment. I asked her to tell me more about what she meant by ‘focusing on 
what they can’t do’: 
Well, because if you're focusing all the time on what someone can't do, 
you're almost reaffirming that lack of belief that they can get a job. So 
for me, I'm not a counsellor, I'm not there to say, oh, I know everything 
about such and such, but because we've got quite a lot of training on 
different conditions, you could ask certain questions and get them to 
deter away from that so that they can focus actually on helping them 
and employability. Because I think you can get really stuck in that role 
being, oh, tell me a little bit more about it, then? Oh, that must be really 
hard. You know, and then you're kind of almost exasperating [sic] it. 
You're letting that keep live on because you're constantly like, oh dear, 
you can't do that. That's okay. We'll just see you in a month's time. 
That's not going to help someone, I don't think. (Deborah, advisor, 
2012-2015) 
Listening too much to clients, or showing understanding (presented here in terms 
of focusing too much on their problems) is seen here as a risk, something that an 
advisor might get stuck in. Focusing too much on problems is also dangerous, 
because it can undermine the belief that Deborah considers important to them 
getting a job. Deborah here echoes something I heard a lot when I was an advisor, 
that it was important to turn conversations away from a discussion of problems 
(on what someone can’t do) toward a conversation about what they could do 
(sometimes reference was made to ‘solution focused therapy’33). This procedure is 
often presented (as it is here and as it was during my time as an advisor) in 
pragmatic terms as the most helpful thing to do. The possibility that it might also 
harmfully diminish the difficulties someone is facing, or in some way have the 
effect of silencing them, was not something that was ever openly voiced or 
considered. It was tacitly understood that to voice such a thing would (by the 
magical logic of activation) also be unhelpful, because it would refocus the 
                                               
33 This is a form of brief therapy which draws a distinction between being ‘solution-focused’ as 
opposed to ‘problem-focused’ (O’Connell, 2005). References were made to the techniques of 
solution-focused therapy during my advisor training, but this was not a formal training in the 
technique. Rather, certain principles were highlighted: not focusing on, or ‘talking into’ the 
problem; focusing on the future rather than the past; encouraging clients to think of exceptions 
to problems; reframing problems in terms of their solution.  
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conversation on the ‘problem’ and on what you ‘can’t do’ – and, as indicated in the 
previous chapter, this went for advisors as much as for clients.  
This ‘pragmatic’ focus on individual (magical) agency comes at the expense of 
being able to talk openly about difficulties and problems. I have suggested that 
this individualising thrust of activation can be understood as congruent with 
certain aspects of neoliberal ideology, and as an example of ‘magical voluntarism’. 
However, whilst I think wider socio-cultural and ‘ideological’ currents 
undoubtedly feed into, and make such forms of thought palatable and plausible, I 
think it is important to emphasise that there are other, perhaps more concrete 
street-level factors that go into producing these ways of constructing the 
claimant’s situation. There is a sense in which the individualisation of context-
laden problems is indeed the most pragmatic form of action that an advisor can 
take – because it is the only form of action they can take. Deborah says that she is 
not a counsellor, and as such is unqualified to address some of the issues her 
clients present to her. Advisors were often aware of the broader contexts of their 
clients’ problems, but (beyond ‘signposting’) came to individualise these contexts 
precisely because they were powerless to address them as anything other than 
individual problems of attitude and perception – a point made very clearly by 
Robert: 
It's kind of quite tricky…because I wasn’t in a position where I could 
remove any of those barriers really because [I wasn’t a] qualified 
substance misuse counsellor, I wasn't a psychologist or a psychiatrist, or 
a doctor or a nurse, so. My role was to help people change their 
perspective on those barriers, to see were those barriers the all 
encompassing I've-been-signed-off-all-work that they felt they were, or 
they'd been led to believe they were [by medical professionals].  My job 
was to help them understand, well perhaps, you know, if I've got a 
physical health complaint could I be doing a job that doesn’t require a 
lot of physical activity? Could I have a phased return to work where I'm 
doing part time hours? Stuff like that, so. It was kind of changing 
people's perspectives and trying to let their talents and capabilities 
define them rather than their health complaints. (Robert, advisor, 2008-
2010) 
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In this sense, the role of the street-level advisor is to transform a variety of 
different problems, with a range of complex determinants and contextual factors, 
into individual problems of perception. In doing so, it is also to ‘challenge’ the 
understanding that others have of these problems  – be they clients themselves, 
but also other professionals such as doctors, counsellors, support workers, 
housing officers – if these construct the problem in such a way as to place limits on 
what someone might do to either find or ‘prepare’ for work. Viewed from this 
perspective, activation services are about the privatisation of problems and the 
practice of an anti-sociological imagination which disconnects individuals from 
their wider context: they are about the production of decontextualised subjects. 
The irony here is that one of the main conceptual instruments through which this 
is articulated and achieved at street-level – the concept of barriers – was explicitly 
formulated in order to make such connections.  
Bad magic: social sadism and sanctions 
One of the street-level consequences of ‘magical activation’, with its 
decontextualising focus on belief, is the production of ‘bad subjects’, and this 
might be understood as a form of ‘bad magic’. In discussing what he calls ‘rites of 
institution’, Bourdieu (1991, pp. 117–126) draws attention to a form of social magic 
in which various social relations and effects of social structure come to be seen as 
the embodied properties of individuals. For example, in the awarding of a degree 
from a particular elite institution, the accumulated dispositions of a habitus as it 
has made its trajectory through social space, and the various structural conditions 
and advantages which have made this journey possible, are crystallised in a title 
which the individual is entitled to deploy as a form of capital – which is to say, as 
a form of power. One feature of this form of social magic, which is efficacious to 
the extent that it is recognised and believed, is that various ‘contextual’ factors are, 
in the act of embodiment, through the rite of institution, erased or made invisible.  
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What I would like to suggest in this section is that for some people, activation 
services perform a similar ‘rite of institution’ albeit in an inverted form: what gets 
instituted, or comes to be regarded as the embodied property of individuals, are 
not the signs of accumulated advantage but rather of disadvantage34. The same 
process is at work here: the effects of a particular trajectory through social space 
are seen to inhere, not in this trajectory, or its structural conditions, but in the 
individual themselves. However, in its inverted form what is gained through this 
process is not rank or prestige, or a form of capital which can be exchanged or 
deployed as symbolic power.  Rather, through this process individuals, 
consecrated as ‘bad’ claimants, gain the sign or mark (the stigma) of 
inconsequence, of disposability, which entitles them to become a kind of 
scapegoat, and the legitimate target of social sadism (Miéville, 2015), acting as a 
repository or container for the disavowed frustrations of those around them – 
most obviously, of advisors. A sensitive topic, advisors were reluctant to discuss 
the issue of sanctions with me during interviews, and when discussed it was often 
in vague terms. However, I would suggest that this process has an important role 
to play in the way that sanctions are produced, and this interpretation fits with the 
existing research which shows that sanctions disproportionately affect already 
disadvantaged groups (Homeless Link, 2013; Reeve, 2017).  
In the previous section it was seen how advisors are encouraged to both believe in 
their clients, and encourage clients to believe in themselves. This is part and parcel 
of an emphasis on the quasi-magical agency of individuals to alter their own 
situation regardless of its particularities. It was argued that there is something 
radically de-contextualising about this way of processing claimants. Furthermore, 
this can be linked to what Friedli and Stearn (2015) refer to as ‘coercive positivity’: 
                                               
34 Similarly, activation services, in ‘creaming’, make capital from accumulated social processes in 
which they have paid very little part. To the extent that activation services, and activation 
workers, try to claim credit for the positive outcomes achieved by creaming, they also perform a 
rite of institution, consecrating already advantaged clients as activated, deserving, good 
claimants. What I describe here might be understood, alongside ‘parking’ and ‘protection’, as 
another alternative to creaming.  
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to the extent that ‘outcomes’ are regarded as the result of belief, then there is a 
corresponding injunction for both advisors and claimants to be positive, to 
emphasise in each and every case what is possible, what can be done as opposed 
to what can’t (and the reasons why). This positivity might also be understood as a 
‘hidden condition’ (Manji, 2016) of activation, to the extent that it was taken as 
indicative of the proper kind of ‘active’ engagement. There is a paradox of sorts 
here, in that what advisors were looking for was a demonstration of good-will, 
willingness, and enthusiasm to ‘voluntarily’ engage with something into which 
claimants had effectively been coerced. As will be seen below, to the extent that 
advisors were invested in the ‘myth of altruism’ and the ‘ideology of benign 
intervention’ (Lipsky, 2010, pp. 71, 119) – that is, in the idea that their actions, like 
their conscious intentions, were always benign and beneficial – then expressions of 
opposition from claimants who felt coerced and subject to malign intervention 
posed a threat to their self-conception and self-image. The response of advisors to 
this situation was, as described by Lipsky (2010, p. 153), to alter their conceptions 
of claimants, locating the source of such perceptions not in their own actions, or 
those of the ‘service’, but in the dispositions and attitudes of clients themselves. 
The negative labelling and categorisation of ‘difficult’ clients is well documented 
in the street-level literature on employment services (Brodkin, 2013c; Watkins-
Hayes, 2009; S. Wright, 2003). Here, I draw attention to the way that such labelling, 
in the context of a ‘behavioural conditionality’ focused largely on ‘attitude’ and 
positive self-presentation, puts clients at risk of punitive practice in the form of 
sanctions.  
It is understandable that advisors had a preference for working with individuals 
who showed willingness and good will toward the programme, or who appeared 
motivated and positive. In a straightforward sense, this made life easier for 
advisors: it is easy to work with someone who, at the very minimum, is not 
suspicious or resistant to the programme. Being willing and positive were often 
ways that advisors assessed whether clients were ‘job ready’ or not. Mixed in with 
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this was the sense that clients ought to be in some way compliant. Susan told me 
that ideally she preferred to work with: 
someone with a positive attitude. Who takes on board what you are 
saying, and tries to make the changes…So you need somebody who 
will listen to constructive feedback, who will take on board the 
guidance that you’re giving them, you know, who understands that 
you are there to help them. (Susan, advisor, 2010-2015) 
Here a positive attitude is also associated with compliance, with the proper ‘active’ 
engagement with the programme, but also with ‘understanding that [advisors] are 
there to help them’. The issue of a willingness to accept help also came up in my 
interview with Isabelle: 
Well I think you're always going to want to have a client that's willing 
to engage with you, and to be on board with you, and to accept the 
support that you're there to provide for them. But I think it's very hard 
when you've got somebody who displays an attitude that is so against a 
system, and they see it as a system, and they see it as a churn, and they 
don't see it as somebody helping. And for me, I always found it quite 
ironic, that there was a willingness to, and a right of entitlement, 
almost, to gain off the system, but unwilling to engage in actually what 
comes with it. And I suppose that's my personal view on that. (Isabelle, 
advisor, 2008-2012) 
In these quotations it can be seen how an understandable preference for working 
with individuals who showed good will toward the programme, and who 
appeared motivated or positive also had another kind of moral significance for 
some advisors. For Isabelle being willing to engage, but also to some extent 
trusting the programme (not seeing it as ‘a system’), were considered to be a form 
of responsibility attendant to claimants’ rights. From Susan, also, there was a sense 
that claimants ought to understand that she was really there to help them. What I 
wish to draw attention to here is the way that certain pragmatic considerations of 
‘job readiness’ as having to do with motivation or willingness, can also become 
elided with moral notions of duty, and notions of how claimants ought to view 
their participation in the programme, and by extension, their advisor. Claimants 
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who did not show the proper attitude in this way were liable to be labelled as 
‘difficult’, ‘negative’, or ‘bad’. Here I quote Susan, discussing the sorts of client she 
perceived to be difficult. I do so at greater length, because here Susan draws 
together several themes from this chapter, showing how certain ideological 
notions and practices hang together and make sense for those invested in the 
street-level activation illusio: 
What I don't like is a person that comes in, ‘There's nae jobs here and 
bloody foreigners, they're taking them.’ [Sighs]. An attitude like that, 
you're going nowhere. Quite often their attitude is the biggest barrier to 
their getting a job. And quite often it can be difficult to change that 
attitude. The other is maybe Employment and Support Allowance 
customers that maybe come in, and you've got to be careful here 
because some of them, they really are genuine, and you think, ‘My god 
why are you on the Work Programme?’ But others you can understand 
why they've been assessed as being on the Work Related Activity 
Group. But again, it's the big attitude, the big negative attitude. ‘What 
am I here for? I won't be able to get a job.’ It's a flipping carry on. ‘I've 
got this… And I shouldn't be able to work.’ And, you know, you try 
and kind of put it across to them with fear of getting your fingers bitten, 
you know, that there's loads of people working with different things. 
There's loads of people working with bad backs and depression and all 
that. It's how you get that across to them. But what we try and do is 
focus on the positive, so although they've come to you with this 
negativity, it's about looking at what can you pull out of that, how can 
you make it positive, how can you keep hitting them with positivity, 
and remember these people have maybe been entrenched in this 
attitude for a number of years, and their GPs and all the medical 
professionals are all agreeing with them. And now they've suddenly hit 
Work Programme, and it's ‘You're capable of restricted work, within 
you capabilities.’ How do you change that attitude? So, that can be a 
bad customer coming in, it's just all this negativity that you've got to 
deal with. And then [on] the other side its positive customers that are 
keen to get your help and guidance into work. (Susan, advisor, 2010-
2015) 
Here Susan draws together the different themes of this chapter, which together go 
toward producing her definition of a ‘bad client’.  For Susan the biggest barrier to 
getting a job is someone’s attitude, and attitude can refer to someone’s propensity 
to be difficult or raise problems of various sorts, from health problems to a lack of 
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jobs. Susan later referred to this ‘type’ of client as ‘Mr Negative’, a character who 
reappeared throughout the remainder of our interview. For Susan, Mr Negative 
was supported in his attitudes by other professionals, such as GPs35, and was also 
someone she feared, or who she felt was hostile and might ‘bite her fingers’. If Mr 
Negative is seen as someone who is potentially violent, then there is also a sense of 
retribution or revenge in the way that Susan describes her response: the way she 
deals with this kind of client is to ‘keep hitting them with positivity’ or to try and 
‘pull’ positivity out of them. Here the advisor recognises her aggressive impulses 
and actions, but describes them in benign terms. In one sense, this is an admission 
that the focus on ‘positivity’ and on ‘what can be done’ is also a form of 
aggression, a weapon. However, from Susan’s point of view this is a legitimate, 
benign form of aggression. Susan doesn’t mention the fact that clients are 
mandated to attend, or that in the case of ESA claimants there is no obligation to 
actively seek work, an interesting omission because in her interview she seemed to 
feel genuinely confused and sometimes hurt that some clients didn’t view her as 
having helpful or benign intent.  For Emily, however, disillusioned with the field, 
and with no investment in the ideology of benign intervention, the ‘weapon’ of 
activation is explicitly tied to conditionality and the coercion inherent to 
conditional activation: 
It [conditional activation] was essentially a weapon of, if you do what 
we want and get a job, we will give you back your autonomy. This is 
the price. Up until that point you belong to us. You have to come here. 
You have to do what we say, and once you’ve ticked all the boxes and 
got a job, you can then become an independent person and do as you 
wish. But up to that point, you belong to us. (Emily, advisor, 2008-2009) 
For Emily, conditionality is a weapon, a form of aggression, because it is founded 
on coercion. This perception lay at the heart of Emily’s disillusionment with the 
role. The consequences for advisors of this kind of perception, and this kind of 
                                               
35 The views of other professionals are challenging precisely to the extent that they often work to 
connect and provide context for a range of problems and difficulties extraneous to an 
individual’s belief or attitudes – be that health, housing, debt etc.  
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disillusionment, were explored in Chapter Six, and usually precipitated an exit 
from the field. However, just as it is incumbent on advisors to ‘believe’ in the 
benign nature of their role, for those advisors so invested, this duty to be willing, 
positive, and to believe extends to claimants too. Mr Negative, however, is someone 
that refuses to ‘believe’ in the programme; they are also someone who refuses to 
accept that they – and their position as a claimant – are disconnected from other 
contextual factors. Moreover, they are someone who refuses to act as if they are 
there voluntarily, or to pretend that their participation is anything other than 
coerced. These clients were often highly frustrating or exasperating for advisors to 
work with. Not only did they present a challenge to the ideology of benign 
intervention, but they forced advisors to confront the issue of failure: 
There were times when there was a level of frustration that you can 
kind of sense, in the office, and it was frustration around, you're not 
doing what I want you to do…It was very much a case of here's a 
process, the same one for everyone, five jobs a day, call these people, 
write these letters, do these interview techniques and you will get a job. 
But it doesn’t work for everyone. (Emily, advisor, 2008-2009) 
Several advisors spoke of the way that claimants made them feel frustrated, and 
this frustration was often the result of struggles to meet targets, and clients not 
doing what the advisor wanted them to do, or not reacting in the ways they 
expected (e.g., to interview offers, job offers etc). For Emily this frustration 
sometimes permeated the office where we worked. Reflecting back on her 
experiences, she understands this frustration as arising from a lack of awareness or 
a refusal on the part of advisors to understand what their clients’ experiences were 
like – or as she later put it, ‘to actually truly understand where they were coming, 
what struggles they were going through’. As this chapter has argued, the refusal 
to understand, or to actively disregard certain aspects of a claimant’s situation and 
struggles was constitutive of the magical ideology of activation: advisors, and by 
extension claimants, were not supposed to dwell on their difficulties, or more 
broadly the context of ‘where they were coming from’.  It is this active refusal to 
understand which makes it possible to typify clients as one more example of ‘Mr 
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Negative’. I would argue that this kind of client-labelling exemplifies a form of 
‘bad magic’ in which the collection of problems which claimants have brought to 
the activation encounter becomes collapsed into an ‘attitude’ or even something 
less mutable about who the client really is (perceived to be). The transformation of 
the consequences, expression, or presentation of problems into the main problem 
itself means that those clients with the most intractable problems – not always 
visible to advisors – are also liable to be the most frustrating; as such they are 
particularly vulnerable to becoming the target of advisors’ frustrations and 
aggressive impulses, including but not limited to sanctions. That advisors engaged 
in punitive forms of behaviour was acknowledged, though no participants 
addressed it directly. Rather they alluded to the practices of others, from which 
they were keen to distance themselves. Here, however, I would suggest that the 
experiences of claimants are instructive: the previous chapter introduced Bridget, 
who worried about what her next advisor would be like, and how they would 
interpret her situation. Punitive practice, for claimants, is experienced as 
something arbitrary and difficult to control – something that results from 
interpersonal encounters, the prejudices of their advisors, and how advisors 
happen to interpret a situation. I would suggest that punitive practices at street-
level can also be the expressions of frustration, exacerbated by targets, and 
encouraged by an ideological refusal (elevated to the level of principle) to 
understand why things aren’t going the way an advisor imagines or believes they 
could – if only their clients would believe too.  
Magical voluntarism  
Activation, it has been argued, is based on the ideological fantasy of magical 
voluntarism.  At street-level this can be understood as an ‘imaginary system’ 
(Crawford and Flint 2015) that invests the individual with quasi-magical powers 
of agency – the ability to alter their situation and personal circumstances through 
sheer force of will and ‘positive thinking’. In this way, this chapter has explored, 
from the point of view of advisors, the system of coercive positivity identified by 
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Friedli and Stearns (2015). Owing to their basis in the fantasy of magical 
voluntarism, the ideological practices of activation systematically erase and ignore 
the various structural and supra-individual factors that condition and determine 
individual circumstance and experience. At street-level, however, this fantasy 
must confront the lived reality of these circumstances, which are often composed 
of concrete problems and obstacles that are intractable to individual will power 
and positive thinking, but also to street-level agency intervention. 
For the street-level bureaucrat (and for the claimant, but in a different way) this 
presents a problem; when confronted by reality this fantasy must either be 
abandoned, or certain aspects of reality must be rejected, denied, or disavowed. In 
the psychoanalytic idiom such a form of disavowed relationship to reality is 
characterised as ‘perverse,’ and is usually accompanied by a fetishised substitute 
for reality. Žižek (2008) characterises such a relationship to reality as ideological, 
and the subject of ideology as one who acts ‘as if’ the fantasy were, indeed, the 
reality. Several authors have pointed to the ways that the neoliberal valorisation of 
the self, and neoliberal practices of performance management and auditing, 
encourage such a perverse and ideological relation to reality (in this case the 
reality of claimants’ circumstances that prevent them from finding or keeping paid 
work). The valorisation of the individual encourages the denial or denigration of 
relatedness and dependency (Layton, 2010, 2014; Peacock et al 2014). Practices of 
performance management and auditing come to act as a fetish, a substitute for 
reality – that is, the measurement comes to substitute for the thing itself (Hoggett, 
2010; Long, 2008). This chapter has explored some of these dynamics as they 
operate in the specific context of street-level activation services, showing how the 
denial of dependency, the decontextualisation of the claimant, and the pressure to 
achieve fetishised performance measures, create the conditions in which certain 
clients are transformed into the legitimate objects of punitive practice and social 
sadism.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter began with my own perplexity at the prevalence of ‘belief-talk’ in 
activation services, which it then went on to explore in greater depth. It asked the 
questions: how do advisors process clients?; what does ‘activation’ mean for 
advisors?; and, what form does the myth of altruism take in street-level activation 
services? This chapter argued that activation is based on an ideological fantasy – of 
‘magical voluntarism’ – and that this fantasy shaped the ways that advisors 
interpreted and conceptualised their clients. Specifically, this ideological fantasy 
encouraged advisors to decontextualize their clients, and instead focus on matters 
of attitude, belief, and motivation. Advisors often make a distinction between 
positive and negative clients, or those who seem willing and motivated. There is 
an irony here, in that advisors preferred to work with clients who acted as if they 
have sought the service out voluntarily. Willingness, enthusiasm, and to a certain 
extent, compliance were important ways of differentiating clients. There is some 
indication that this distinction is even more important than considerations of 
employability or proximity to the labour market; some advisors say that positivity 
and employability amount to the same thing. However, it is not clear from the 
research whether this holds in practice. Advisors do sometimes recognise that 
people face very different ‘barriers to work’ and are differently positioned with 
respect to labour market. To see what difference positivity or employability make 
in practice would require observation. However, advisors often felt unable to 
address these barriers, and focused instead on attitude. In this way activation 
often entails a focus on attitude; activation appears to be about changing peoples’ 
attitudes so that they are more positive about, or ‘believe in’, work. Positivity and 
negativity could, however, affect advisors perceptions about whether someone is 
engaging, and therefore meeting their conditions. In some cases it seems that 
having a positive attitude and being well-disposed to the activation programme is 
a ‘hidden condition’. Investment in, and compromise with the activation field 
entails investing in an ‘imaginary system’ characterised by ‘magical activation’ 
explicitly linking belief, attitude, and employability. The focus on belief and 
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attitude creates the conditions for ‘bad magic’ and the identification of ‘bad 
clients’, the legitimate target of punitive practice and social sadism.  
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Chapter Nine – Conclusion: conditionality and 
activation in street-level welfare-to-work services 
Street-level montage 
This thesis has explored the policies of conditionality and activation as they are 
materialised at street-level in the lives and experiences of both advisors and 
benefit recipients. Before embarking on its empirical street-level journey, the thesis 
traced the recent development of both conditionality and activation in British 
social policy, drawing attention to their ideological rationale and reliance on the 
persistent but widely contested tropes of ‘dependency’ and 
‘demoralisation’(Mead, 1997; Murray et al,1999; Prideaux, 2010; see Chapter Two). 
Here, it was argued that there was a need to understand how these policies are 
experienced through and alongside such moralising narratives and stigmatising 
representations. Introducing the street-level perspective of the thesis (Chapter 
Three), attention was drawn to the twin-track of policy reform shaping street-level 
spaces of activation: beside the ‘formal’ policies of conditionality and activation, 
there have also been important changes to the governance of the welfare state, 
meaning that activation is often implemented by private and voluntary sector 
contractors operating in a quasi-marketised environment. Following the argument 
that it is necessary to attend to street-level organisations as places where both 
policy and politics are mediated (Brodkin, 2013a), here the thesis focused its 
attention on the significance of this marketised context for the experience of 
activation, and on the role of street-level management practices in particular.  
The managerial and policy context of activation is one in which both advisors and 
claimants are treated, by operational and formal policies respectively, as versions 
of the ‘rational’ utility-maximising actor, or, as potentially deviant subjects who 
must be disciplined into following the desired course – in either case, they are seen 
as responsive to systems of incentives and disincentives in relatively 
straightforward ways. Whilst this is a view also taken in some of the street-level 
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literature (Brodkin, 2011, 2013b; Soss et al., 2013), the thesis also drew attention to 
work highlighting the importance of ‘culture’, ‘identity’, or ‘values’ in guiding the 
practice of street-level actors (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Watkins-Hayes, 
2009). This thesis adopted the view that, whilst both claimants and advisors might 
come to the street-level situation with a variety of identities, orientations, and 
relational investments, they are nonetheless also in practice subjected to models 
which presuppose a particular kind of subjectivity, or which otherwise try to 
fashion one (Soss et al., 2013; Wright, 2016b). This is to say, both advisors and 
claimants become, through policy, at street-level, imbricated among complex 
relations of power.  Responding to this analytical problem, the thesis proposed a 
theoretical approach capable of investigating the way such models as are applied 
to claimants and advisors are experienced, accommodated, and perhaps also 
contested or resisted (Chapter Four). In constructing a conceptual framework for 
this approach, the thesis offered an original psychosocial synthesis of 
Bourdieusian (Bourdieu, 1977, 2000; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) sociological 
theory and psychoanalytic concepts.   
Before training its gaze at street-level, the thesis outlined the ethnographic 
sensibility it would adopt vis-à-vis the apprehension and analysis of street-level 
data (Chapter Five). This was a sensibility which sought, not to isolate discrete 
street-level phenomenon, but rather to perceive its chosen focal points in terms of 
their entanglements with each other, but also with other objects in the field. In so 
doing, the thesis assembled a variety of different perspectives on street-level 
activation such that ‘activation’ might be apprehended according to some its 
different constituent street-level relations and experiences. This was not, nor could 
it be, exhaustive; rather, the intention was to generate a multi-layered and 
contextual account sensitive to ambiguity, contradiction, and tension between its 
various elements. Among the different perspectives brought together by the thesis 
were those of former advisors, current advisors, claimants of ESA and JSA, as well 
as my own experiences as a street-level advisor. In so doing, the thesis makes an 
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original empirical contribution particularly with respect to its incorporation of 
both advisor and claimant experiences, of former advisors in particular, and in the 
auto-ethnographic treatment of my own experiences as a ‘complete member’ of 
the field. With respect to gathering data from former advisors, here the thesis 
makes an original contribution by enquiring into the limits and boundaries of this 
particular street-level field. 
Activation patterns 
In the following sections I would like to draw together some of the different 
argumentative threads which make their way through this thesis. These are 
thematic, but they also broadly reflect the preceding chapter structure. These 
themes are ‘street-level symptoms’, ‘obscure dynamics’, and ‘street-level fantasy’. 
In the first section I draw together the conclusions pertaining to the analysis of 
street-level advisors and their investments in the field, highlighting its significance 
for the way that street-level research understands matters of street-level practice. 
In the second section I draw together the arguments pertaining to the ‘obscure 
dynamics’ of street-level relations, pointing to the thesis’ contribution in terms of 
analysing some existing phenomenon in terms of their relational dynamics. 
Finally, the third section pulls together both the analysis of street-level symptoms 
and their obscure dynamics into the main argumentative stream of the thesis, 
which is the understanding of activation policy as a kind of fantasy and a magical 
thinking.  
Street-level symptoms 
One of the central claims of this thesis is that street-level actors ought not to be 
understood as either pre-formed ‘rational’ agents, responding to a calculus of 
choice (Brodkin, 2013c), or in terms of an integrated identity, of which their 
practice is the expression (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, 2003). Rather, this 
thesis argues that street-level actors themselves need to be understood as locations 
of conflict, tension, contradiction and division, and that attention to them as such 
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illuminates both the subjective experiences of street-level workers, but also the 
wider fabric of social relations (which are also relations of power) in which they 
are entangled.  The thesis enquired as to the ways that advisors become drawn to 
the activation field, the conflicts they faced within it, the ways they coped and 
negotiated with these conflicts, but also the ways they left the field and, 
consequently, to the field’s boundaries and limits.  
Overwhelmingly, advisors were drawn to and became invested in activation work 
through notions of help and helping others. These notions were, to different 
degrees, often imbued with paternalist inflections resonant with the ideological 
frameworks guiding formal activation and conditionality policy. Sometimes, 
however, advisors described coming to the role with quite vague notions and an 
ill-defined sense of what ‘help’ might mean, and here they were oriented by the 
nature of the work as they found it. Their definitions of help were shaped by their 
experiences of the field, through their perceptions of what their clients needed, but 
also in terms of how their employer defined these needs. These coincided, for 
different advisors, to different degrees.  
Despite the differences among advisors – as to how they perceived their role, and 
how they defined ‘help’ – the main tensions they experienced were often very 
similar (although accorded different kinds of meaning and significance).  These 
were the tensions between their idea of the role and of ‘helping’ clients; the need 
to meet monthly performance targets; and the work-first emphasis of conditional 
activation. These, in a way, describe different aims and objectives within the field – 
some of which were brought by advisors themselves, others which were more or 
less imposed on them (e.g. targets). Of these different aims, targets were, for all 
advisors, dominant. This was true both for those advisors who accepted and 
submitted to the target regime, seeing it as legitimate, and for those who resisted 
or rejected it. This dominance can be seen in the way that, of the different street-
level aims and objectives, only acceptance or acquiescence to the target regime 
could secure continued participation in the field. In a sense, then, advisors 
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experienced domination through targets; for some this operated in terms of 
symbolic domination (Bourdieu, 1991), where this regime shaped the way they 
conceptualised their role and practice; for others this regime was perceived to be 
illegitimate – although again, such a perception usually signalled an exit from the 
field in one way or another. The illegitimacy of targets was often the result of a 
perception that they were not only in tension with other important aims – such as 
helping clients – but in contradiction with them. The short-term emphasis on job 
outcomes, when combined with the regime of work-first conditionality, produced 
some of the most fraught dilemmas for those advisors who dissented from either 
aspect of the field; some perceived activation, in this form, to be a kind of weapon, 
blunt and unwieldy, and the cause of harm rather than help. This was especially 
the case with clients that advisors perceived to be either too unwell, or to have 
problems too complex, for the service to adequately address. 
These dilemmas and conflicts were dealt with in various ways. In particular, 
advisors could make use of the incentive systems operative within the field to 
pursue other ends – ends which enabled them to bring their actual activation 
practice into closer alignment with their conceptions, hopes for, or beliefs about 
the role (Lipsky, 2010). For example, the widely commented on practice of 
creaming and parking (Carter & Whitworth, 2015; Finn, 2011; Johnson, 2013; Rees 
et al., 2014), whilst on the one hand helping advisors to manage their caseload in 
order to meet performance targets, could also serve a second function in that it 
allowed them to ‘protect’ or ‘shelter’ those clients for whom they deemed the 
‘service’ to be unsuitable. Here, I have argued against a kind of managerial or 
monocausal view of such practices (as solely determined by calculative concerns, 
for example), in favour of viewing them symptomatically – which is to say, as the 
expression of various conflicts within the field, and as something, potentially, 
overdetermined. The analysis of such street-level symptoms requires attention to 
the meaning(s) they hold for those who participate in them. To view creaming and 
parking in terms of the allocation of resources is to adopt a (concealed) normative 
position vis-à-vis the value and meaning of those ‘resources’, as if the particular 
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form they take is not also situated, constrained and determined. Put simply, 
advisors did not always think their service was ‘good’ for everyone; sometimes 
this reflected their perception of what was realistic given the wider policy, labour 
market, and organisational contexts. Through this example, this research makes 
the wider point that in analysing street-level practices it is important to attend to 
the meanings these have for those involved in them.  
This is one example of the way that advisors coped with street-level conflict. 
However, the thesis also argues that the dilemmas and conflicts contained within 
the street-level field are also sometimes internalised by participants; here, coping, 
or the resolution of conflict, requires that advisors make more or less conscious 
adjustments to their dispositions and habitus. This is a form of coping which 
requires that street-level actors bring their subjective perceptions more into line 
with the sorts of practices that are required of them by the field (Bourdieu, 2000). In 
exploring this experience, the thesis made recourse to the psychoanalytic concepts 
of splitting, disavowal, and projection (Freud, 1991a; Hoggett, 2006; Klein, 1946), 
deployed in order to understand the psychosocial dynamics of street-level coping. 
Attention to such conflicts thus reveals more than the subjective experiences of 
advisors; it also reveals important relations of power operative within the field. 
Here, the thesis argues that managerial power is pre-eminent, and precludes 
advisors acting on perceptions of need which fall beyond the narrow scope set by 
conditional work-first activation. The effects of this power are clearly visible in the 
experiences of advisors who speak of becoming, or having to become, a different 
sort of person. The form of activation implicitly dictated through the operational 
focus on targets and outcomes is not simply work-first activation, but is also an 
authoritarian and paternalist form of activation. Advisors spoke of the pressure to 
become ‘harder’ or ‘tougher’ with their clients. No countervailing pressure to be 
‘softer’ or ‘more understanding’ was described; indeed, such positions were 
sometimes disparaged and denigrated by those on whom the role had a more 
secure hold. 
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Obscure dynamics 
If with respect to street-level practices this thesis argues that these be understood 
symptomatically, in terms of the meaning(s) they hold, then another important 
claim made by this thesis is that these meanings are not always conscious (Clarke 
& Hoggett, 2009). This is particularly important with respect to the arguments 
made in relation to claimants’ experiences of activation. The relations and forms of 
experience that policies of conditionality and activation produce are complex, and 
not reducible to the adjustment of incentives. There are clear material threats 
presented by conditionality, but these are often denied or disavowed, and so the 
operations of discipline, control, and power exercised through conditionality and 
sanctions are not always clearly expressed ‘surface’ or discursive phenomenon. In 
some instances conditionality and activation were accepted by claimants as 
legitimate, in others as illegitimate; this might be during the same interview. Here, 
the thesis argues that the experiences of conditionality and activation that 
claimants might present during a research encounter are likely to be highly 
determined by a range of contextual, situational factors (Rapley, 2001). Where the 
mandatory nature of activation means it is impossible to withdraw consent in 
practice without attracting punishment, likewise, it is also difficult to withdraw 
consent at a discursive level without attracting the penalty of stigma. Here the 
alignment of conditionality and activation with denigrating narratives about 
welfare dependency (Jensen, 2014; Jensen & Tyler, 2015; Shildrick & MacDonald, 
2013) redoubles the material power that the threat of sanctions introduces. 
However, even in cases where there is conscious consent and compliance, it is 
possible to discern that conditional activation might still exact a psychological cost 
on claimants.  
The thesis this research develops is that conditional work-first activation can take 
the form of a protection racket. That is, the regime of activation produces both the 
threat and the means of defence simultaneously; to the extent that there is 
compliance with the programme, this results from the need to protect oneself from 
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danger. As a dynamic relational form, this is a situation liable to produce various 
forms of conscious and unconscious dissembling. The thesis introduces and 
outlines the constituent features of this protection racket: the widespread 
suspicion and surveillance to which claimants are subject from the outset; the 
threat of material sanction but also of psychosocial penalty; the need to evidence 
their activity and, hence, eligibility or ‘deservingness’; and differential access to 
help and support with respect to providing such evidence of active deservingness. 
The thesis argues that where claimants consent to conditionality and activation, 
the threat posed by sanctions is often denied or disavowed; to the extent that they 
‘engage’ with the programme then this threat is not really meant for them. 
Activation allows claimants to disavow the threat that has been made to them, 
seeing it as really meant for other ‘bad’ claimants (cf: Shildrick & MacDonald, 
2013). The threats of conditionality can thus be contained, often by ‘good’ advisors 
(Hoggett, 2005; Lyth, 1988). Advisors are perceived to be good to the extent that 
they are understanding and helpful; however, notably this help often has to do 
with producing the forms of evidence that are required to forestall the material 
and psychological penalties of sanctions and stigma. Claimants who otherwise 
valued their advisors were nonetheless inclined to view them as ineffectual with 
respect to the explicit and official goals of activation: namely, helping someone 
return to work.  
In making these arguments the thesis draws on other established research on the 
agency of welfare subjects (Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 2004; Wright, 2016b), and on 
people’s coping mechanisms when subjected to denigration and stigmatisation as 
a result of class position and/or material circumstances: namely, practices of 
‘Othering’, (Lister, 2004; Shildrick & MacDonald, 2013) understood here in terms 
of splitting, disavowal, and projection. Where this thesis makes an original 
contribution is in situating such practices as part of the policy programme of 
conditionality and activation itself. These policies both work alongside but also 
enlist and enrol common ideological representations and narratives about 
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dependency; the programmes both act on and act through these representations. It 
is in this sense that the research develops the thesis that ‘activation’ is also the 
activation of stigma.  
Activation fantasy and street-level magic 
The different argumentative threads pursued throughout this thesis, from the 
symptomatic nature of street-level practice, to the sometimes obscure dynamics of 
activation, are grounded in a more central argument: what gets implemented, 
materialised, or enacted at street-level is not simply a policy, but also the fantasy 
on which this policy is based. It is in trying to enact and make this fantasy fit with 
various aspects of street-level reality that street-level symptoms and their 
sometimes obscure dynamics are produced. To the extent that adherence to this 
fantasy is required by the field, as a form of belief, then street-level activation 
programmes also become populated with their own peculiar forms of magical 
thinking. The point of such magical thinking is to reconcile various street-level 
contradictions and maintain the activation illusio. 
Street-level activation is, in many respects, a highly restricted form of intervention. 
As other scholars have argued (Bonoli, 2010; Clasen & Clegg, 2007), the form 
activation has taken in the UK is predominantly incentive reinforcement (through 
conditionality). Where, in other iterations, activation might include access to 
training, education, and other development opportunities, the work-first approach 
taken in the UK aims at more or less immediate labour market entry. Much of 
advisors’ activity revolves around increasing the intensity of job search, volume of 
applications, widening job goals (to include less-preferred types of work), and 
coaching people for interviews. Advisors do also perform a ‘signposting’ function, 
but the value of this role is clearly dependent on the wider ecology of services in 
which they are situated (as well as the inclination of advisors to undertake this 
sort of work when it does not yield formal recognition in terms of their targets). 
What activation aims to produce, then, is more competition and more competitive 
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job applicants (Peck, 2001) – not in the sense of better trained, qualified, or 
otherwise more preferentially positioned, but more competitive in an existential 
sense – where applicants, with whatever skills and competencies they already 
have (and whatever difficulties and disadvantages too) pursue whatever vacancies 
already exist with more energy, effort, and intensity.  
This situation does not, of itself, indicate the operations of fantasy. Here, the issue 
is not simply that activation is a form of ‘supply side’ intervention which targets 
only individuals (Lister, 1998; Serrano Pascual, 2001; Webster, 2006), or aims at the 
stimulation and intensification of competition (Peck, 2001; Wiggan, 2015)36; rather, 
the fantasy resides in the refusal to recognise the intervention as such and, 
therefore, the refusal to recognise its necessarily restricted and incomplete nature. 
This is a form of denial, and results in inflated and delusional claims made for the 
power of individual agency, belief, and will-power to effect changes to situations 
and circumstances which are, from a ‘common sense’ point of view as much as a 
social science one, also highly constrained and conditioned by a variety of factors 
that lie beyond the scope of individual agential capabilities. What is denied are the 
contexts of competition; the fact that people are differentially placed to compete; 
and, that the ‘outcomes’ of this sort of competition depend on much else besides 
the factors of ‘belief’ or ‘motivation’ to which they are nonetheless attributed.  
The activation fantasy is thus the notion that belief itself creates the job, and that 
interventions aimed at increasing ‘motivation’ and ‘belief’ are in themselves 
sufficient to address complex situations in which a variety of multi-level factors 
combine to produce any single individual predicament. It is also the notion that ‘a 
job’ is the solution to nearly every problem. The form this fantasy takes, at street-
                                               
36 For Wiggan (2015), what are sometimes regarded as the unintended consequences of such 
programmes and their design – e.g. creaming and parking – can be viewed, in critical political-
economic terms, as their purpose and function. Creaming and parking, for example, perform an 
important function in facilitating labour market segregation, and as such these programmes 
assist the functioning of an increasingly flexible labour market. Such links between street-level 
practice and its political-economic effects – that is, linking these levels of analysis – falls outside 
the scope of this thesis, but is one way in which this work might be developed.   
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level, is a kind of ‘magical voluntarism’ (Fisher, 2011; Smail, 2005) in which the 
context(s) of labour-market competition is/are effectively denied. This can be seen 
quite clearly in the way that the concept of ‘barriers to work’ is subverted in street-
level activation services, becoming the means for transforming any number of 
difficulties into individual subjective problems of attitude or belief. This is different 
from the pragmatic consideration of how a problem looks, and how it might be 
addressed, from an individual’s point of view. Viewing a problem from the 
perspective of a single individual also means admitting the existence of 
constraining factors, or things it is difficult to control. It might also mean 
admitting that there is no solution, and that a job might not be the best outcome to 
pursue. The activation fantasy of magical voluntarism insists that such 
considerations are excluded from the activation purview – and this applies to 
advisors, as much as to claimants. The insistence on the importance of various 
constraining factors – be they health problems, economic conditions, or the make-
up of a caseload – threatens the magic spell which activation programmes attempt 
to propagate; such forms of thinking, reasoning, or explanation are thus 
pathologised as excuses, and seen as part of the problem itself– here, naming the 
problem is seen as dwelling on the problem, and as a barrier to finding work.  
Elsewhere, this thesis has also referred to this fantasy as a kind of ‘anti-sociological 
imagination’ which actively seeks to sever individual biography from questions of 
history or social structure. As explored in Chapter Two, this kind of anti-
sociological imagination is found among some of the most influential proponents 
of anti-welfare discourse, and is arguably the undead élan vital animating the 
zombie concepts (Macdonald et al., 2014) of demoralisation and dependency to 
which the development of work-first conditional activation is indebted. This kind 
of imagination, or this kind of fantasy, does a real violence (Bourdieu, 1991; 
Graeber, 2012) to people when imposed on them at street-level; it blames them for 
their difficulties, insisting these be seen as the products of their subjective attitude, 
but it also creates the conditions for a social sadism in which the imposition of 
both material and psychological sanctions come to be seen as necessary – even 
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helpful – motivational tools rather than brutal deprivations and cruel 
punishments.  
Conclusion: the activation illusio and anti-sociological 
behaviour 
This thesis has argued that street-level activation services, grounded in a coercive 
conditionality, contrive to produce a kind of racket. For claimants, this is defined 
by the need to constantly evidence their ‘active’ deservingness, but without the 
guarantee that this will be recognised. From street-level advisors, the activation 
racket requires a form of belief and investment which prohibits the full recognition 
and articulation of the inevitable difficulties they and their clients face. As such, 
the thesis has drawn attention to the way that street-level activation services foster 
different forms of denial, ignorance, and magical thinking.  
Nevertheless, the thesis also offers a glimpse into some of the ways in which 
advisors can, and have, struggled against the imperatives of conditional 
activation, or sought to redefine the activation illusio from within. In particular, the 
calculative necessity of ‘parking’ some claimants can be used as a means of 
shielding them from the full coercive force of activation. However, in so far as 
those who struggled in this way were often also advisors who became 
disillusioned and left the field, then the picture this thesis presents is of a highly 
constrained and controlled street-level space. Some of those inclined to struggle in 
this way also described their eventual acquiescence to the more authoritarian and 
paternalistic requirements of their role, achieved through the discipline of targets, 
and their own experiences of insecurity. As Brokdin (2011a) argues, the (quasi) 
marketised governance and managerial dominance of such street-level spaces 
means that street-level advisors are perhaps less free to exercise discretion or 
determine the meaning of their role than might have previously been the case.   
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It is for this reason that Brodkin (2013c, 2013d) argues that street-level spaces are 
important locations for the mediation of both policy and politics. Whilst at the 
level of political rhetoric the development of conditional activation has advanced 
under the banner of various pairings – rights and responsibilities, obligations and 
opportunities, sanctions and support – the street-level organisation of such 
programmes has tended to produce a specific set of emphases. Surveying the 
broader international activation landscape, she argues that ‘governance and 
managerial reforms appear to be quietly shifting street-level practices away from 
social support and investment and toward greater social regulation’(Brodkin, 
2013b, p. 280). This thesis supports such an interpretation in the British context. In 
so doing, it also shows how an ostensibly ‘balanced’ rhetoric of rights and 
responsibilities, sanctions and support, would obscure the ways that these work 
together to produce particular effects. In conditional activation what passes for 
‘support’ does not stand distinct from a regulatory or disciplinary logic, but is put 
to regulatory and disciplinary use. Conditional activation involves the (further) 
subsumption of whatever ‘social support’ functions may exist under a broader 
regulatory and disciplinary regime. As such the political rhetoric of rights and 
responsibilities, obligations and opportunities, sanctions and support, by holding 
these terms apart, obscures the way that a practical emphasis on the former does, 
in practice, undermine people’s sense of a claim to the latter. In people’s everyday 
experiences of conditional activation, so-called ‘support’ cannot be separated from 
the ever-present threat of sanction. Moreover, in many of the instances from this 
research, ‘support’ is defined by clients in terms of the assisted avoidance of 
sanctions – that is, by a particular need created by conditional activation itself – 
rather than a more expansive sense of their needs, rights, hopes and entitlements. 
In this way, the marketised governance and managerial dominance of street-level 
activation helps to achieve a more punitive, paternalist, and authoritarian version 
of these policies than might otherwise be politically palatable (Brodkin, 2013b, p. 
280).  
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In keeping with the thesis’ conceptualisation of the street-level space of activation 
in terms of field and habitus, its limits and limitations can be identified in similar 
terms. I was unable, during the course of fieldwork, to gain access to or recruit 
participants from Jobcentre Plus, and although claimants were able to offer their 
perspectives and experiences of this particular space within the broader activation 
field, further research might seek to explore the experiences of its staff. In 
particular, data gathered from these public-sector workers would offer the 
opportunity to apply and further develop the thesis’ conceptual framework and 
associated theme of street-level investments and disinvestments (in terms of illusio 
and disillusionment), with the possibility of comparing these across public and 
contracted-out services.  Also missing from this research are the accounts of those 
who, having passed through activation services, have subsequently stopped 
claiming benefits and entered work. Similarly, whilst the thesis drew on 
participant accounts of their journeys into and out of the field, this might be more 
systematically developed in future research design. There is something inherently 
‘longitudinal’ about some kinds of benefit claim, and in so far as behavioural 
conditionality can be defined as the ‘ongoing’ regulation of benefit receipt (Clasen 
& Clegg, 2007), then research that follows these trajectories might offer different 
perspectives and insights to those gathered here. However, emerging evidence 
from recent research adopting such an approach (looking at claimants’ 
experiences) presents a complementary picture to the one developed here, 
particularly with respect to the production of uncertainty and insecurity (see: 
Patrick, 2017). 
Here it should also be mentioned that some of these omissions were less the 
product of design than of the not insignificant difficulties encountered when 
negotiating access with relevant agencies and organisations. The period in which 
this research was conducted was one in which the effects of both austerity and a 
harsher welfare regime were increasingly coming into public view. During this 
period, the more overtly coercive and punitive features of mandatory activation 
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meant that these programmes, and the organisations which deliver them, became 
the subject of greater media scrutiny and some popular forms of opposition. Some 
participants who had worked at higher and managerial levels within provider 
organisations suggested that political (and commercial) sensitivities might have 
had something to do with my difficulties negotiating and gaining access. On the 
one hand, such difficulties with gatekeepers are perhaps to be expected, and might 
be seen as important but tangential to this research itself. On the other hand, such 
difficulties might also be interpreted as important information about the street-
level field, and indications of where certain forms of power reside. Similar 
research has, in the past, had much less difficulty negotiating access to Jobcentre 
Plus in particular (Wright, 2003b), where the relevant gate keeping powers lay 
with local managers at street-level. My own attempts to negotiate access to several 
street-level locations rather indicated that this form of power – to either grant or 
deny access – now resides at higher managerial levels.  
This further illustrates an important theme of the thesis, one which points away 
from street-level spaces upwards, towards those more powerful participants in the 
activation field who are able to shape the contractual and managerial form that 
street-level activation work takes. Marketised governance and its associated 
managerial regime dominated the working lives of the street-level activation 
workers studied here, and in this sense it would seem plausible that this particular 
street-level space is more constrained and subject to greater oversight than those 
of the past (Brodkin, 2012). On this point, the thesis speaks not only to the street-
level literature, but also to the broader literature on neoliberalism, and its 
ideological and practical effects (see Chapter Two). Widely identified as fostering 
highly individualised and competitive forms of subjectivity (Layton, 2010, 2014; 
Read, 2009), the ideological form taken by neoliberalism in street-level activation 
services is one which denies the salience of social and economic structures, their 
effects, and the constraints they place on individual agency. This I have described 
in terms of ‘magical voluntarism’, an important feature of the activation illusio. 
This illusio involves a specific anti-sociological imaginary, as well as notions of the 
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street-level helping situation which rest on social fantasies about a dependent and 
demoralised underclass. Here it should be noted that not all advisors felt able to 
accommodate themselves to this form of activation; it was in their struggles with 
different aspects of the street-level illusio that some advisors became disillusioned 
with the role. Others found themselves having to alter their conceptions and 
preconceptions, bringing them more into line with those required by the field. In 
this sense, then, the activation illusio and the ideology of magical voluntarism are 
not the spontaneous product of street-level advisors’ subjectivity, but are to some 
extent selected for by the organisational and managerial form of activation, and 
also, to varying degrees, imposed on advisors by the field. For these reasons, then, 
it is worth asking where else this illusio might originate, and whose investments, 
fantasies, and imaginaries it more comfortably reflects. As Wright (2012) argues, 
the academic and social policy literature has by now paid a great deal of attention 
to the agency of benefit recipients, ‘and, to a lesser extent, front-line workers, but 
has largely overlooked the motivation and behaviour of more powerful social 
actors, such as policy-makers and employers’ (Wright, 2012, p. 310). In 
contributing to the literature on front-line workers, and in pointing to the ways 
that they are themselves dominated and subject to forms of disciplinary power, 
this thesis further strengthens the case for directing future attention to the 
behaviours – but also the investments, fantasies, and imaginaries – of these more 
powerful others.  
There is another reason why it might be important to understand the behaviour of 
more powerful policy actors along these lines. If it is customary in applied fields to 
highlight the significance of a piece of research for both policy and practice, then 
this thesis confronts a particular difficulty. In Chapter Two the thesis drew 
attention to the way that policy-making in this area has, despite well-founded 
theoretical and empirical critique, continued to rely on myths and moral panics 
about the underclass, cultures of dependency, the demoralised and the deactivated 
claimant. In this area, the disjuncture between academic argument and policy 
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development seems stark. There is, of course, also political disagreement amongst 
the academic community, and there is by no means a consensus regarding the 
activation agenda. However, it is also true that the strength of academic analysis, 
opposition, and critique has not, during the period in which the policy measures 
studied here have developed, had equivalent expression at an executive political 
level. As such, at various points during the research, not least when tracing the 
intertwined developments of activation, marketisation, and their associated 
academic commentary, it has sometimes seemed that making yet one more appeal 
to evidence – particularly the evidence of experience – risks becoming something 
of a ritual gesture, and a quixotic one at that. What use is either argument or 
evidence, after all, if they are to be ignored by those to whom they are ostensibly 
addressed? If there is denial, disavowal, and ignorance at street-level, then it is 
perhaps worth asking to what extent this is the implementation of denials, 
disavowals, and forms of ignorance which arise elsewhere. If, as this thesis has 
argued, the activation illusio is also a kind of fantasy, then whose fantasy is this, 
and what social conditions, investments, and material practices make it possible?  
More than this or that discrete reform to conditionality, or to the organisation of 
street-level activation services, this thesis rather suggests the need for a radical 
reimagining, not only of what this policy area currently accomplishes, but what it 
might aim to accomplish in the future, and the sort of assumptions, evidence, or 
demands on which this ought to be based. Whilst the picture presented here, 
especially in earlier contextual chapters, is of a field operating with a constrained, 
atrophied, and narrowly ideological imaginary, there are also, at the margins and 
peripheries, signs of renewal and reinvigoration, most notably with respect to 
emerging discussions around the feasibility and desirability of a universal (or 
unconditional) basic income – a policy which, with respect to conditionality, 
represents the most radical departure imaginable – and this widening of horizons 
is to be welcomed (for recent advocacy, discussion, and critique see: Blix, 2017; 
Fisher & Gilbert, 2014; Sage & Diamond, 2017; Srnicek & Williams, 2015). In 
paying close attention to everyday practices, local meanings, and lived 
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experiences, this thesis has at various points drawn attention to the way that 
certain key policy assumptions and terms are either more ambiguous and 
ambivalent than they might first appear (creaming and parking), or are, in other 
cases, little more than rhetorical vacuities or obfuscations, devoid of consistent or 
meaningful content (‘support’). Here the thesis demonstrates the critical value of 
cleaving closely to the form and texture of life at street-level, and of qualitative, 
interpretive, and street-level approaches for the wider field of social policy 
research.  However, in seeking a different course (and given the political 
uncertainties of the present moment, and the opportunities these might present) 
then perhaps such methods might also serve a different generative or imaginative 
purpose. If ‘activation’ is a kind of fantasy imposed on both street-level employees 
and claimants, then it is also true that this imposition is not always successful, is 
sometimes rejected or resisted, and that such ‘services’ are not always experienced 
as welcome forms of help or assistance. In these cases, a generative form of street-
level research might take inspiration from participatory approaches to policy 
research (Beresford, 2016) and ask the question (of those who work in them, or are 
subject to them and must use them) of how these policies and services might be 
imagined differently.  
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Appendix A: claimant sample 
Name Current conditional 
benefit (other recent 
benefit) 
Current activation 
programme (other 
recent programme) 
Jill JSA Work Programme (JCP) 
Maria JSA Work Programme (JCP) 
Michelle JSA Work Programme (JCP) 
Paul JSA (IS) Work Programme (JCP) 
Elizabeth JSA (IS) Work Programme (JCP) 
Sam JSA Work Programme (JCP) 
Gregg JSA Work Programme (JCP) 
Frank JSA Work Programme (JCP) 
Sybil ESA Work Programme (JCP) 
Bridget JSA (ESA) Community Work 
Placement 
(JCP, Work Programme) 
Stephanie JSA (ESA) Community Work 
Placement 
(Work Programme) 
David JSA (ESA) JCP 
Adam ESA Support Group JCP 
Sarah ESA Support Group (?) 
(JSA) 
JCP 
Melissa ESA WRAG JCP (Work Programme) 
Lisa JSA JCP 
Figure 1 - Claimant Sample 
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Appendix B: interview prompts (advisors) 
About their work and job role (general) 
a. advisors 
To start perhaps you could tell me a little bit about your background, how you got 
involved in welfare-to-work? What different roles did you do? How did you come 
to leave that role? 
Could you help me to understand the nature of the work you did – what did your 
job entail, what did an average day look like? 
What kinds of clients were you working with? What kinds of barriers did they 
have? 
What did you do about the barriers?  
Did you do any kinds of group work? What did this involve? 
Did the work involve any particular dilemmas or challenges? What were they? 
How did you feel about the job? Is there anything you found particularly 
enjoyable about your work? Is there anything you found unpleasant or difficult? 
How did other people feel about their jobs? 
 
b. for managers 
When did you become a manager? On what contracts? Can you talk about how 
being a manager differed from being an advisor? 
What was the nature of the work of being a manager? What did your job entail, 
what did an average day look like? 
Who did you manage? What was your relationship with them? What was your 
role, with respect to advisors? 
Did you have any contact with clients? How? 
Did being a manager entail any particular dilemmas and challenges? What were 
they? 
How did you feel about this role? Was they anything you found particularly 
enjoyable or difficult? 
 
About the way that they are managed/supervised/appraised: 
 
a. advisors 
Did being an employment advisor suit you? In what ways? 
How were you assessed and appraised?  
What kind of relationship was there between managers and advisors? What kind 
of contact did you have with management? Did they offer any advice/support? In 
what way?  
How was your performance measured? How was your performance managed?  
What targets did you have? Apart from targets, what other things were important 
to doing the job? How were these assessed? 
Were the targets realistic/achievable? Why/why not?  
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Did you always meet target? How did you make sure you met target? Why did 
you not meet your target? What happened if you didn’t meet your target? 
How did you feel about the targets?  (in general, when you met them, when you 
didn’t…) 
How did other people feel about targets?  
 
b. manager 
Did being a manager suit you? In what ways? How was it different? 
How were you assessed and apprised as a manager? 
What kind of relationship did you have with a. advisers and b. senior managers? 
What kinds of advice and support did you offer? What did you receive? 
Did you have targets? How did targets affect you? Were they realistic, achievable? 
How did you feel about being a manager? How did you feel towards advisers? 
Towards senior managers? What happened when people didn’t meet targets? 
 
About their work with clients: 
How did you feel about one-to-one work with clients? 
How were the clients with you? (can you elaborate on the differences, give 
examples) 
What kinds of help/support did you offer? (Was it mainly practical – if so what? 
Or was it emotions, psychological, something else? How?) 
Did you ever sanction someone? In what circumstances? How did you feel about 
it?  
What is it like to sanction someone? What do you think about sanctions in the 
benefit system? 
Did clients show/talk to you about how they are feeling? What kinds of emotions 
do clients bring to their appointments with you? (positive, negative, etc.) 
How did you present yourself to clients? Did you try present yourself in a 
particular way? How? 
Were all clients required to come and see you? What were the requirements of the 
programme? How did clients feel about the (mandatory) requirements? What did 
you think/feel about the mandatory requirements? 
How did clients feel about the appointments? 
What made for a job ready client? 
 
Administration 
Did you have to do any administrative/recording tasks? What were they? Can you 
give some examples? What were their purposes? 
 
Beliefs 
What were the main reasons why people were claiming benefits? 
In general, what are the main reasons for people being unemployed? What are the 
main reasons why people claim benefits? 
What do you think about the level at which benefits are set? 
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Was there (is there) a job for everyone? 
Why are some people out of work?  
What do you think about the conditions attached to claiming benefits? 
What is a good way to support people who are unemployed/claiming benefits? 
Are welfare-to-work programmes doing a good job? How so? 
 
Reflections 
How do/did you describe this job to other people? 
How do you feel about your involvement in welfare-to-work?  
There has been a lot of controversy about some aspects of welfare-to-work, 
especially around sanctions. How do you feel about this? What are the reasons for 
it, do you think? 
 
Probing: 
What did/does that mean to you? 
What difference does it make? 
What was/is that like? 
How did/does that make you feel? 
What did you mean by _________? 
Can you tell me a little more about ________? 
How did/does that make you feel? 
Can you tell me more about your thinking on that? 
I’m not sure I understood what you meant by ____. Can you say a little bit more 
about it? 
You mentioned ______. Can you say more, what stands out in your mind about it? 
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Appendix C: interview prompts (claimants) 
About their situation: 
To start perhaps you could tell me about your background and situation. How did 
you come to be here today? 
When did you start claiming? Do you go to the Work Programme provider, or just 
the Jobcentre? 
Could you help me to understand more about what happens when you come here 
– what does this service do for you? 
How does coming here make you feel about your situation / claiming JSA / finding 
work? 
I’d like to understand more about the different kinds of feelings you have about 
using this service? Are you able to talk more about how you feel about [agency 
name]? 
 
About using the service and relation to advisers. 
Are there any things that work well for you about the service? Or are there any 
things that you would change?  
What makes for a good adviser, do you think? 
What do you think the people here/the agency want from you/want you to do?  
What kind of relationship(s) / interactions do you have with your advisor(s) and 
staff here?  
How does the staff here feel about you, do you think? 
How was your appointment today? What is the reason you came here? 
What happened in today’s appointment? / How did you feel about that 
appointment? 
Prompts – based on observed interactions/moments. 
 
Conditionality 
What kinds of things are made mandatory? 
How are they checked? 
What happens if you haven’t done them? 
How do you avoid having problems with your claim? 
Have you had any problems with your claim? 
Do you know people who have had problems with their claim? 
 
Politics and Involvement in activism around welfare 
How did you get involved in activism around welfare? 
What are your thoughts about the way things are going? 
What do you think should be done/done differently? Is this possible? 
Why do you think things are done the way they are? 
Feelings 
How does the process make you feel? 
How do you think it makes other people feel? 
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What do you think advisers feel? 
 
The process of claiming 
Could you help me understand more about the process of claiming? 
How do you first claim? 
What happens when you go to Job Centre Plus? Work Programme office? 
What is it like inside the Jobcentre? How is it organised? Do you have to wait? For 
how long? 
How do people treat you/talk to you?  
What are the security guards for?  
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